List, John: Thank you for your clear exposition of your views. Better than most.
Never the less, I find the assertion: > The usual reason beauty and truth are taken to be teleological terms is that > they are values. They can’t be given a purely descriptive definition that > doesn’t require empirical justification. to be a bit of an over statement. As with the concept of identity, these terms are given to us at such a level that extension to a class seems rather difficult. My experience suggests to me that your facile notion of extension to the class of "values" cheapens the meaning that I would attribute to these terms. For example, keeping my shoes polished and choosing what color of shirt to wear express my values. Your further assertion: > The inability to define truth has been known for some time (it leads to > paradoxes). I can provide references if you need. suggests that the science of chemistry generates paradoxes. Could you provide the examples you have in mind? Crisp examples would require that your examples are expresses in terms of the chemical symbol system as a class of values. Please keep in mind that the examples must include the values of the atomic numbers. Cheers Jerry On Sep 28, 2014, at 5:51 AM, John Collier wrote: > Jerry, List, > > The usual reason beauty and truth are taken to be teleological terms is that > they are values. They can’t be given a purely descriptive definition that > doesn’t require empirical justification. That means that they can’t be given > nontrivial definitions. The inability to define truth has been known for some > time (it leads to paradoxes). I can provide references if you need. For > beauty, suppose that I claim that beauty is harmony, and don’t mean this > trivially to mean that I will use the words in the same way, and that I claim > harmony is a descriptive property. My claim would be open to various possible > empirical counterexamples (dissonance used in contemporary music, for > example). Peirce, of course, thought that both were values. > > This isn’t quite enough, since someone might be able to recognize truth or > beauty, but not value it. Peirce argues, though, that if you want to pursue > inquiry, then you must pursue truth, so there is a hypothetical imperative, > not a categorical one. In Peirce’s article, The Fixation of Belief, he offers > the method of stubbornly holding on to what you believe, but you can do this > only if you (at least implicitly) don’t value truth. I doubt very much that > one can legitimately hold that truth and beauty are required by reason alone > to be valued (though many have claimed that), but this doesn’t mean that they > are not values. I may not value hatching eggs, but I can easily recognize > that it is in the nature of eggs to be hatched, and that it is a value for > eggs. Likewise, it is only in the context that truth an beauty are recognized > as values (something to be pursued, and end) that they can be fully > understood, hypothetically, as it were. > > John > > From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] > Sent: September 28, 2014 6:05 AM > To: Stephen C. Rose > Cc: Peirce-L > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6912] Re: Natural Propositions, > > Stephen: > > You simply state: > Beauty and truth are teleological terms > I wonder why. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > On Sep 26, 2014, at 1:05 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: > > > Beauty and truth are teleological terms and valuable as objectives that > continuity heads toward and fallibility clouds. > > @stephencrose > > On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > Stefan, all, > > I think that there's much to be said for your suggestion of our jettisoning > 'truth' and replacing it with 'knowledge', at least in science. There are, I > believe, strong hints of this notion in Peirce as well, for example, here: > > When our logic shall have paid its devoirs to Esthetics and the Ethics, it > will be time for it to settle down to its regular business. That business is > of a varied nature; but so far as I intend in this place to speak of it, it > consists in ascertaining methods of sound reasoning, and of proving that they > are sound, not by any instinctive guarantee, but because it can be shown by > the kinds of reasoning already considered, especially the mathematical, of > one class of reasonings that they follow methods which, persisted in, must > eventually lead to the truth in regard to those problems to which they are > applicable, or, if not to the absolute truth, to an indefinite approximation > thereto, while in regard to another class of reasonings, although they are so > insecure that no reliance can be placed upon them, it will be shown in a > similar way that yet they afford the only means of attaining to a > satisfactory knowledge of the truth, in case this knowledge is ever to be > attained at all, doing so by putting problems into such form that the former > class of reasonings become applicable to them. This prospectus of how I am to > proceed is sufficient to show that there can be no ground of reasonable > complaint that unwarranted assumptions are made in the course of the > discussion. Nothing will be assumed beyond what every sincere and intelligent > person will and must confess is perfectly evident and which, in point of > fact, is not really doubted by any caviller (CP2.200, emphasis added). > > These hints follow naturally from the principle of fallibility, and from the > knowledge that pragmatism is offered by Peirce as but a method of > asymptotically approaching the truth of any matter being inquired into, the > communities of scientists correcting errors along the way. Still, on the way > to scientific knowledge societies may discover laws invaluable for developing > tools of at least potential value to humanity and to the earth and its > inhabitants, for example, the technologies which led to the development of > the internet or, my personal favorite, modern plumbing. > > That we can misuse these tools and technologies, and do so today as we have > throughout human history, is an ethical matter (quite distinct from the > ethics of scientific inquiry which Peirce addresses). > > Best, > > Gary > > > > . > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > C 745 > 718 482-5690 > > On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 5:52 AM, sb <peirc...@semiotikon.de> wrote: > > Ben, Garys, list, > > seems i took some things down the wrong pipe (see my post to Gary). There is > not much in what you say that I'd disagree with. But there is still the > truth-problem, but maybe this is just a problem of labeling. > > For me truth has no little errorbars, but i'm apodictic here like "god > doesn't throw dices". What is true now, can't be false later. Yes, truth is > not changeable. And we don't have this truth. > > But by introducing the "distincton between opinion and true opinion" it seems > to me you are trying to reintroduce truth under a new flag. Something is true > or not true, do we know with absolute certainty that something is true or not > true? No, we can't and therefore you have to introduce the errorbars. But > errorbars and truth don't fit together, something is true or not and not > possibly-maybe-a-little -less-than-true. Samples can have errorbars but not > truth and hence true opinion as something actual existent doesn't seem sound > to me. > > This Foucault quote shows the paradox "Mendel said the truth but he wasn't > within the biological truth of his time" you are already adressing. Now > exchange Mendel with Newton. Is Newtons mechanics true or false? Hmm, i would > say neither, it works under certain circumstances. So yes, inquiry can be > succesful! In this little example we had three meanings of truth: as actual > opinion, truth as better viable opinion and truth as true opinion at the end > of all time. > > That's the reason why i wouldn't use truth and opinion as opposites. I belief > the better distinction is knowledge and opinion like the greece doxa and > episteme. Important is wether you can give a sound justification for your > belief or not. Knowledge is justified belief and opinion unjustified belief. > > Is there much difference between what you and i said except not using the > word "truth"? > > Best > Stefan > > > P.S.: Introducing the errorbars into this topic is problematic, because it > assumes bayesian statistics. But yes it is important to argue for the > reasonableness of a knowledge claim and to point at possible shortcomings but > this just means to justify. > > > Stefan, Gary R., Gary F., list, > > I'm not sure how much there is in what you say that I'd disagree with. > > I'd point out that I wasn't attempting to describe social influences on > research in real depth, but just to indicate that I believe that they exist > and that I had given them at least a little thought. > > "Light pseudo-hallucinatory fun" was just my way of referring to fanciful fun > in the mind. I wasn't jumping to the end of "the long run" or of sufficient > investigation except in that sense in which every one of us does in asserting > a proposition, making a declarative statement. To assert a proposition is to > say that anybody who _were_ to investigate it far enough _would_ find it to > be true. Note the conditional modal 'would' as per Peirce's repeated > formulation of truth as the end of inquiry. > > All this idea of truth as _only_ at the end of the longest run, as attainable > _only_ by a perfect sign incorporating all possible perspectives at the end > of all times, goes against Peirce's idea that inquiry can succeed without > taking forever or almost forever. When you think that you've reached the > truth about something, then you think that your actual opinion coincides with > the final opinion that would be reached by sufficient investigation. That > final opinion to which sufficient research would be destined is not affected > by any person's or group's actual opinion. The idea of the final opinion is a > way of defining truth pragmatically in relation to investigation. You can't > have absolute theoretical certainty that your actual opinion coincides with > the final opinion that would be reached; but you can have strong reasons to > think that it does. But even then, being scientifically minded, you would not > _define_ the truth as yours or anybody's actual opinion. > > Now, statisticians add error bars to their graphs. One way, pointed out by > Peirce, to close a suspected gap between actual opinion and the ideal final > opinion is for one's actual opinion to include a confession of its own > possible error, its being merely plausible, or likely, or whatever, so that, > in asserting your opinion, you're asserting that anybody who were to > investigate far enough would find it likely that such-and-such is the case; > or even that anybody who were to investigate far enough would find it likely > that anybody who were to investigate far enough would find it likely that > such-&-such is the case. > > The proposition that I asserted was that conflating the ideas of truth and > opinion, making them the same thing in the mind, leads, like by having a > drink or a toke or both, to fanciful fun in the mind, the thought of somehow > having one's cake and eating it too, for example, some idea of people's > conflicting opinions/truths as involving conflicting realities, various > actual worlds, somehow intersecting, maybe in a somewhat magical way like in > an old _Dr. Strange_ comic book. But maybe I'm wrong. Maybe some people never > get any pleasurable sensation out of it at all. > > The distinction between opinion and truth, which can also be formulated as > the distincton between opinion and true opinion, is one that Peirce certainly > held with; he strongly opposed James's idea of changeable truths. Peirce held > that opinions, propositions, etc., can be true and can be false. He did not > believe that truths can be false. > > Sometimes it is hard to arrive at a firm conclusion about which opinion is > true, and sometimes something that one firmly believed turns out false, it > feels as if one's truth turned out to be false. As Robert Creeley wrote > somewhere, "What I knew / wasn't true". That doesn't make the truth-opinion > distinction spurious. But there won't be a 'constructive' definition of truth > from philosophy that will empower philosophy to hand out warrants of truth, > validity, soundness, etc., to particular conclusions claimed by researchers > in the special sciences. > > I certainly agree that it is good to approach the object from multiple > perspectives. The idea of convergence is not just the idea of one person > approaching every more closely to the truth from a single direction, but also > of various researchers converging from various starting points (and > zigzagging too) till things fit together like in a crossword puzzle, as Haack > said. > > Best, Ben > > On 9/24/2014 8:36 AM, sb wrote: > Ben, Gary, R., Gary F., > > i've got to start from the end of your post. You speak of the society > "rewarding diciplines" and this sheds a light on your idea of sociology in > this discussion. Your sociology consists of conscious actors who reward, > strive for power, wealth or status. This is more a rational choice approach > which is not the thing i was trying to hint at with my Fleck example. And > thats also not the thing sociology of knowlede is interested in. It's about > the knowledge underlying societal habits. There are so many things we take > for granted and we should explore why we (did) take them for granted. And > this not only the case in society it is also the case in the sciences. > > Why did microbiologist search for syphillis in the blood? They searched there > because for centuries it was taken for granted that there is something like > "syphillitic blood". Was it possible to reproduce the results? No, it was > almost impossible to stabilize the results. Nowadays we would stop > researching with results like this. But they kept on trying and trying until > Wassermann found a way to stabilize the experiment. Why did the retry and > retry? Because it was clear that it had to be there! > > The snake example: The snake example is so trivial and easy to understand > that we don't have to discuss it. Yes, it bites you -> you are dead in > tradtion A or B. There is no incompatiblity. But this is not a real world > example of a living science. Sciences are complex, they consist of > assumptions, crafting in the lab/the field, cognitive training etc.. They are > much more than the simple "if A then B" of logic. Much knowledge and training > is needed to come to the point where one can write down a proposition like > "if A then B". > > Nobody doubts that when you do exactly the same as another person that the > same will happen. "Experiences whose conditions are the same will have the > same general characters". But since scientific paradigms are such complex > structures it is not an easy task to create the same conditions. You think > its easy, just go to a lab and try to re-cook a Wassermann-test! You say > opinion and truth are not the same thing. Yes, sure ,but how should we deal > with the idea of the syphillitic blood? Is it opinion or truth? They found it > in the blood! And the idea to find it in the blood is certainly a cultural > import into science. > > But there are different Problems: a) Can there be different truths about one > object of investigation b) are there cultural imports into science that > influences the content of science and not only the organizational context of > research. What is organizational context? Org. context is for me all the > stuff you named: funding, rewarding, strive for power, money etc.. An > influence on the content instead is everything which is part of the "how we > see the object" of investigation. > > Karl Mannheim uses in "Ideology and Utopia" a good metaphor. He says that we > can look at a object from different perspectives and objectivation is for him > to take different positions relative to the object. Trying to investigate the > object beyond this is an absurdity like seeing without perspective. > > You distinct between opinion and truth. Do you have the truth? No you don't, > like i don't. We both have beliefs we are willing to put on test. But when > you write somthing like: > > "Conflating opinion with truth seems to produce some light > pseudo-hallucinatory fun, at least that has been my consistent experience > since I was a teenager (as I said I do look at other perspectives). It's the > fun of absurdity. Yet, to build a theory on the acceptance of that conflation > is to build on broken logic, inquiry with its bones broken, inquiry more > susceptible than ever to social manipulation, inquiry less likely than ever > to be fruitful." > > it seems to me that you have the truth and you are able to destinct between > pseudo-hallucinations and non-hallucinations. You talk like you are one of > those who has left the cave and reached the light. Ben, i don't really > insinuate this, because it was written by you in the heat of the moment. We > are not far away from each other, but nonetheless this paragraph shows we are > still standing on different sides of a water devide. There is a hair between > us. My impression is you are trying to pull the long-run-perspective on truth > into the now to safe some kind of non-perspective-truth in science. > > Now, truth is for me a perfect sign which incorporates all possible > perspectives on an object. But we will be there only at the end of all times. > As long as we are not there we only have beliefs we are willing to act upon. > And as long we have not reached the all-perspectives-mode we take in > positions on objects and phenomena that are influenced by our societal > position, tradtions and our culture. The point is now that modern science > with its non-prespective-truth tries to erase these influences in its > representation. Part of this strategy is to make influences, where the > cleaning has not been finished, to exceptions or to reduce the cultural > influences to failed knowledge. > Just take insulin shock therapy. How was it possible that psychic ill were > tortured that way? It was only possible in a certain culture of medicine. A > culture where a real phycicist had to cut or give drug. But psychatrist > didn't have these instruments and so they were inferior to real phycicist. > That's the reason why they were so eager to use insulin shocks, because when > they used it they were real phycicists. > Look at nazi science. It is widley branded as pseudo-science to clean science > from this era. But there were nazi scientists whose experiments would hold > our standards today. But people say: Huh, in the greater part it was pseudo > science. Yes, so what? Just think of Feynmans great "Cargo Cult Science", it > shows that a lot of science today is pseudo. How was nazi science possible? > It was a child of nazi germany. > Take the scientific revolution. Where did the knowledge of the scientific > revolution come from like Steven Shapin asks? The "new scientists" laughed > about the scholastics who discussed "how many angels can dance on top of a > needle", but the logic of the new scientists grounded on the work of > scholastics. In the field of chemistry the techniques of the bench work > stemmed from alchemy. Newton himself was an alchemist. > All three examples are examples of the cleaning strategy. > > But back to the two problems: a) Can there be different truths about one > object of investigation? b) Are there cultural imports into science that > influence the content of science? > > Ad a): No, this is not possible. If there are two truths about one object, > then it is due to different perspectives. But since the perspectives are > different there are not the same conditions and hence not the same > conclusions. But within one perspective the results are intersubjective and > reproducable. > Ad b) Yes, there are such imports and there are less dramatic examples than > those mentioned above. From my study time i knew at last 6 different soil > classifications. I googled it now and found out there are even more and that > pedologist have lost every confidence that there ever will be a universal > classification. If you look at the classification you will reckon they are > dependent on the soil usage and engeneering techniques. But these both vary > greatly with different cultures. > > But pedology, physics or chemistry are not the main battle field. We find > examples there, they are insteresting and shed a light on the cleaning > practices, but they are not of vital importance. Like Foucault identified it, > the main battle field is anthropology. There are everywhere cultural and > ideological components in the content of the sciences arround anthropology. > And that is the reason why people in the 60ies and 70ies read his historical > investigations, which ended in the 19th century, as critiques of the then > contemporary psychatry, medicine and criminology. He showed what was > implicitly taken for granted and people didn't like to see that. > All of this hasn't something to do with fallibilism. Fallibilism works only > in one perspective, the tertium non datur works only in one perspective. It > has to do with pluralism and the possibility of other world views. And > therefore it is a legitimate endeavour to search for traces of culture, > tradition, ideology within the content of sciences. They are not free of > them. Its like Fleck writes in "Wissenschaftstheoretische Probleme": "It is > an extraordinary interesting thing, how far scholars who dedicate their whole > life to destinct hallucinations from reality, are unable to destinct their > own dreams about science from the true form of science". > > > Best > Stefan > > > > > > Stefan, Gary F., list, > > I was indeed addressing the snakebite example, just not mentioning it by > name. If two traditions, two people, two of anything, arrive at incompatible > conclusions about snakebites, then at most one of their conclusions is true. > That's what "incompatible conclusions" means. It doesn't take Peircean > semiotics or pragmatism to see it, it's elementary definitions and logic. > > I haven't ever argued or believed that judgments, that two given traditions' > conclusions are incompatible, are infallible. I haven't ever argued or > believed that society does not influence, help, or hinder inquiry, or > contribute to focusing it in some directions rather than others. This sort of > thing will result in society's influencing the opinions that result from > actual inquiry. > > But opinion and truth are not the same thing. > > Conflating opinion with truth seems to produce some light > pseudo-hallucinatory fun, at least that has been my consistent experience > since I was a teenager (as I said I do look at other perspectives). It's the > fun of absurdity. Yet, to build a theory on the acceptance of that > conflation is to build on broken logic, inquiry with its bones broken, > inquiry more susceptible than ever to social manipulation, inquiry less > likely than ever to be fruitful. > > A challenge for inquiry and society is to overcome capricious or mischievous > skews produced by society's influence on inquiry, without keeping society > from helping inquiry thrive and vice versa. It's one thing for society to > reward some disciplines more than others. In various cases there can be good > reasons for that, bad reasons for that, and so on. The economy of inquiry > itself may sometimes impoverish inquiries that would not have been all that > costly and whose findings would have corrected and improved the inquiries > that do proceed, but people can't know everything in advance, and people need > to make choices. So inquiry will tend, even when going comparatively well, to > have defects. But it can also correct and improve itself. It's another thing > for society to reward disciplines with power, wealth, glamour, status, only > for producing conclusions that suit society's preconceptions. And so on. > > Best, Ben > > On 9/23/2014 5:20 AM, sb wrote: > > Gary F., Ben, List, > > yes, it is an extremist position. Ludwik Fleck in some of his texts about the > Denkkollektive (thought collectives) comes close to this point. But his > microbiological bench research maybe prevented him to fall prey to such > solipcism. Also Latours (maybe polemic) can be read this way, but even he > says now, facing the threat of climate change deniers, that he has gone to > far. Apart from these two (and alleged epigones of social constructivism of > different strives) i would say this is a crude misrepresentation of social > constructivism. > > Yes, you may be right that you and Ben are just responding, but i have the > imression that Stans polarization fell on just too fertile ground. Maybe it > activated an already existent resentiment?! Now when Gary and Cathy applaud > Bens post, i would follow them if it was not under the label of social > constructivism. If we call it solipcism/relativism/culturalism i'd be fine. > Nevertheless i feel uncomfortable with Bens post since it doesn't try to > understand Stans position. > > Stan braught up the example "one must not tease certain snakes". If you tease > the snake, it bites you, injects enough poison and there are no lucky > circumstances that safe you, then you will die! These are the plain facts. > But there can be different mythologies/theories arround this snake type. At > this point i always remember the end of Ecos "Name of the Rose" when Adson > and William discuss retrospective what has happend. Adson says to William: > "Over the whole investigation we had the false premisses and the false > hypothesis' but we came up with the right conclusion". Important in this > example is now that they start with predjudice which turns out to be false. > In the same manner scientists start with personaly, socially or tradionally > conditioned predjudices. > > All scientific theories have a social import which is not forced upon us by > reality. E.g. Fleck shows in his book that until the 20th century and the > discovery of the Wassermann-reaction the syphillis research was influenced by > the religious idea of the syphillitic blood as a punishment of god. In an > enlightment perspective it is important to understand and explore such > imports. Ben argues in his response only from an epistemological standpoint > and ignores the importance of the sociologcal view Stan brings in. > Sociologically the "claim of truth" as "truth" and the will to act upon this > truth is a interesting phenomenon. At the same time Stan mixes up the > epistemological and the sociological perspective and thinks we can conclude > from the sociology of knowledge to epistemology. Once again, i do follow Bens > critique, but it should also pick up the sociological perspective. > > Science is not only brought forward by empirical research and new theories, > it is also brought forward by the critique of its own social boundedness. > Sure, the sociological is from a different sphere but since it is from a > different sphere it could and should inform science. From my point of view > social constructivism/ sociology of knowledge and pragmatism are > complementary, means pragmatism delivers the right epistemology for the > sociology of knowledge. > > Best > Stefan > > Am 22.09.14 14:22, schrieb Gary Fuhrman: > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. 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