Stephen: You simply state: > Beauty and truth are teleological terms I wonder why.
Cheers Jerry On Sep 26, 2014, at 1:05 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: > Beauty and truth are teleological terms and valuable as objectives that > continuity heads toward and fallibility clouds. > > @stephencrose > > On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > Stefan, all, > > I think that there's much to be said for your suggestion of our jettisoning > 'truth' and replacing it with 'knowledge', at least in science. There are, I > believe, strong hints of this notion in Peirce as well, for example, here: > > When our logic shall have paid its devoirs to Esthetics and the Ethics, it > will be time for it to settle down to its regular business. That business is > of a varied nature; but so far as I intend in this place to speak of it, it > consists in ascertaining methods of sound reasoning, and of proving that they > are sound, not by any instinctive guarantee, but because it can be shown by > the kinds of reasoning already considered, especially the mathematical, of > one class of reasonings that they follow methods which, persisted in, must > eventually lead to the truth in regard to those problems to which they are > applicable, or, if not to the absolute truth, to an indefinite approximation > thereto, while in regard to another class of reasonings, although they are so > insecure that no reliance can be placed upon them, it will be shown in a > similar way that yet they afford the only means of attaining to a > satisfactory knowledge of the truth, in case this knowledge is ever to be > attained at all, doing so by putting problems into such form that the former > class of reasonings become applicable to them. This prospectus of how I am to > proceed is sufficient to show that there can be no ground of reasonable > complaint that unwarranted assumptions are made in the course of the > discussion. Nothing will be assumed beyond what every sincere and intelligent > person will and must confess is perfectly evident and which, in point of > fact, is not really doubted by any caviller (CP2.200, emphasis added). > > These hints follow naturally from the principle of fallibility, and from the > knowledge that pragmatism is offered by Peirce as but a method of > asymptotically approaching the truth of any matter being inquired into, the > communities of scientists correcting errors along the way. Still, on the way > to scientific knowledge societies may discover laws invaluable for developing > tools of at least potential value to humanity and to the earth and its > inhabitants, for example, the technologies which led to the development of > the internet or, my personal favorite, modern plumbing. > > That we can misuse these tools and technologies, and do so today as we have > throughout human history, is an ethical matter (quite distinct from the > ethics of scientific inquiry which Peirce addresses). > > Best, > > Gary > > > > . > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > C 745 > 718 482-5690 > > On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 5:52 AM, sb <peirc...@semiotikon.de> wrote: > > Ben, Garys, list, > > seems i took some things down the wrong pipe (see my post to Gary). There is > not much in what you say that I'd disagree with. But there is still the > truth-problem, but maybe this is just a problem of labeling. > > For me truth has no little errorbars, but i'm apodictic here like "god > doesn't throw dices". What is true now, can't be false later. Yes, truth is > not changeable. And we don't have this truth. > > But by introducing the "distincton between opinion and true opinion" it seems > to me you are trying to reintroduce truth under a new flag. Something is true > or not true, do we know with absolute certainty that something is true or not > true? No, we can't and therefore you have to introduce the errorbars. But > errorbars and truth don't fit together, something is true or not and not > possibly-maybe-a-little -less-than-true. Samples can have errorbars but not > truth and hence true opinion as something actual existent doesn't seem sound > to me. > > This Foucault quote shows the paradox "Mendel said the truth but he wasn't > within the biological truth of his time" you are already adressing. Now > exchange Mendel with Newton. Is Newtons mechanics true or false? Hmm, i would > say neither, it works under certain circumstances. So yes, inquiry can be > succesful! In this little example we had three meanings of truth: as actual > opinion, truth as better viable opinion and truth as true opinion at the end > of all time. > > That's the reason why i wouldn't use truth and opinion as opposites. I belief > the better distinction is knowledge and opinion like the greece doxa and > episteme. Important is wether you can give a sound justification for your > belief or not. Knowledge is justified belief and opinion unjustified belief. > > Is there much difference between what you and i said except not using the > word "truth"? > > Best > Stefan > > > P.S.: Introducing the errorbars into this topic is problematic, because it > assumes bayesian statistics. But yes it is important to argue for the > reasonableness of a knowledge claim and to point at possible shortcomings but > this just means to justify. > >> Stefan, Gary R., Gary F., list, >> >> I'm not sure how much there is in what you say that I'd disagree with. >> >> I'd point out that I wasn't attempting to describe social influences on >> research in real depth, but just to indicate that I believe that they exist >> and that I had given them at least a little thought. >> >> "Light pseudo-hallucinatory fun" was just my way of referring to fanciful >> fun in the mind. I wasn't jumping to the end of "the long run" or of >> sufficient investigation except in that sense in which every one of us does >> in asserting a proposition, making a declarative statement. To assert a >> proposition is to say that anybody who _were_ to investigate it far enough >> _would_ find it to be true. Note the conditional modal 'would' as per >> Peirce's repeated formulation of truth as the end of inquiry. >> >> All this idea of truth as _only_ at the end of the longest run, as >> attainable _only_ by a perfect sign incorporating all possible perspectives >> at the end of all times, goes against Peirce's idea that inquiry can succeed >> without taking forever or almost forever. When you think that you've reached >> the truth about something, then you think that your actual opinion coincides >> with the final opinion that would be reached by sufficient investigation. >> That final opinion to which sufficient research would be destined is not >> affected by any person's or group's actual opinion. The idea of the final >> opinion is a way of defining truth pragmatically in relation to >> investigation. You can't have absolute theoretical certainty that your >> actual opinion coincides with the final opinion that would be reached; but >> you can have strong reasons to think that it does. But even then, being >> scientifically minded, you would not _define_ the truth as yours or >> anybody's actual opinion. >> >> Now, statisticians add error bars to their graphs. One way, pointed out by >> Peirce, to close a suspected gap between actual opinion and the ideal final >> opinion is for one's actual opinion to include a confession of its own >> possible error, its being merely plausible, or likely, or whatever, so that, >> in asserting your opinion, you're asserting that anybody who were to >> investigate far enough would find it likely that such-and-such is the case; >> or even that anybody who were to investigate far enough would find it likely >> that anybody who were to investigate far enough would find it likely that >> such-&-such is the case. >> >> The proposition that I asserted was that conflating the ideas of truth and >> opinion, making them the same thing in the mind, leads, like by having a >> drink or a toke or both, to fanciful fun in the mind, the thought of somehow >> having one's cake and eating it too, for example, some idea of people's >> conflicting opinions/truths as involving conflicting realities, various >> actual worlds, somehow intersecting, maybe in a somewhat magical way like in >> an old _Dr. Strange_ comic book. But maybe I'm wrong. Maybe some people >> never get any pleasurable sensation out of it at all. >> The distinction between opinion and truth, which can also be formulated as >> the distincton between opinion and true opinion, is one that Peirce >> certainly held with; he strongly opposed James's idea of changeable truths. >> Peirce held that opinions, propositions, etc., can be true and can be false. >> He did not believe that truths can be false. >> >> Sometimes it is hard to arrive at a firm conclusion about which opinion is >> true, and sometimes something that one firmly believed turns out false, it >> feels as if one's truth turned out to be false. As Robert Creeley wrote >> somewhere, "What I knew / wasn't true". That doesn't make the truth-opinion >> distinction spurious. But there won't be a 'constructive' definition of >> truth from philosophy that will empower philosophy to hand out warrants of >> truth, validity, soundness, etc., to particular conclusions claimed by >> researchers in the special sciences. >> >> I certainly agree that it is good to approach the object from multiple >> perspectives. The idea of convergence is not just the idea of one person >> approaching every more closely to the truth from a single direction, but >> also of various researchers converging from various starting points (and >> zigzagging too) till things fit together like in a crossword puzzle, as >> Haack said. >> >> Best, Ben >> >> On 9/24/2014 8:36 AM, sb wrote: >>> Ben, Gary, R., Gary F., >>> >>> i've got to start from the end of your post. You speak of the society >>> "rewarding diciplines" and this sheds a light on your idea of sociology in >>> this discussion. Your sociology consists of conscious actors who reward, >>> strive for power, wealth or status. This is more a rational choice approach >>> which is not the thing i was trying to hint at with my Fleck example. And >>> thats also not the thing sociology of knowlede is interested in. It's about >>> the knowledge underlying societal habits. There are so many things we take >>> for granted and we should explore why we (did) take them for granted. And >>> this not only the case in society it is also the case in the sciences. >>> >>> Why did microbiologist search for syphillis in the blood? They searched >>> there because for centuries it was taken for granted that there is >>> something like "syphillitic blood". Was it possible to reproduce the >>> results? No, it was almost impossible to stabilize the results. Nowadays we >>> would stop researching with results like this. But they kept on trying and >>> trying until Wassermann found a way to stabilize the experiment. Why did >>> the retry and retry? Because it was clear that it had to be there! >>> >>> The snake example: The snake example is so trivial and easy to understand >>> that we don't have to discuss it. Yes, it bites you -> you are dead in >>> tradtion A or B. There is no incompatiblity. But this is not a real world >>> example of a living science. Sciences are complex, they consist of >>> assumptions, crafting in the lab/the field, cognitive training etc.. They >>> are much more than the simple "if A then B" of logic. Much knowledge and >>> training is needed to come to the point where one can write down a >>> proposition like "if A then B". >>> >>> Nobody doubts that when you do exactly the same as another person that the >>> same will happen. "Experiences whose conditions are the same will have the >>> same general characters". But since scientific paradigms are such complex >>> structures it is not an easy task to create the same conditions. You think >>> its easy, just go to a lab and try to re-cook a Wassermann-test! >>> You say opinion and truth are not the same thing. Yes, sure ,but how should >>> we deal with the idea of the syphillitic blood? Is it opinion or truth? >>> They found it in the blood! And the idea to find it in the blood is >>> certainly a cultural import into science. >>> >>> But there are different Problems: a) Can there be different truths about >>> one object of investigation b) are there cultural imports into science that >>> influences the content of science and not only the organizational context >>> of research. What is organizational context? Org. context is for me all the >>> stuff you named: funding, rewarding, strive for power, money etc.. An >>> influence on the content instead is everything which is part of the "how we >>> see the object" of investigation. >>> >>> Karl Mannheim uses in "Ideology and Utopia" a good metaphor. He says that >>> we can look at a object from different perspectives and >>> objectivation is for him to take different positions relative to the >>> object. Trying to investigate the object beyond this is an absurdity like >>> seeing without perspective. >>> >>> You distinct between opinion and truth. Do you have the truth? No you >>> don't, like i don't. We both have beliefs we are willing to put on test. >>> But when you write somthing like: >>> >>> "Conflating opinion with truth seems to produce some light >>> pseudo-hallucinatory fun, at least that has been my consistent experience >>> since I was a teenager (as I said I do look at other perspectives). It's >>> the fun of absurdity. Yet, to build a theory on the acceptance of that >>> conflation is to build on broken logic, inquiry with its bones broken, >>> inquiry more susceptible than ever to social manipulation, inquiry less >>> likely than ever to be fruitful." >>> >>> it seems to me that you have the truth and you are able to destinct between >>> pseudo-hallucinations and non-hallucinations. You talk like you are one of >>> those who has left the cave and reached the light. Ben, i don't really >>> insinuate this, because it was written by you in the heat of the moment. We >>> are not far away from each other, but nonetheless this paragraph shows we >>> are still standing on different sides of a water devide. There is a hair >>> between us. My impression is you are trying to pull the >>> long-run-perspective on truth into the now to safe some kind of >>> non-perspective-truth in science. >>> >>> Now, truth is for me a perfect sign which incorporates all possible >>> perspectives on an object. But we will be there only at the end of all >>> times. As long as we are not there we only have beliefs we are willing to >>> act upon. And as long we have not reached the all-perspectives-mode we take >>> in positions on objects and phenomena that are influenced by our societal >>> position, tradtions and our culture. The point is now that modern science >>> with its non-prespective-truth tries to erase these influences in its >>> representation. Part of this strategy is to make influences, where the >>> cleaning has not been finished, to exceptions or to reduce the cultural >>> influences to failed knowledge. >>> Just take insulin shock therapy. How was it possible that psychic ill were >>> tortured that way? It was only possible in a certain culture of medicine. A >>> culture where a real phycicist had to cut or give drug. But psychatrist >>> didn't have these instruments and so they were inferior to real phycicist. >>> That's the reason why they were so eager to use insulin shocks, because >>> when they used it they were real phycicists. >>> Look at nazi science. It is widley branded as pseudo-science to clean >>> science from this era. But there were nazi scientists whose experiments >>> would hold our standards today. But people say: Huh, in the greater part it >>> was pseudo science. Yes, so what? Just think of Feynmans great "Cargo Cult >>> Science", it shows that a lot of science today is pseudo. How was nazi >>> science possible? It was a child of nazi germany. >>> Take the scientific revolution. Where did the knowledge of the scientific >>> revolution come from like Steven Shapin asks? The "new scientists" laughed >>> about the scholastics who discussed "how many angels can dance on top of a >>> needle", but the logic of the new scientists grounded on the work of >>> scholastics. In the field of chemistry the techniques of the bench work >>> stemmed from alchemy. Newton himself was an alchemist. >>> All three examples are examples of the cleaning strategy. >>> >>> But back to the two problems: a) Can there be different truths about one >>> object of investigation? b) Are there cultural imports into science that >>> influence the content of science? >>> >>> Ad a): No, this is not possible. If there are two truths about one object, >>> then it is due to different perspectives. But since the perspectives are >>> different there are not the same conditions and hence not the same >>> conclusions. But within one perspective the results are intersubjective and >>> reproducable. >>> Ad b) Yes, there are such imports and there are less dramatic examples than >>> those mentioned above. From my study time i knew at last 6 different soil >>> classifications. I googled it now and found out there are even more and >>> that pedologist have lost every confidence that there ever will be a >>> universal classification. If you look at the classification you will reckon >>> they are dependent on the soil usage and engeneering techniques. But these >>> both vary greatly with different cultures. >>> >>> But pedology, physics or chemistry are not the main battle field. We find >>> examples there, they are insteresting and shed a light on the cleaning >>> practices, but they are not of vital importance. Like Foucault identified >>> it, the main battle field is anthropology. There are everywhere cultural >>> and ideological components in the content of the sciences arround >>> anthropology. And that is the reason why people in the 60ies and 70ies read >>> his historical investigations, which ended in the 19th century, as >>> critiques of the then contemporary psychatry, medicine and criminology. He >>> showed what was implicitly taken for granted and people didn't like to see >>> that. >>> All of this hasn't something to do with fallibilism. Fallibilism works only >>> in one perspective, the tertium non datur works only in one perspective. It >>> has to do with pluralism and the possibility of other world views. And >>> therefore it is a legitimate endeavour to search for traces of culture, >>> tradition, ideology within the content of sciences. They are not free of >>> them. Its like Fleck writes in "Wissenschaftstheoretische Probleme": "It is >>> an extraordinary interesting thing, how far scholars who dedicate their >>> whole life to destinct hallucinations from reality, are unable to destinct >>> their own dreams about science from the true form of science". >>> >>> >>> Best >>> Stefan >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Stefan, Gary F., list, >>>> >>>> I was indeed addressing the snakebite example, just not mentioning it by >>>> name. If two traditions, two people, two of anything, arrive at >>>> incompatible conclusions about snakebites, then at most one of their >>>> conclusions is true. That's what "incompatible conclusions" means. It >>>> doesn't take Peircean semiotics or pragmatism to see it, it's elementary >>>> definitions and logic. >>>> >>>> I haven't ever argued or believed that judgments, that two given >>>> traditions' conclusions are incompatible, are infallible. I haven't ever >>>> argued or believed that society does not influence, help, or hinder >>>> inquiry, or contribute to focusing it in some directions rather than >>>> others. This sort of thing will result in society's influencing the >>>> opinions that result from actual inquiry. >>>> But opinion and truth are not the same thing. >>>> Conflating opinion with truth seems to produce some light >>>> pseudo-hallucinatory fun, at least that has been my consistent experience >>>> since I was a teenager (as I said I do look at other perspectives). It's >>>> the fun of absurdity. Yet, to build a theory on the acceptance of that >>>> conflation is to build on broken logic, inquiry with its bones broken, >>>> inquiry more susceptible than ever to social manipulation, inquiry less >>>> likely than ever to be fruitful. >>>> A challenge for inquiry and society is to overcome capricious or >>>> mischievous skews produced by society's influence on inquiry, without >>>> keeping society from helping inquiry thrive and vice versa. It's one thing >>>> for society to reward some disciplines more than others. In various cases >>>> there can be good reasons for that, bad reasons for that, and so on. The >>>> economy of inquiry itself may sometimes impoverish inquiries that would >>>> not have been all that costly and whose findings would have corrected and >>>> improved the inquiries that do proceed, but people can't know everything >>>> in advance, and people need to make choices. So inquiry will tend, even >>>> when going comparatively well, to have defects. But it can also correct >>>> and improve itself. It's another thing for society to reward disciplines >>>> with power, wealth, glamour, status, only for producing conclusions that >>>> suit society's preconceptions. And so on. >>>> Best, Ben >>>> On 9/23/2014 5:20 AM, sb wrote: >>>> >>>> Gary F., Ben, List, >>>> >>>> yes, it is an extremist position. Ludwik Fleck in some of his texts about >>>> the Denkkollektive (thought collectives) comes close to this point. But >>>> his microbiological bench research maybe prevented him to fall prey to >>>> such solipcism. Also Latours (maybe polemic) can be read this way, but >>>> even he says now, facing the threat of climate change deniers, that he has >>>> gone to far. Apart from these two (and alleged epigones of social >>>> constructivism of different strives) i would say this is a crude >>>> misrepresentation of social constructivism. >>>> >>>> Yes, you may be right that you and Ben are just responding, but i have the >>>> imression that Stans polarization fell on just too fertile >>>> ground. Maybe it activated an already existent resentiment?! Now when Gary >>>> and Cathy applaud Bens post, i would follow them if it was not under the >>>> label of social constructivism. If we call it >>>> solipcism/relativism/culturalism i'd be fine. Nevertheless i feel >>>> uncomfortable with Bens post since it doesn't try to understand Stans >>>> position. >>>> >>>> Stan braught up the example "one must not tease certain snakes". If you >>>> tease the snake, it bites you, injects enough poison and there are no >>>> lucky circumstances that safe you, then you will die! These are the plain >>>> facts. But there can be different mythologies/theories arround this snake >>>> type. At this point i always remember the end of Ecos "Name of the Rose" >>>> when Adson and William discuss retrospective what has happend. Adson says >>>> to William: "Over the whole investigation we had the false premisses and >>>> the false hypothesis' but we came up with the right conclusion". Important >>>> in this example is now that they start with predjudice which turns out to >>>> be false. In the same manner scientists start with personaly, socially or >>>> tradionally conditioned predjudices. >>>> >>>> All scientific theories have a social import which is not forced upon us >>>> by reality. E.g. Fleck shows in his book that until the 20th century and >>>> the discovery of the Wassermann-reaction the syphillis research was >>>> influenced by the religious idea of the syphillitic blood as a punishment >>>> of god. In an enlightment perspective it is important to understand and >>>> explore such imports. Ben argues in his response only from an >>>> epistemological standpoint and ignores the importance of the sociologcal >>>> view Stan brings in. Sociologically the "claim of truth" as "truth" and >>>> the will to act upon this truth is a interesting phenomenon. At the same >>>> time Stan mixes up the epistemological and the sociological perspective >>>> and thinks we can conclude from the sociology of knowledge to >>>> epistemology. Once again, i do follow Bens critique, but it should also >>>> pick up the sociological perspective. >>>> >>>> Science is not only brought forward by empirical research and new >>>> theories, it is also brought forward by the critique of its own social >>>> boundedness. Sure, the sociological is from a different sphere but since >>>> it is from a different sphere it could and should inform science. From my >>>> point of view social constructivism/ sociology of knowledge and pragmatism >>>> are complementary, means pragmatism delivers the right epistemology for >>>> the sociology of knowledge. >>>> >>>> Best >>>> Stefan >>>> >>>> Am 22.09.14 14:22, schrieb Gary Fuhrman: >>> >> > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . 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