Gary F., lists,
This is a very helpful outline of this section, Gary, which, along with the
next, 3.4, seems to me to be at the heart of this chapter, perhaps even at
the heart of NP itself. I've nothing to add or emend to what you've
written, and so I'll move immediately to your now twice asked and doubly
vexing question:
GF: "if a *genuine dicisign* or "indexical proposition" does not have to be
symbolic in order to fulfill its function of conveying information, why
does Peirce identify the *symbol* with the *genuine sign*?"
You conclude the substantive part of your post by giving Peirce's late
definition of a symbol as "a sign which is fit to serve as such simply
because it will be so interpreted" (EP2:307) then commenting:
GF: "Now, the icon/index/symbol trichotomy is supposed to be the list of
possible relations between sign (representamen) and *object*. Yet this
definition of *symbol,* on the face of it, seems to be more about the
sign's relation with its *interpretant* than with its object. No wonder the
relation between dicisign and symbol seems so complex.
Now as to the symbol seeming "to be more about the sign's relations with
its interpretant than with its object," I find the following quotation
suggestive (and, in consideration of the representamen, increasingly so as
I proceed down the ensuing group of quotes):
. . . . The most fundamental [division of signs] is into Icons, Indices,
and Symbols. Namely, while no Representamen actually functions as such
until it actually determines an Interpretant, yet it becomes a
Representamen as soon as it is fully capable of doing this; and* its
Representative Quality is not necessarily dependent upon its ever actually
determining an Interpretant,* nor even upon its actually having an Object
(emphasis added).
An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a
Firstness of it as a First. That is, a quality that it has qua thing
renders it fit to be a representamen. Thus, anything is fit to be a
Substitute for anything that it is like. (*The conception of "substitute"
involves that of a purpose, and thus of genuine thirdness*.) [emphasis
added CP 2.275-276]
So the first hint here is that a representamen, while not actually
functioning as such, is indeed one "as soon as it is fully *capable* of
[determining an interpretant]. So, an icon is serving as a representamen
when it merely *may* substitute for something which it's like, AND the idea
of substitution involves that of purpose, "and thus of genuine thirdness."
But stepping back a bit from signs to categorial thirdness itself, Peirce
writes something telling here in suggesting that logic perhaps "ought to be
the science of Thridness in general":
Now it may be that logic ought to be the science of Thirdness in
general. But as I have studied it, it is simply the science of what must be
and ought to be true representation, so far as representation can be known
without any gathering of special facts beyond our ordinary daily life. It
is, in short, the philosophy of representation (CP 1.539).
But philosophy is the work of human minds. Yet, since thirdness involves
secondness and firstness, and since anything which involves the idea of
"purpose" (even the icon as the likeness of something) expresses "genuine
thirdness" (CP2.276), it would seem that to the extent that the dicisign
expresses purpose (which I think it clearly does) it expresses thirdness
even when it is not the symbolic variety of that sign.
Peirce also comments on "genuine triads" in a way which might be pertinent
to this inquiry. He begins the next passage with language seemingly
contradicting that which he used directly above--but note the conclusion of
the passage).
Genuine triads are of three kinds. For while a triad if genuine cannot
be in the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere law,
or regularity, of quality or of fact. But a thoroughly genuine triad is
separated entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of
representations. Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine
triad. For it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or
inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. Now this
is neither a matter of fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter
of law, *since thought is living *(CP 1.480, emphasis added).
So, every genuine triad "[involving] a sign, or representamen, o
f
some kind, outward or inward" (even the now
near
proverbial
"
sunflower"
)
has the *potential* to become a living thought (see CP 2.276 above). So the
idea of genuine thirdness, *the genuine triad*, may trump
,
in
certain cases, the idea of
*the genuine sign*
, which is to say *the sign *
*completed in its being interpreted*, that is, *the symbol*.
So, as the following quote concludes, "
take away the psychological or accidental human element, and in this
genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a sign
,
"
and 'philosophy' as such has nothing to do with it.
Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all
three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one another
they are first, second, and third. The first is thought in its capacity as
mere possibility; that is, mere mind capable of thinking, or a mere vague
idea. The second is thought playing the role of a Secondness, or event.
That is, it is of the general nature of experience or information. The
third is thought in its role as governing Secondness. It brings the
information into the mind, or determines the idea and gives it body. It is
informing thought, or cognition.* But take away the psychological or
accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the
operation of a sign *(CP1.537).
So, whether or not it is possible that "logic ought to be the science of
Thirdness in general," for me the dicisign concept suggests that this idea
might have some resonance in biosemiotics, or perhaps that semiotics
generally ought be tempered by this idea (or something like it).
Finally, Peirce makes a distinction which may make a difference in this
direction of analysis by defining a sign as "anything which conveys any
definite notion of any object in any way":
. . . I use these two words, sign and representamen, differently. By a sign
I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any way,
as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with
this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to
a sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that analysis
applies to. [. . . ] *All signs convey notions to human minds; but I know
no reason why every representamen should do so *(CP1.540, emphasis added).
And this is immediately followed by the following famous definition (which,
note in the context of what I just quoted, is a definition of a
representamen and *not* of a sign):
My definition of a representamen is as follows:
A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its
OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being
such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the
same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant (CP1.541).
I am not prepared to draw any definitive conclusions from the above which
are just some preliminary thoughts I had today. In short, I offer these
quotes and comments as suggestions towards a possible answer to the
intriguing question you asked, Gary. For all I know I may be heading in the
wrong direction.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 7:21 AM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote:
> On to the third section of NP Chapter 3:
>
>
>
> Here we come to the intension (depth), i.e. the definition, of the
> dicisign -- first in the definition of "proposition" (from "Kaina
> Stoicheia") as "a sign which separately, or independently, indicates its
> object." Separately from what? From the rest of the sign. In a verbal
> replica of a proposition, the part which indicates the object is called the
> *subject*. Like all words, it is symbolic -- but this is not definitive of
> its function in the proposition. What is definitive is not the symbolic but
> the *indexical* function. Thus the definition applies equally well to a
> sign which is *not* verbal or symbolic.
>
>
>
> An index alone, though, would indicate the object without giving us any
> information about it. The part of a verbal proposition which does tell us
> something *about* its object is called the *predicate*. But here too, the
> symbolicity of the predicate part is not definitive of its function; what's
> definitive of that function is the *iconicity* of the sign. Thus "the
> vital spark of every proposition, the peculiar propositional element of the
> proposition, is an indexical proposition; an index involving an icon"
> (EP2:310). Hence the name *dicisign* or *dicent* sign for a sign that
> combines these indexical and iconic functions (whether it does so by
> symbolic means or not). This is the core of Peirce's doctrine of the
> Dicisign.
>
>
>
> This still leaves open the question I posed earlier about "Kaina
> Stoicheia", which may be reworded thus: if a *genuine dicisign* or
> "indexical proposition" does not have to be symbolic in order to fulfill
> its function of conveying information, why does Peirce identify the
> *symbol* with the *genuine sign*? To clarify this question, we should
> note Peirce's definition of "symbol", in KS and in the *Syllabus*, as "a
> sign which is fit to serve as such simply because it will be so
> interpreted" (EP2:307). Now, the icon/index/symbol trichotomy is supposed
> to be the list of possible relations between sign (representamen) and
> *object*. Yet this definition of *symbol,* on the face of it, seems to be
> more about the sign's relation with its *interpretant* than with its
> object. No wonder the relation between dicisign and symbol seems so complex.
>
>
>
> This will probably be my last post for a few days, as I'll be away from
> home and fully occupied all weekend. I trust that the seminar will carry on
> in my absence.
>
>
>
> gary f.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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