Gary F, list,
Thank you for your detailed comments and I apologize for
the gap in communication.
Gary F. wrote: "You suggest that an “alternative
solution” to the problem you raise “would be to cede symbols to all instances
of semiosis (or at least to some non-humans)”. Do you mean that at least some
semiosis other than human varieties should be regarded as symbolic? If so, I
don’t get what problem it’s supposed to solve, or how it’s relevant to the idea
that inference is implicit in all cognitive semiosis. This is part of the
Dicisign doctrine, and symbols are not essential to the functioning of
Dicisigns in the way that icons and indices are; so what difference does it
make whether we “cede symbols” to instances of non-human semiosis?"
The problem has to do with associating the highest types of
sign use to all instances of semiosis, as Frederik does with NP. When we do
this, we lose the ability to meaningfully class different types of sign use. I
proposed that either symbols should be reserved for higher sign types than at
least the E. coli bacteria (Edwina's
stated preference), or we should cleave to the later Peirce where there are
twenty types of legisign, in which case there is plenty of room to both describe
the symbol use of non-humans as well as retain some sign types for the
description of verbal language (There are plenty of scholars who
believe the taxonomic application of sign types is an inappropriate use of
Peirce.
I am not one of them).
To clarify, when I speak of the taxonomic approach I think
mainly of Deacon's use in Symbolic
Species of the icon-index-symbol trichotomy for distinguishing verbal
language semiosis from other kinds. As you know this approach is somewhat
maligned in for example The Symbolic
Species Evolved, where Frederik has an article that says
the bare use of the object dimension (icon-index-symbol) is insufficient for
this task (He does not say that such a classificatory approach is not possible.
He only says Deacon's attempt is an oversimplification). I also think of Kalevi
Kull's use of the object dimension to classify vegetative animal and cultural
forms of semiosis.
Dicisigns do indeed involve icons and indices in a more explicit way than
symbols, however the fact remains that Frederik associates symbols and even
arguments with all instances of semiosis. For example here:
"Thus, the perceptual Dicisign of reading the active site on a carbohydrate
molecule--a proto version of the proposition 'This is sugar'--is followed by
the action Dicisign of swimming in that direction--to form an argument: 'If
sugar, swim in its direction. This is sugar. So, swim in its direction'. That
this forms a very primitive argument--and not merely a cause-effect chain--can
be induced from the fact that the E. coli may be fooled by artificial sweetener
whose molecules possess the same
molecular surface configuration as the active site in carbohydrates--but
otherwise have a rather different chemistry without the easily releasable
covalent binding energy of carbohydrates" (145-146)."
In the footnote there he reaffirms that this is a deductive
argument. The only distinction he offers between this and verbal language for
example is that the E. coli behavior is a "very
primitive" argument. This distinction is much like the distinction between
proto and fully fledged propositions. I asked Frederik at the Bulgaria IASS
congress last month, "So, all
forms of semiosis involve arguments?" And he said yes. This is no internal
contradiction to NP or dicisign doctrine, but it presents a serious
complication for any taxonomic use of Peirce's theory of signs. If any
sub-argument is merely the 'workings out' of a fully fledged argument, these
workings out themselves are degenerate and supposedly not signs at all. To me
this line of argument is a needless over complication of an otherwise usable
system.
Gary also wrote: "You argue that “NP already goes
beyond the 1903 classification, even if not explicitly. It does so in 3.7 where
Frederik maintains that dicisigns have both immediate and dynamic objects.” But
I don’t see how that “goes beyond the 1903 classification”, as NP merely points
out that the idea of the Dicisign having two objects is introduced in the 1903
Syllabus itself (EP2:276), which refers to them as “Primary” and “Secondary”
objects."
As a static taxonomy the table of ten signs commonly
referred to as the 1903 classification does not make room for a sign to have
more than one object relation(as far as I understand it). When it comes to a
taxonomy we need a static set of sign types that explicitly make room for all
the dimensions of the sign. When I wrote that dicisign doctrine implies a
post-1903 sign typology, I was referring to the section where Frederik
associates the primary (index/subject) and secondary (icon/predicate) objects
with
the dynamic and immediate objects (68). The way that the immediate and dynamic
objects factor into the different types of signs is not worked out in the 1903
classification. It produces two of the ten trichotomies generally associated
with the 1908 classification. I take this reference to the later Peirce as an
invitation to consider NP in the context of the 1908, 66 types of sign in order
to retain a taxonomic approach.
About the quote from Diagrammatology:
"...there is probably no upper bound to the complexity
of symbol types which higher animals have access to as single signs," but
"To Peirce, explicit control is even paramount to
reasoning proper -- which is why animal reasoning despite many similarities to
human reasoning only rarely may qualify as proper reasoning." Diagrammatology
You are right, I did take it to mean higher animals not
including humans. Perhaps that is not what he meant there, however it does
still seem clear to me that Frederik wants to maintain that all instances of
semiosis entail arguments, and that therefore there is no "upper
bound" to symbol use in non-human semiosis.
My position is simply that, if we want to use a static
taxonomy of signs of however many types, it seems that there should be a set of
signs that are unique to human language use. Edwina Taborsky , Deacon, Kull,
and others seem to think this set is symbols in general. Dicisign doctrine
clearly contradicts this. I happen to think the book is brilliant, but I would
hope to maintain a taxonomic approach. My thought is that the typology of 66
signs can both apply symbol use to non-humans while at the same time retaining
some types of sign to describe human language use. This would also allow us to
clarify the difference between proto and fully fledged propositions or, as he
says it above, animal reasoning and "proper reasoning".
That being said I definitely defer to your expertise regarding Peirce's own
writings.
regards,Tyler Bennett
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