Part of the problem may also be due to my understanding of the 'icon' in
that it is not a Sign, even though many seem to consider it as such. It is
the term for the Relation between the Dynamic Object and the Representamen.
A Sign is a triad and the Icon, as a single Relation, is not a Sign.
This Relation between the Dynamic Object and the Representamen (which I also
term 'input') can be in any of the three categorical modes and as such, is
termed: icon, index or symbol.
To actually function as an icon, that 'input sensation' must be in a
Relation or connection. Otherwise, ...nothing. But an iconic input certainly
has no 'committment' in itself as to how it will be 'read' by the mediative
rules of the Representamen or understood within the Interpretant. That is
why it, as Firstness, can be considered as open and offering potentiality
rather than closed actuality.
So, I'd agree that a Sign (that triad) operating within Firstness would
indeed by nothing but a Rheme (Rhematic Iconic Qualisign). It is only when
an attachment to a more specific categorical mode is made (operating within
Secondness or Thirdness) that a commitment is made, as you point out.
Thanks for your input.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" <[email protected]>
To: <[email protected]>; "'Peirce List'" <[email protected]>
Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 4:22 PM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7077] iconic commitment (was: Natural
Propositions, Chapter 3.6)
Gary F., Edwina, Lists,
I find myself agreeing with both sides in this disagreement. Am I confused?
Icons themselves involve "connectivity and thus continuity" because a
qualisign may be connected to a token figure and a rule for interpreting
those connections--and not yet have the kind of object and interpretant
needed to make a positive assertion of fact. As such, I read the claim that
"icons commit themselves to nothing at all" to be based on an understanding
of what is needed for a sign to involve such a commitment. The kinds of
commitment that he is talking about is similar in kind to what a person does
when making an affidavit.
When those three things are connected to one another as parts of our
percepts, we are then in a position to make a perceptual judgment about some
object. In making such a judgment, those three connected things can
function as qualisign, iconic sinsign, and iconic legisign--where we
attribute qualities with an intensity to some object at a place and a time.
At this point, we have enough for a dicisign--and an assertion is thereby
made.
Couldn't we simplify matters by saying that no theme taking as an
unsaturated sign alone commits itself to anything? One a rheme that is part
of a larger design involves such a commitment. If that is right, then the
reason icons commit themselves to nothing at all is that such signs, taken
by themselves, are never more than a rheme.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Gary Fuhrman [[email protected]]
Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 9:45 AM
To: [email protected]; 'Peirce List'
Subject: [biosemiotics:7077] iconic commitment (was: Natural Propositions,
Chapter 3.6)
ET: nowhere in my post did I disagree with Peirce that 'icons commit
themselves to nothing at all'. Where do you come up with that conclusion?
GF: The first sentence of your previous post said: “I think that Icons
commit themselves to connectivity and thus continuity”. Now you claim to
have agreed with Peirce that 'icons commit themselves to nothing at all'.
I think that’s enough to show that any further comment would be superfluous,
and any further attempt at dialogue along these lines would be fruitless.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 4-Oct-14 12:11 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:7075] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6
Gary F - nowhere in my post did I disagree with Peirce that 'icons commit
themselves to nothing at all'. Where do you come up with that conclusion?
Nor do I disagree with the 'fortuitous variations in reproduction' play a
role in adaptation. I've constantly focused on the vital role of
chance/Firstness. My comment was on the nature of the connections, where I
pointed out that the function of Thirdness was not merely mediation but also
continuity of type. It isn't easy for novelty to get Thirdness to change!
Therefore, chance - if we consider it only as randomness (and I don't think
it is)...is necessary restrained within the general constraints of
Thirdness.
Constructive deviations do not, in my view, emerge within random chance
mutations -- and Peirce also rejected that evoluation/adaptation was
guided only by mechanical randomness and held that an agapastic 'connected
and informed' force was the key agent in adaptation/evolution). Chance or
Firstness is a much stronger force than mere mechanical randomness. Its
connectedness enables it to offer informed potentiality rather than
mechanical uninformed randomness.
As for my disagreement with your 'Man-as-Sinner' - we'll have to leave it
at that. I disgree and point to the various research on complex adaptive
systems which disagree with the one-way linearity of your view. I strongly
promote CAS (complex adapative systems) functioning in all realms -
biological as well as societal, economic, etc..and view semiosis as the
basic process in the CAS....lots of articles on biology as a CAS and the
saltational dynamics that take place.
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Fuhrman<mailto:[email protected]>
To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> ; 'Peirce
List'<mailto:[email protected]>
Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 11:50 AM
Subject: RE: [biosemiotics:7072] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions,
Chapter 3.6
Edwina, I guess you don’t agree with Peirce that icons “commit themselves to
nothing at all” (MS 599, as quoted). You also seem to disagree with his
suggestion that “fortuitous variations in reproduction” (or what you call
“deviations from the norm”) play a role in evolution analogous to the role
of icons in cognition (and the role of chance as Firstness in Peirce’s
cosmology). This may well indicate a major difference between you and Peirce
concerning Firstness as a mode of being.
I’m more surprised, though, at your denial that this is an age of mass
extinction in biology — the seventh in the history of the planet, by the
usual count of evolutionary biologists, and the first to be caused mainly by
a single species (guess who). What I hear from biologists is that
biodiversity is in steep decline. I’d like to see your evidence that the
complexity of the biosphere is increasing … but not at the cost of
distracting the list from the main argument of NP. So I’ll just leave it at
that.
gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 4-Oct-14 10:38 AM
To: Gary Fuhrman; [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>;
'Peirce List'
Subject: [biosemiotics:7072] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter
3.6
Gary F wrote:
1) "Icons, representing Firstness, commit themselves to nothing, but their
connection (Thirdness) with experiential external Secondnesses constitutes
information. The Dicisign is the kind of sign which actually makes such a
connection. The generalized (and fallible!) commitment to that connection is
what we call “knowledge” or “belief” and is represented by assertion as a
speech act. The analogous commitment in biology is the adaptation of the
species, which furthers the survival of its form (sometimes by modifying
it)."
I think that Icons commit themselves to connectivity and thus continuity-
even though in themselves they convey no information; what is vital is their
role of connectivity. And this connectivity is to Thirdness which functions
as the general communal long term mode of identity. Therefore, this is not
merely to promote adaptation of the species, which I suggest is informed
more by deviations from the norm; it functions to promote continuity and
robust stability of the species. Deviations emerge within connections with
other Sign systems that provide their information to the 'home system'.
2) I don't think we live in a 'biological age of mass extinction'. Species
always die and new ones or adaptations of the old, emerge. I'd say we are
living in a biological age, as always, which operates as a complex adaptive
system - and this complexity is increasing, which promotes both increasing
decay and diversity. [I'd certainly agree with the 'information overload'
comment!]
Edwina
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