Gary, lists, GF: By shifting the emphasis (in his definition of "fact") from that Secondness to its *structure* -- which is that of a proposition or dicisign, and therefore partakes of Thirdness -- I think Peirce was adding another dimension to the mode of being of "fact".
I would tend to agree that Peirce did indeed add exactly this new dimension to the mode of being a fact in his reflections ca. 1904, moving from his late 19th century emphasis on its *existential* *2ns* to examining its *structure* *as a dicisign *at the beginning of the 20th. Continuing with our ongoing analysis of genuineness and degeneracy in this regard, you wrote regarding a passage you quoted (EP2:274): GF: [That t]his shows at least that* genuineness and degeneracy are not absolute qualities* but *always relative to a function.* So even though Peirce gave the icon and index the "disparaging name" of "degenerate" in KS, he also pointed out that they (especially when combined!) can carry out semiotic functions that the symbol is incapable of *except by involving them*. Yes, no doubt mathematical ideas related to degeneracy can help us overcome a linguistic tendency to think perhaps a bit disparagingly of degeneracy in semiotic relations when such is not at all Peirce's intent. But this is still a vexing issue for me. For example, you wrote: GF: I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the proposition itself can be described as "degenerate" *relative to the argument*, which is the most complete and complex of all sign-types because it separately indicates its interpretant -- and which, for that very reason, can only be a *symbol*. Is that the main reason why the symbol is the most genuine member *of the first (icon/index/symbol) trichotomy* of signs? But in looking for telling passages related to "genuine" relations, I came across this. A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism. CP 2.26 Perhaps one needn't make too much of this apparent equivalence of 'proof' and 'genuine argument', but it does make me abit unsure about your thought that the dicisign might be "described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument." I think there may be good reasons to think that that's a pretty good abduction, but I'm not yet entirely convinced. At CP 5.76 Peirce refers to the symbol as the "relatively genuine form of Representamen" in relation to the index and the icon. Again one needn't make too much of the phrase '*relatively* genuine', but I'm not exactly certain now *how much* to make of it. Maybe it simply means what we've always taken it to mean in this context, but why then "relatively"? As for the 'genuine index' in consideration of the dicisign, although you (or Frederik?) may have already quoted some of this passage, I found it of the greatest interest, although I not quite yet sure exactly what to make of it. . . . Now in analyses hitherto proposed, it seems to have been thought that if assertion [. . .] were omitted, the proposition would be indistinguishable from a compound general term--that "A man is tall" would then reduce to "A tall man." It therefore becomes important to inquire whether the definition of a Dicisign here found to be applicable to the former [. . .] may not be equally applicable to the latter. The answer, however, comes forthwith.* Fully to understand and assimilate the symbol "a tall man," it is by no means requisite to understand it to relate [. . .] to a real Object. Its Interpretant, therefore, does not represent it as a genuine Index; so that the definition of the Dicisign does not apply to it.* It is impossible here fully to go into the examination of whether the analysis given does justice to the distinction between propositions and arguments. But it is easy to see that *the proposition purports to intend to compel its Interpretant to refer to its real Object, that is represents itself as an Index*, while the argument purports to intend not compulsion but action by means of comprehensible generals, that is, represents its character to be specially symbolic (CP 2.321, emphasis added). I want to spend more time reflecting on this passage in consideration of "the distinction between propositions and arguments" as it seems to me to be of potential considerable importance in our reflections on the dicisign. I'll be interested to hear what you or other members of the lists make of this quotation. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Sep 29, 2014 at 2:53 PM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, lists, > > > > This is an extremely helpful post, Gary, and I'm still in the process of > following up on it, but thought I'd better (rather than wait any longer) > mention some of the considerations it inspires with particular reference to > dicisigns. > > > > First, your quote from CP 2.275-276 is originally from the "Speculative > Grammar" section of the *Syllabus* (EP2:272-3) immediately preceding > Peirce's introduction of the Dicisign as part of the "second trichotomy of > representamens" (EP2:275). Your next quote, CP 1.539, is from the Lowell > Lectures which the *Syllabus* was intended to accompany. But your third, > CP 1.480 (about "genuine triads"), is from the "Logic of Mathematics" paper > c.1896. It occurs to me that Peirce's concept of a *fact,* or his usage > of the word, may have shifted somewhat during the intervening years. > > > > In "Kaina Stoicheia" (1904?), Peirce wrote that "What we call a "fact" is > something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an > element of the very universe itself." Earlier on, he wrote that > representation is necessarily triadic because "it involves a sign, or > representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an object > and an interpreting thought. Now this is *neither a matter of fact, since > thought is general*, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is living" > (CP 1.480, emphasis altered). This seems to imply that a "matter of fact" > lacks the generality of "thought", as if the universe of which it is > "supposed to be an element" is only the universe of *existence*, i.e. of > Secondness. By shifting the emphasis (in his definition of "fact") from > that Secondness to its *structure* -- which is that of a proposition or > dicisign, and therefore partakes of Thirdness -- I think Peirce was adding > another dimension to the mode of being of "fact". > > > > But I'm not sure how much sense this makes, yet ... I think it's related to > a some other pieces of the puzzle of the "genuine" which turn up in this > neighborhood. One is that although in KS the index is a degnerate sign, > relative to the symbol, it also seems to be true that the *linguistic* > symbol at least, if related to its object mainly by *reference*, involves > a *degenerate index*: the Index is a "Representamen whose Representative > character consists in its being an individual second. If the Secondness is > an existential relation, the Index is *genuine.* If the Secondness is a > reference, the Index is *degenerate*" (EP2:274)*.* This shows at least > that genuineness and degeneracy are not absolute qualities but always > relative to a function. So even though Peirce gave the icon and index the > "disparaging name" of "degenerate" in KS, he also pointed out that they > (especially when combined!) can carry out semiotic functions that the > symbol is incapable of *except by involving them*. > > > > The more we take the concept of "degeneracy" back to its purely > mathematical roots, the less disparaging it appears. For instance, we could > describe a circle as a degenerate ellipse, which only means that it is > *simpler* than an ellipse. I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the > proposition itself can be described as "degenerate" *relative to the > argument*, which is the most complete and complex of all sign-types > because it separately indicates its interpretant -- and which, for that very > reason, can only be a *symbol*. Is that the main reason why the symbol is > the most genuine member *of the first (icon/index/symbol) trichotomy* of > signs? > > > > It's difficult to hold all these pieces of the puzzle in mind long enough > to see how it all fits together, and there's much in the latter part of > your post that I haven't dealt with here. But I think the joint effort > should be helpful toward a deeper and more exact understanding of Peirce's > doctrine of the Dicisign. > > > > gary f. > > *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 26-Sep-14 3:51 PM > *To:* [email protected] > *Cc:* Peirce List > *Subject:* Re: [biosemiotics:7008] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, > Chapter 3.3 > > > > Gary F., lists, > > > > This is a very helpful outline of this section, Gary, which, along with > the next, 3.4, seems to me to be at the heart of this chapter, perhaps even > at the heart of NP itself. I've nothing to add or emend to what you've > written, and so I'll move immediately to your now twice asked and doubly > vexing question: > > > > GF: "if a *genuine dicisign* or "indexical proposition" does not have to > be symbolic in order to fulfill its function of conveying information, why > does Peirce identify the *symbol* with the *genuine sign*?" > > > > You conclude the substantive part of your post by giving Peirce's late > definition of a symbol as "a sign which is fit to serve as such simply > because it will be so interpreted" (EP2:307) then commenting: > > > > GF: "Now, the icon/index/symbol trichotomy is supposed to be the list of > possible relations between sign (representamen) and *object*. Yet this > definition of *symbol,* on the face of it, seems to be more about the > sign's relation with its *interpretant* than with its object. No wonder > the relation between dicisign and symbol seems so complex. > > > > Now as to the symbol seeming "to be more about the sign's relations with > its interpretant than with its object," I find the following quotation > suggestive (and, in consideration of the representamen, increasingly so as > I proceed down the ensuing group of quotes): > > > > . . . . The most fundamental [division of signs] is into Icons, Indices, > and Symbols. Namely, while no Representamen actually functions as such > until it actually determines an Interpretant, yet it becomes a > Representamen as soon as it is fully capable of doing this; and* its > Representative Quality is not necessarily dependent upon its ever actually > determining an Interpretant,* nor even upon its actually having an Object > (emphasis added). > > An Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a > Firstness of it as a First. That is, a quality that it has qua thing > renders it fit to be a representamen. Thus, anything is fit to be a > Substitute for anything that it is like. (*The conception of "substitute" > involves that of a purpose, and thus of genuine thirdness*.) [emphasis > added CP 2.275-276] > > > > So the first hint here is that a representamen, while not actually > functioning as such, is indeed one "as soon as it is fully *capable* of > [determining an interpretant]. So, an icon is serving as a representamen > when it merely *may* substitute for something which it's like, AND the > idea of substitution involves that of purpose, "and thus of genuine > thirdness." > > > > But stepping back a bit from signs to categorial thirdness itself, Peirce > writes something telling here in suggesting that logic perhaps "ought to be > the science of Thridness in general": > > > > Now it may be that logic ought to be the science of Thirdness in > general. But as I have studied it, it is simply the science of what must be > and ought to be true representation, so far as representation can be known > without any gathering of special facts beyond our ordinary daily life. It > is, in short, the philosophy of representation (CP 1.539). > > > > But philosophy is the work of human minds. Yet, since thirdness involves > secondness and firstness, and since anything which involves the idea of > "purpose" (even the icon as the likeness of something) expresses "genuine > thirdness" (CP2.276), it would seem that to the extent that the dicisign > expresses purpose (which I think it clearly does) it expresses thirdness > even when it is not the symbolic variety of that sign. > > > > Peirce also comments on "genuine triads" in a way which might be pertinent > to this inquiry. He begins the next passage with language seemingly > contradicting that which he used directly above--but note the conclusion of > the passage). > > > > Genuine triads are of three kinds. For while a triad if genuine > cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere > law, or regularity, of quality or of fact. But a thoroughly genuine triad > is separated entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of > representations. Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine > triad. For it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or > inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. Now this > is neither a matter of fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter > of law, *since thought is living *(CP 1.480, emphasis added). > > > > So, every genuine triad "[involving] a sign, or representamen, o > > f > > some kind, outward or inward" (even the now near proverbial "sunflower") has > the *potential* to become a living thought (see CP 2.276 above). So the > idea of genuine thirdness, *the genuine triad*, may trump , in certain > cases, the idea of *the genuine sign*, which is to say *the sign > completed in its being interpreted*, that is, *the symbol*. > > So, as the following quote concludes, "take away the psychological or > accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the > operation of a sign," and 'philosophy' as such has nothing to do with it. > > > > > > Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are > all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one > another they are first, second, and third. The first is thought in its > capacity as mere possibility; that is, mere mind capable of thinking, or a > mere vague idea. The second is thought playing the role of a Secondness, or > event. That is, it is of the general nature of experience or information. > The third is thought in its role as governing Secondness. It brings the > information into the mind, or determines the idea and gives it body. It is > informing thought, or cognition.* But take away the psychological or > accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the > operation of a sign *(CP1.537). > > > > So, whether or not it is possible that "logic ought to be the science of > Thirdness in general," for me the dicisign concept suggests that this idea > might have some resonance in biosemiotics, or perhaps that semiotics > generally ought be tempered by this idea (or something like it). > > > > Finally, Peirce makes a distinction which may make a difference in this > direction of analysis by defining a sign as "anything which conveys any > definite notion of any object in any way": > > > > . . . I use these two words, sign and representamen, differently. By a > sign I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any > way, as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start > with this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is > essential to a sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that > analysis applies to. [. . . ] *All signs convey notions to human minds; > but I know no reason why every representamen should do so *(CP1.540, > emphasis added). > > > > And this is immediately followed by the following famous definition > (which, note in the context of what I just quoted, is a definition of a > representamen and *not* of a sign): > > > > My definition of a representamen is as follows: > > A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its > OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being > such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the > same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant (CP1.541). > > > > I am not prepared to draw any definitive conclusions from the above which > are just some preliminary thoughts I had today. In short, I offer these > quotes and comments as suggestions towards a possible answer to the > intriguing question you asked, Gary. For all I know I may be heading in the > wrong direction. > > > > Best, > > > > Gary > > > > >
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