Hi, Gary,
Yes, when Peirce is discussing the idea that Mill meant by 'event', that
won't be the same that Peirce meant by 'event' in his own thinking.
Meanwhile, I did a little more looking around. At the very least, this
sort of thing will help people clarify the terminological tangles that
they may encounter in the future.
In an 1896 passage that Gary R. brought to my attention many years ago,
Peirce discusses in some detail his own idea of an event; once again,
similarly as with the probability context, it is the idea of something
involving exclusive alternatives. Here's Peirce's summary of his
discussion in that passage:
[....] In general, however, we may say that for an event there is
requisite: first, a contradiction [e.g., between contradictory
qualities – B.U.] ; second, existential embodiments of these
contradictory states; [third, [– C.P. editors]] an immediate
existential junction of these two contradictory existential
embodiments or facts, so that the subjects are existentially
identical; and fourth, in this existential junction a definite one
of the two facts must be existentially first in the order of
evolution and existentially second in the order of involution. We
say the former is earlier, the latter later in time. That is, the
past can in some measure work upon and influence (or flow into) the
future, but the future cannot in the least work upon the past. On
the other hand, the future can remember and know the past, but the
past can only know the future so far as it can imagine the process
by which the future is to be influenced. [....]
[From CP 1.493 in "Triads" in "The Logic of Mathematics; An Attempt
to Develop My Categories From Within", circa 1896]
Best, Ben
On 10/11/2014 3:32 PM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Thanks, Ben, for the research!
I know that “Jon was suggesting that Peirce was consciously operating
in a terminological tradition including the fields that we now call
probability theory and statistics, in which Peirce did some important
work.” But that seems to me unlikely in a context where he’s mainly
referring to the logical difficulties with J.S. Mill’s concept of
causality. Of course Peirce was aware of that technical sense, but
there’s nothing in “Kaina Stoicheia” to indicate that he had that
technical usage in mind.
gary f.
*From:* Benjamin Udell
*Sent:* 10-Oct-14 12:36 PM
*To:* [email protected]
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8
Gary F., Jon,
I think that Jon was suggesting that Peirce was consciously operating
in a terminological tradition including the fields that we now call
probability theory and statistics, in which Peirce did some important
work. And you know how Peirce was about honoring terminological
traditions. Years ago here at peirce-l I was discussing 'event' as
that word is sometimes used in physics, going by a definition that I
remembered from a passage somewhere by Einstein, pretty much
equivalent to Peirce's definition of 'occurrence', and Jon became
insistent that I shouldn't use the word 'event' in that way. Jon is
often milder nowadays! Anyway, in case this argument is really about
who is to do a little investigation, I'll do a little.
'Event' is in the word list at P.E.P.-UQÀM:
http://web.archive.org/web/20120324152509/http://www.pep.uqam.ca/listsofwords.pep?l=E
<http://web.archive.org/web/20120324152509/http:/www.pep.uqam.ca/listsofwords.pep?l=E>
'Occur' (but not 'occurrence') is in the word list at P.E.P.-UQÀM:
http://web.archive.org/web/20120324152344/http://www.pep.uqam.ca/listsofwords.pep?l=O
<http://web.archive.org/web/20120324152344/http:/www.pep.uqam.ca/listsofwords.pep?l=O>
I don't find anything in the Century Dictionary definitions of
'occur' and 'occurrence' relating to a technical distinction made
between them and 'event' in probability theory.
The Century Dictionary, starting with 4th meaning under "event":
A contingent, probable, or possible happening; a coming to pass;
in the theory of probabilities, anything which may or may not be;
any general state of things considered as having a probability:
as, in the _/event/_ of his death his interest will lapse. —
*Compound event,* that which in reference to its probability is
regarded as consisting in the concatenation or coincidence of two
or more different events. — *Double event,* two races, or other
trials of strength or skill, upon the winning of both depends the
winning of certain wager or stake. — *Simple event,* in the
doctrine of probabilities, something whose probability is deduced
from direct observation. *= Syn. 1.* [....] _/Occurrence/_ is
literally that which meets us in our progress through life, and
does not connect itself with the past as an _/event/ _ does. [....]
[End quote]
In that sense, the same event can take indefinitely many forms, since
it is defined by an abstractive question that it resolves (note the
etymological parallel between 'event' and 'outcome'). As Peirce was
aware of that technical sense, it's easy to see how he felt the need
to use another word for the sense of a slice of the actual in all its
actual detail. Such a slice the closest that he gets to the idea of
an actual thing in itself, - the _/occurrence/_ (in MS 647) is not
incognizable, but instead is not fully cognizable, yet still is
without some pre-designatable actual hidden part or actual secret
compartment that in principle nobody could ever know or imagine.
Best, Ben
On 10/10/2014 11:06 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Jon,
If we adopt your methodology, I guess that in order to decode this
message of yours, we need to look into the history of usage of the
terms "probability", "statistics", "technical" and "distinction", as
well as "term" and "look into"; and we have to make all of that
history explicit before we dare to guess what you're talking about.
I think we have a better chance of understanding Peirce's particular
usages of the terms "event" and "occurrence" by looking at the
contexts in which he used them, including his purpose of contrasting
them with the term "fact". We may guess wrong about what he means,
at first - abductions are often wrong - but just as often, by
continuing the dialogue, we can *learn* that they are wrong, and
guess again.
gary f.
-----Original Message-----
From: Jon Awbrey
Sent: 10-Oct-14 9:10 AM
To: 'Peirce List'
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8
Gary & All,
Just off-hand, you might look into the way the term "event" is used
in probability and statistics, and the technical distinction that
is made between "event" and "occurrence". I'm pretty sure the
terms have been used that way since Boole, at least, if not since
the time of Fermat and Pascal.
Regards,
Jon
Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Gary R, Clark, Stephen, lists,
Clark, I can't comment on Davidson because I haven't read him.
But as for Peirce's usage of "event", it never occurred to me
that it means anything different than the usual vernacular
meaning: an event is something that actually happens.
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