There are two ways of dealing with Peirce, I've sensed. One is to fathom what among however many thousands of writings he had in mind and in essence engage in a form of hermeneutics. It reminds me of seminary. The prize goes to whoever best recapitulates what he says and what he means.
The other way is to allow his thoughts to stimulate us without attempting to "get it right". Harold Bloom refers to such encounters in his Anxiety of Influence. I think this list wants to be more the former but inevitably cannot avoid the latter. As one who is happy to be fallible - because there is much in Peirce I cannot comprehend - I will demur from trying to defend my readings. I do massively respect the document from which the reading came though. *@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* On Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Stephen, you have to read a lot of Peirce to see how he used the terms. > Again, the 'icon' is a specific term used to refer to the relation between > the Dynamic Object and the Representamen. If you read through his Division > of Signs (in eg, 2.247) you'll see that the Icon "is a sign which refers to > the Object that it denotes'......The point is, the relation is to the > Object. Not within the Representamen. Not between the Representamen and the > Interpretation. It refers to the relation between the Representamen and the > Object. > > When I referred to 'many' I refer to those people who call the whole triad > as a 'symbol' or an 'icon' or an 'index...when, again, these terms refer > only to the relation between the Representamen and the Object. After all, > the triad can be made up of an iconic relation, i.e., in a mode of > Firstness (between the Rep.and the Object); and the Representamen can be in > a mode of Thirdness, and the Relation between the Rep. and the Interpretant > can be in a mode of Firstness. That's 1-1-3 as I codify it; it's a Rhematic > Iconic Legisign - an abstract idea. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Stephen C. Rose <[email protected]> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > *Cc:* Peirce List <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Saturday, October 04, 2014 5:16 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7077] iconic commitment (was: > Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6) > > I'm confused. > > > ET: my understanding of the 'icon' in that it is not a Sign, even > though many seem to consider it as such. > > CP: 1, Speculative Grammar, or the general theory of the nature and > meanings of signs, whether they be icons, indices, or symbols .... Peirce: > CP 1.192 Cross-Ref:†† > > > Evidently CP is among the "many". > > *@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* > > On Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 5:00 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Part of the problem may also be due to my understanding of the 'icon' in >> that it is not a Sign, even though many seem to consider it as such. It is >> the term for the Relation between the Dynamic Object and the Representamen. >> A Sign is a triad and the Icon, as a single Relation, is not a Sign. >> >> This Relation between the Dynamic Object and the Representamen (which I >> also term 'input') can be in any of the three categorical modes and as >> such, is termed: icon, index or symbol. >> >> To actually function as an icon, that 'input sensation' must be in a >> Relation or connection. Otherwise, ...nothing. But an iconic input >> certainly has no 'committment' in itself as to how it will be 'read' by the >> mediative rules of the Representamen or understood within the Interpretant. >> That is why it, as Firstness, can be considered as open and offering >> potentiality rather than closed actuality. >> >> So, I'd agree that a Sign (that triad) operating within Firstness would >> indeed by nothing but a Rheme (Rhematic Iconic Qualisign). It is only when >> an attachment to a more specific categorical mode is made (operating within >> Secondness or Thirdness) that a commitment is made, as you point out. >> >> Thanks for your input. >> >> Edwina >> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" < >> [email protected]> >> To: <[email protected]>; "'Peirce List'" <[email protected]> >> Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 4:22 PM >> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7077] iconic commitment (was: >> Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6) >> >> >> >> Gary F., Edwina, Lists, >> >> I find myself agreeing with both sides in this disagreement. Am I >> confused? >> >> Icons themselves involve "connectivity and thus continuity" because a >> qualisign may be connected to a token figure and a rule for interpreting >> those connections--and not yet have the kind of object and interpretant >> needed to make a positive assertion of fact. As such, I read the claim >> that "icons commit themselves to nothing at all" to be based on an >> understanding of what is needed for a sign to involve such a commitment. >> The kinds of commitment that he is talking about is similar in kind to what >> a person does when making an affidavit. >> >> When those three things are connected to one another as parts of our >> percepts, we are then in a position to make a perceptual judgment about >> some object. In making such a judgment, those three connected things can >> function as qualisign, iconic sinsign, and iconic legisign--where we >> attribute qualities with an intensity to some object at a place and a time. >> At this point, we have enough for a dicisign--and an assertion is thereby >> made. >> >> Couldn't we simplify matters by saying that no theme taking as an >> unsaturated sign alone commits itself to anything? One a rheme that is >> part of a larger design involves such a commitment. If that is right, then >> the reason icons commit themselves to nothing at all is that such signs, >> taken by themselves, are never more than a rheme. >> >> --Jeff >> >> Jeff Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> NAU >> (o) 523-8354 >> ________________________________________ >> From: Gary Fuhrman [[email protected]] >> Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 9:45 AM >> To: [email protected]; 'Peirce List' >> Subject: [biosemiotics:7077] iconic commitment (was: Natural >> Propositions, Chapter 3.6) >> >> ET: nowhere in my post did I disagree with Peirce that 'icons commit >> themselves to nothing at all'. Where do you come up with that conclusion? >> >> GF: The first sentence of your previous post said: “I think that Icons >> commit themselves to connectivity and thus continuity”. Now you claim to >> have agreed with Peirce that 'icons commit themselves to nothing at all'. >> >> I think that’s enough to show that any further comment would be >> superfluous, and any further attempt at dialogue along these lines would be >> fruitless. >> >> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]] >> Sent: 4-Oct-14 12:11 PM >> Subject: [biosemiotics:7075] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6 >> >> Gary F - nowhere in my post did I disagree with Peirce that 'icons commit >> themselves to nothing at all'. Where do you come up with that conclusion? >> Nor do I disagree with the 'fortuitous variations in reproduction' play a >> role in adaptation. I've constantly focused on the vital role of >> chance/Firstness. My comment was on the nature of the connections, where I >> pointed out that the function of Thirdness was not merely mediation but >> also continuity of type. It isn't easy for novelty to get Thirdness to >> change! Therefore, chance - if we consider it only as randomness (and I >> don't think it is)...is necessary restrained within the general constraints >> of Thirdness. >> >> Constructive deviations do not, in my view, emerge within random chance >> mutations -- and Peirce also rejected that evoluation/adaptation was >> guided only by mechanical randomness and held that an agapastic 'connected >> and informed' force was the key agent in adaptation/evolution). Chance or >> Firstness is a much stronger force than mere mechanical randomness. Its >> connectedness enables it to offer informed potentiality rather than >> mechanical uninformed randomness. >> >> As for my disagreement with your 'Man-as-Sinner' - we'll have to leave >> it at that. I disgree and point to the various research on complex adaptive >> systems which disagree with the one-way linearity of your view. I strongly >> promote CAS (complex adapative systems) functioning in all realms - >> biological as well as societal, economic, etc..and view semiosis as the >> basic process in the CAS....lots of articles on biology as a CAS and the >> saltational dynamics that take place. >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: Gary Fuhrman<mailto:[email protected]> >> To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> ; 'Peirce >> List'<mailto:[email protected]> >> Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 11:50 AM >> Subject: RE: [biosemiotics:7072] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, >> Chapter 3.6 >> >> Edwina, I guess you don’t agree with Peirce that icons “commit themselves >> to nothing at all” (MS 599, as quoted). You also seem to disagree with his >> suggestion that “fortuitous variations in reproduction” (or what you call >> “deviations from the norm”) play a role in evolution analogous to the role >> of icons in cognition (and the role of chance as Firstness in Peirce’s >> cosmology). This may well indicate a major difference between you and >> Peirce concerning Firstness as a mode of being. >> >> I’m more surprised, though, at your denial that this is an age of mass >> extinction in biology — the seventh in the history of the planet, by the >> usual count of evolutionary biologists, and the first to be caused mainly >> by a single species (guess who). What I hear from biologists is that >> biodiversity is in steep decline. I’d like to see your evidence that the >> complexity of the biosphere is increasing … but not at the cost of >> distracting the list from the main argument of NP. So I’ll just leave it at >> that. >> >> gary f. >> >> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]] >> Sent: 4-Oct-14 10:38 AM >> To: Gary Fuhrman; [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]. >> ee>; 'Peirce List' >> Subject: [biosemiotics:7072] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter >> 3.6 >> >> Gary F wrote: >> >> 1) "Icons, representing Firstness, commit themselves to nothing, but >> their connection (Thirdness) with experiential external Secondnesses >> constitutes information. The Dicisign is the kind of sign which actually >> makes such a connection. The generalized (and fallible!) commitment to that >> connection is what we call “knowledge” or “belief” and is represented by >> assertion as a speech act. The analogous commitment in biology is the >> adaptation of the species, which furthers the survival of its form >> (sometimes by modifying it)." >> >> I think that Icons commit themselves to connectivity and thus continuity- >> even though in themselves they convey no information; what is vital is >> their role of connectivity. And this connectivity is to Thirdness which >> functions as the general communal long term mode of identity. Therefore, >> this is not merely to promote adaptation of the species, which I suggest is >> informed more by deviations from the norm; it functions to promote >> continuity and robust stability of the species. Deviations emerge within >> connections with other Sign systems that provide their information to the >> 'home system'. >> >> 2) I don't think we live in a 'biological age of mass extinction'. >> Species always die and new ones or adaptations of the old, emerge. I'd say >> we are living in a biological age, as always, which operates as a complex >> adaptive system - and this complexity is increasing, which promotes both >> increasing decay and diversity. [I'd certainly agree with the 'information >> overload' comment!] >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> -------------------- >> >> >> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/ >>> peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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