Gary F - your understanding of a discussion seems to me to be rather merely a submissive reiteration of a text. That's hardly an intelligent way to debate and discuss that text - which is, in itself, a discussion of a theory. I would think that a full debate would explore even the definitions - those used by Peirce, those used by Frederik - and others.
I don't see that my definition of a symbol is in any way different from that of Peirce, in that it is - if you go deeply into Peircean analysis - a RELATION between the Object and the Representamen, and this Relation is 'used and understood (my emphasis) as such', which implies an element of consciousness. That is, the symbol is both not a full triad and therefore is not a Sign but is a specific interaction between two aspects of the triad and furthermore, implies an action of consciousness. I would also add that when you conclude that 'we don't need them (my views on the meaning of terms) to discuss NP' - are you speaking for everyone or just yourself? If you personally disagree with my interpretation of the Peircean 'symbol', then all that is needed is for you to personally voice such disagreement; I don't think that you need add a universal'we don't need them'. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Gary Fuhrman To: [email protected] ; 'Peirce list' Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 12:25 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:7313] Re: Natural Propositions chapter four Edwina, it seems to me that for purposes of discussing Natural Propositions, we should use the Peircean definitions of "symbol", "argument" and "Dicisign", because that's what Frederik is doing in NP. Peirce's definitions can be found in EP2:272 ff. His definition of "symbol" in Baldwin's Dictionary also applies here: "(1) A SIGN (q.v.) which is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and without regard to the motives which originally governed its selection." If you want other definitions that better suit your own purposes, you're welcome to supply them, but we certainly don't need them for a discussion of NP. gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 31-Oct-14 10:35 AM To: [email protected]; Peirce list Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7309] Natural Propositions chapter four I agree with much of what Tyler is arguing. A few points and these are about definitions. 1) I think we need a clear definition of 'symbol'. To me, it is a Relation (that between the Representamen and the Object, whether Dynamic or Immediate) that is arbitrary, is consciously assigned by the species or Representamen-Agent, is in the conscious control of the species/Representamen-Agent; and thus, can be changed. As such an unconnected sign, it must be assigned by a collective with the conscious intentionality to so assign it. So, the collective will assign the sound of 'cat' to an animal. Or assign the meaning of STOP to a red light. As such, I consider that the symbol is confined to the human species. 2) As for the definition of the term 'argument', I think that it doesn't refer necessarily to the Sign of that term (Argument Symbolic Legisign) but to the syllogistic process of reasoning. All Peircean Signs are, as triads, also syllogisms. Therefore, all Peircean Signs operate as 'arguments'. (lower case). That is, they have a minor premiss (the Object relation); a Major Premiss (the Representamen) and a Conclusion (the Interpretant relation). 3) What is the Dicisign? To my view, at the moment, it is a powerful physical argument - an argument in the full semiosic or syllogistic framework, where Mind is obviously at work (the Major Premiss) to transform one form of physical /biologicalexistentiality into another form of physical/biological existentiality. What removes this interaction from the mechanical cause-effect interaction and puts it into a syllogistic argument (semiosis) is that insertion of 'thought' or Mind into the interaction. There is no mechanical reason for the E. Coli to swim to sugar, but there certainly is a mental reason. And yes, it would be deductive because of the necessary relation - within the 'mind' of the E. Coli morphology. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Tyler Bennett To: biosemiotics list ; Peirce list Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 10:01 AM Subject: [biosemiotics:7309] Natural Propositions chapter four Gary F, list, Thank you for your detailed comments and I apologize for the gap in communication. Gary F. wrote: "You suggest that an "alternative solution" to the problem you raise "would be to cede symbols to all instances of semiosis (or at least to some non-humans)". Do you mean that at least some semiosis other than human varieties should be regarded as symbolic? If so, I don't get what problem it's supposed to solve, or how it's relevant to the idea that inference is implicit in all cognitive semiosis. This is part of the Dicisign doctrine, and symbols are not essential to the functioning of Dicisigns in the way that icons and indices are; so what difference does it make whether we "cede symbols" to instances of non-human semiosis?" The problem has to do with associating the highest types of sign use to all instances of semiosis, as Frederik does with NP. When we do this, we lose the ability to meaningfully class different types of sign use. I proposed that either symbols should be reserved for higher sign types than at least the E. coli bacteria (Edwina's stated preference), or we should cleave to the later Peirce where there are twenty types of legisign, in which case there is plenty of room to both describe the symbol use of non-humans as well as retain some sign types for the description of verbal language (There are plenty of scholars who believe the taxonomic application of sign types is an inappropriate use of Peirce. I am not one of them). To clarify, when I speak of the taxonomic approach I think mainly of Deacon's use in Symbolic Species of the icon-index-symbol trichotomy for distinguishing verbal language semiosis from other kinds. As you know this approach is somewhat maligned in for example The Symbolic Species Evolved, where Frederik has an article that says the bare use of the object dimension (icon-index-symbol) is insufficient for this task (He does not say that such a classificatory approach is not possible. He only says Deacon's attempt is an oversimplification). I also think of Kalevi Kull's use of the object dimension to classify vegetative animal and cultural forms of semiosis. Dicisigns do indeed involve icons and indices in a more explicit way than symbols, however the fact remains that Frederik associates symbols and even arguments with all instances of semiosis. For example here: "Thus, the perceptual Dicisign of reading the active site on a carbohydrate molecule--a proto version of the proposition 'This is sugar'--is followed by the action Dicisign of swimming in that direction--to form an argument: 'If sugar, swim in its direction. This is sugar. So, swim in its direction'. That this forms a very primitive argument--and not merely a cause-effect chain--can be induced from the fact that the E. coli may be fooled by artificial sweetener whose molecules possess the same molecular surface configuration as the active site in carbohydrates--but otherwise have a rather different chemistry without the easily releasable covalent binding energy of carbohydrates" (145-146)." In the footnote there he reaffirms that this is a deductive argument. The only distinction he offers between this and verbal language for example is that the E. coli behavior is a "very primitive" argument. This distinction is much like the distinction between proto and fully fledged propositions. I asked Frederik at the Bulgaria IASS congress last month, "So, all forms of semiosis involve arguments?" And he said yes. This is no internal contradiction to NP or dicisign doctrine, but it presents a serious complication for any taxonomic use of Peirce's theory of signs. If any sub-argument is merely the 'workings out' of a fully fledged argument, these workings out themselves are degenerate and supposedly not signs at all. To me this line of argument is a needless over complication of an otherwise usable system. Gary also wrote: "You argue that "NP already goes beyond the 1903 classification, even if not explicitly. It does so in 3.7 where Frederik maintains that dicisigns have both immediate and dynamic objects." But I don't see how that "goes beyond the 1903 classification", as NP merely points out that the idea of the Dicisign having two objects is introduced in the 1903 Syllabus itself (EP2:276), which refers to them as "Primary" and "Secondary" objects." As a static taxonomy the table of ten signs commonly referred to as the 1903 classification does not make room for a sign to have more than one object relation(as far as I understand it). When it comes to a taxonomy we need a static set of sign types that explicitly make room for all the dimensions of the sign. When I wrote that dicisign doctrine implies a post-1903 sign typology, I was referring to the section where Frederik associates the primary (index/subject) and secondary (icon/predicate) objects with the dynamic and immediate objects (68). The way that the immediate and dynamic objects factor into the different types of signs is not worked out in the 1903 classification. It produces two of the ten trichotomies generally associated with the 1908 classification. I take this reference to the later Peirce as an invitation to consider NP in the context of the 1908, 66 types of sign in order to retain a taxonomic approach. About the quote from Diagrammatology: "...there is probably no upper bound to the complexity of symbol types which higher animals have access to as single signs," but "To Peirce, explicit control is even paramount to reasoning proper -- which is why animal reasoning despite many similarities to human reasoning only rarely may qualify as proper reasoning." Diagrammatology You are right, I did take it to mean higher animals not including humans. Perhaps that is not what he meant there, however it does still seem clear to me that Frederik wants to maintain that all instances of semiosis entail arguments, and that therefore there is no "upper bound" to symbol use in non-human semiosis. My position is simply that, if we want to use a static taxonomy of signs of however many types, it seems that there should be a set of signs that are unique to human language use. Edwina Taborsky , Deacon, Kull, and others seem to think this set is symbols in general. Dicisign doctrine clearly contradicts this. I happen to think the book is brilliant, but I would hope to maintain a taxonomic approach. My thought is that the typology of 66 signs can both apply symbol use to non-humans while at the same time retaining some types of sign to describe human language use. This would also allow us to clarify the difference between proto and fully fledged propositions or, as he says it above, animal reasoning and "proper reasoning". That being said I definitely defer to your expertise regarding Peirce's own writings. regards, Tyler Bennett
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