Tyler, lists, I find your approach quite intriguing, and see some textual support for it. For example, in the following passage from the "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmatism" Peirce discusses his Categories (here sometimes referred to as Predicaments == "predicates of predicates") in the context of hypostatic abstraction, by which operation he says that we can turn "signs that we can think or think through" into "subjects of thought."
CP 4.549 . I will now say a few words about what you have called Categories [. . . ] That wonderful operation of hypostatic abstraction by which we seem to create entia rationis that are, nevertheless, sometimes real, furnishes us *the means of turning predicates from being signs that we think or think through*, into being subjects thought of. We thus think of the thought-sign itself, making it the object of another thought-sign. Thereupon, we can repeat the operation of hypostatic abstraction, and from these second intentions derive third intentions. Does this series proceed endlessly? I think not. So, to begin with, there seems to be this primitive semiotic level of *signs thought or thought through*. I think this is important, but time constraints keep me from saying exactly why. For now I'll just suggest that at this primitive level of semiosis that there is clearly no hypostatic abstraction whatsoever. Peirce continues: What then are the characters of its different members? My thoughts on this subject are not yet harvested. I will only say that the subject concerns Logic [i.e., semiotic GR], but that the divisions so obtained must not be confounded with the different Modes of Being: Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny). On the contrary, the succession of [Categories] is different in the different Modes of Being. Meantime, it will be proper that in our system of diagrammatization we should provide for the division, whenever needed, of each of our three Universes of modes of reality into Realms for the different [Categories]. I've attempted to address this in part (in the Peirce list and in certain papers) as movement through 6 possible categorial paths, or vectors, of genuine trichotomic relations. However, there's no need (nor time) to get into that just now. Interestingly, Peirce immediately continues in the Prolegomena with a discussion of *Mind* and *Quasi-mind*. CP 4.550 . All the various meanings of the word "Mind," Logical, Metaphysical, and Psychological, are apt to be confounded more or less [. . . ] "Mind." In one of the narrowest and most concrete of its logical meanings, a Mind is that Seme of The Truth, whose determinations become Immediate Interpretants of all other Signs whose Dynamical Interpretants are dynamically connected. In our Diagram the same thing which represents The Truth must be regarded as in another way representing the Mind, and indeed, as being the Quasi-mind of all the Signs represented on the Diagram. For any set of Signs which are so connected that a complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be Determinations of one Sign which is a *Quasi-mind*. It is here that he next famously notes that thought "is not necessarily connected with a brain." I recently quoted a short snippet from this passage, but will quote a bit more concerning the Quasi-minds, notably the *Quasi-utterer* and *Quasi-interpreter* (which yet are one mind in the sign). - CP 4.551. Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there. [, , , ] Not only is thought in the organic world, but it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give "Sign" a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense to come within our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interprete*r; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, *welded*. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic. . . [emphasis in the original] One final well-known quotation which, I think, tends to support your thesis, Tyler, although its religious overtones might present an obstacle to some, but not to those who know Peirce's cosmology well, and who appreciate the breadth and depth of his religious thought. In this passage the universe is seen as "a great symbol," "precisely an argument." CP 5.119. . . [T]he universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play in an argument that, they of course, play in the universe -- that Universe being precisely an argument. In the little bit that you or I can make out of this huge demonstration, our perceptual judgments are the premisses for us and these perceptual judgments have icons as their predicates, in which icons Qualities are immediately presented. But what is first for us is not first in nature. The premisses of Nature's own process are all the independent uncaused elements of facts that go to make up the variety of nature which the necessitarian supposes to have been all in existence from the foundation of the world, but which the Tychist supposes are continually receiving new accretions.These premisses of nature, however, though they are not the perceptual facts that are premisses to us, nevertheless must resemble them in being premisses. We can only imagine what they are by comparing them with the premisses for us. . . Best, Gary R *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 11:56 AM, Tyler Bennett <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, Gary R, Gary F, Frederik, list, > > > In my initial post I wanted to raise the question of the taxonomic > approach mainly because, from one perspective it is not possible within the > dicisign doctrine as it is laid out in NP. If all real signs partake of > arguments, the details of which are worked out as separate interactions of > icons, indices, etc., than these particular workings out are degenerate or > fragmentary and as such are not "signs" per se and have no individual > significance. Therefore to use the typology of ten for example to classify > different kinds of sign actions would be incorrect. > > > On this topic Edwina wrote: > > > "My own view is that the symbol is a semiosic relation (that between the > Representamen and the Object) which is confined to human cognition. As a > purely artificial relation, I think that it REQUIRES an artificial means of > expression - which is language or other cognitively constructed media > system. Furthermore, I think that this enabled the human species to free > itself from the restrictions of the physical realm and 'imagine' the world > as it 'ought to be' rather than 'as it is'...This leaves the non-human > realm with the Dicent Indexical Sinsign - a local mechanical reaction, and > the Dicent Indexical Legisign which is, by virtue of its Legisign, > connected to the truths of the Universal and thus, not merely reactive." > > > While this is one way to preserve the taxonomic use of Peirce's theory of > signs (e.g. for distinguishing human from non-human semiosis), it seems to > me that the alternative solution could be just as effective. That > alternative solution would be to cede symbols to all instances of semiosis > (or at least to some non-humans), but to subdivide them and arguments > according to the typology of 66 signs, where some kinds of > symbols/arguments are applicable to *E. coli* for example, and others > only occur in the case of verbal language signs. > > > One reason I think this approach would be better is that NP already goes > beyond the 1903 classification, even if not explicitly. It does so in 3.7 > where Frederik maintains that dicisigns have both immediate and dynamic > objects. As Gary pointed out, this connection of the parts of the dicisign > to immediate and dynamic objects is one of the most interesting portions of > the book so far, and explains in a concrete example how one sign action can > possess more than one relation to an object (can be an icon, index, and/or > a symbol), something for which the 1903 classification does not > accommodate. Another reason to prefer this solution has to do with the > stress Frederik puts on hypostatic abstraction being the true human > semiotic threshold. Hypostatic abstraction is another of Peirce's terms > which, although it is not explicitly articulated within any known > typologies of the 66 types, certainly could be said to only obtain within > one of the six classes of symbolic legisigns (according to Romanini's > periodic table of signs). This is just one way that we could both cede > symbols to all forms of semiosis, while retaining the possibility of > taxonomically differentiating human from non-human semiosis, and would > allow us to disambiguate some of the terms in NP. > > > On this disambiguation, > > Gary R. wrote, "your unsettling question concerning the differentiation of > proto-propositions from full fledged propositions surely needs to be > addressed if we are to include the proto-propositions in the kind of > thinking just discussed above." > > For example we could possibly distinguish proto-propositions from fully > fledged propositions as those which do not entail hypostatic abstraction. > > > Though this solution would be a nice way to preserve the taxonomic use of > Peirce's signs, elsewhere Frederik does maintain, > > "that higher animals are not only at the command of symbols in general, > but also of those most demanding and complex of symbols called arguments > and reasonings, involving diagrams," and > > > "...there is probably no upper bound to the complexity of symbol types > which higher animals have access to as single signs," but > > > "To Peirce, explicit control is even paramount to reasoning proper -- > which is why animal reasoning despite many similarities to human reasoning > only rarely may qualify as proper reasoning." 245 Diagrammatology > > > I wonder if he would also say that there is no "upper bound" to the symbol > use of the *E.Coli* bacteria? Frederik appears at once to allow for the > taxonomic approach ("My aim here is to render the semiotic aspects of > Deacon's hypothesis -- with which I basically sympathize -- somewhat more > precise" [Diagrammatology]), and at the same time to preclude the > possibility that this precision can be articulated in taxonomic Peircean > terms. > > > There are two ambiguities: The degrees of "self control" that distinguish > the human use of signs, and the distinction between proto- and fully > fledged propositions. Can/should they be 'rendered more precise' according > to the higher types of sign? > > > > > > >
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