Dear Mara, Garys, lists - A good summary. But I do not think neutral objects are confined to human being Umwelt only. It is correct that Uexküll sometimes said things in that direction, just as, other times, he said the opposite. But we have no reason to assume that mammals or birds, e.g., have a functional relation to every medium-size stone they perceive - rather, animals able to navigate their way through surroundings to find or flee from the functional parts of the Umwelt (like predators, preys, conspecifics, nourishment, shelter etc.) will have to be able to cognize those non-functional parts of their Umwelt - that is, neutral objects. Best F
Den 18/11/2014 kl. 02.07 skrev Gary Richmond <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>: Mara, Gary F. Lists, Thank you for your recent, exhilarating and insightful dialogue on several key issues taken up in Chapter 5 as it helped clarify much which I just couldn't seem to get my head around regarding the dorsal stream and how Frederik employs the logical lessons which Hurford draws from the dorsal split, 'correcting' his logic in extrapolating adroitly to that of Peirce's and the dicisign. I can't say that I'm yet wholly secure in these matters, but your discussion was decidedly helpful A kind of model of the dialogical thinking you've been doing which helped me so much, to rather "break through" to a better understanding of some of the principal themes of Chapter 5, occurs at the conclusion of Gary's most recent post in the chapter thread. GF. . . that’s why the ventral/dorsal should not be regarded as an absolute split, but rather as a differentiation of the perception part of the cycle — just as the subject/predicate split is not absolute in Peircean semiotic logic (NP §3.10). MW: Isn't that what makes objects in the Umwelt always have functional meaning, i.e., the lack of neutral objects in non-human species? In other words, wouldn't the Subjects of these natural propositions already be laden with some type of Predicate -- e.g., danger/GET AWAY FROM -- to enter the Innenwelt at all? GF Yes — or if we regard the Innenwelt as the home base of predicates, and the Umwelt (or universe of discourse) as the domain of subjects, the dorsal stream would be providing feedback to the Innenwelt, which will then feed forward into perception in the next turn of the semiotic cycle, calling in more detailed information from the ventral stream. (Except that the division into separate ‘cycles’ — like the division of semiosis into separate ‘signs’ — is somewhat artificial, an attempt to pin down these continuous processes so that we can diagram them. . . Surely action and perception must be running in parallel in the brain, not taking turns.) I hope we’re thinking along the same lines here, and perhaps clarifying the connection between dorsal/ventral and subject/predicate. I would say that you are both most certainly "clarifying the connection between dorsal/ventral and subject/predicate." Indeed it occurs to me, as perhaps it does to some others on the Peirce list in particular, that while I find the discipline of biosemiotics fascinating, interesting, and important, and imagine that Frederik's book may contribute to expanding not only its but all semiotic horizons (which, of course, is why we're doing a seminar on it) that it is immensely helpful to read just the kind of exchange you've been having. In fact it proved considerably more valuable than reading the source material I excerpted and posted links to earlier in this thread, material which actually tended to complicate matters for me (and perhaps some other non-biosemioticians) and, so, muddy the waters a bit. So, thanks again. Best, Gary R
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