All,
In section 5.2, Stjernfelt brings up the “Adaptation to Rationality” hypothesis in conjunction with the issue of "logical constants" so problematic in Hurford's account. The logical constants problem is mostly a consequence of Hurford's limited view that reference to a dynamic object requires omniscience. It is not necessary, I think, to go into much detail here, except to mention that Hurford conflates mistake making in animal cognition with the inability to perceive concrete individuals across space or time. The immediate object of the individual in one scene does not bind with the immediate object of the same individual in another scene to make a sign that refers to the dynamic object of the concrete individual. Stjernfelt solves this problem in Hurford's work by bringing in the concept of the "Universe of Discourse", a subset of all possible referents in the universe that are brought to bear on a particular proposition (or, presumably, set of propositions). He quotes Boole in a footnote on p. 131 of NP: "In every discourse, whether of the mind conversing with its own thoughts, > or of the individual in his intercourse with others, there is an assumed or > expressed limit within which the subjects of its operation are confined. > The most unfettered discourse is that in which the words we use are > understood in the widest possible application, and for them the limits of > discourse are co-extensive with those of the universe itself. But more > usually we confine ourselves to a less spacious field. (...) Now, whatever > may be the extent of the field within which all the objects of our > discourse are found, that field may properly be termed the universe of > discourse. Furthermore, this universe of discourse is in the strictest > sense the ultimate subject of the discourse" (Boole, from *The Laws of > Thought*, 1852). What I am curious about in this section is how the Universe of Discourse concept overlaps with Umwelt theory. For one, it is clear from Stjernfelt's words that he sees the Universe of Discourse as a restriction on the referent objects of discourse. In Umwelt theory, though, it is not just that a species only attends to certain dynamic objects in the environment. All perception and interaction with the environment is already loaded with meaning. It seems that the limitation of an Umwelt is not just on what objects can be detected by a perceptual apparatus but rather what meaning the objects have or potentially could have for the animal. In Uexkull's work this is mediated by the functional tone of the object -- the "what can I do with this"-ness that the object radiates with from the point of view of the perceiver. Thus, if anything, a Universe of Discourse would be the subset of Immediate Objects, the signs of which are picked up because of the framing or priming effects of the interpretants rising from the animal's Innenwelt. I wonder the indexical relation that the immediate object has with the proposition (the perception-action cycle in question) could be said to point to an iconic relation in the Innenwelt between the physiological goals and the psychological drives of the animal. Regardless, a Universe of Discourse would not be limited only by the set of possible dynamic objects but also which interpretants are applicable to the discourse in the first place. This may be domain specific (e.g., the concept of "subject" in the various disciplines, or framing or priming effects of the previous thought) or level specific (e.g., explaining an inference chain to a first year university student or to an expert in the discipline) or application specific (e.g., having a casual conversation versus a problem solving discussion). Whether the immediate objects produced by these different Universes of Discourse may be intelligently brought together to form a referent to the same dynamic object is another issue. In any case, given that Umwelt theory does see the Umwelt as already populated with meaning, or at least counterpoints to meaning "inside" the organism, I am a little concerned that the ventral-dorsal split discussion in *NP* has the organism scanning the entire perceptual field for "things out there" for further processing without considering the internal affective or even functional need to go looking for somethings out there. Wouldn't we expect that the search image have some influence on which "that out there" is selected/prioritized for further detailed processing? Isn't that what makes objects in the Umwelt always have functional meaning, i.e., the lack of neutral objects in non-human species? In other words, wouldn't the Subjects of these natural propositions already be laden with some type of Predicate -- e.g., danger/GET AWAY FROM -- to enter the Innenwelt at all? Mara Woods
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