Mara, that’s a very good question you’ve raised. I’ll insert my responses below.
From: Mara Woods [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 14-Nov-14 3:45 PM All, In section 5.2, Stjernfelt brings up the “Adaptation to Rationality” hypothesis in conjunction with the issue of "logical constants" so problematic in Hurford's account. The logical constants problem is mostly a consequence of Hurford's limited view that reference to a dynamic object requires omniscience. It is not necessary, I think, to go into much detail here, except to mention that Hurford conflates mistake making in animal cognition with the inability to perceive concrete individuals across space or time. The immediate object of the individual in one scene does not bind with the immediate object of the same individual in another scene to make a sign that refers to the dynamic object of the concrete individual. Stjernfelt solves this problem in Hurford's work by bringing in the concept of the "Universe of Discourse", a subset of all possible referents in the universe that are brought to bear on a particular proposition (or, presumably, set of propositions). He quotes Boole in a footnote on p. 131 of NP: "In every discourse, whether of the mind conversing with its own thoughts, or of the individual in his intercourse with others, there is an assumed or expressed limit within which the subjects of its operation are confined. The most unfettered discourse is that in which the words we use are understood in the widest possible application, and for them the limits of discourse are co-extensive with those of the universe itself. But more usually we confine ourselves to a less spacious field. (...) Now, whatever may be the extent of the field within which all the objects of our discourse are found, that field may properly be termed the universe of discourse. Furthermore, this universe of discourse is in the strictest sense the ultimate subject of the discourse" (Boole, from The Laws of Thought, 1852). GF: We should notice here that discourse is essentially communicative, or dialogic as Peirce would say, and is usually applied to communication carried out through a linguistic medium. This makes it problematic to apply the “universe of discourse” concept to phenomena closer to the other end of the semiotic spectrum, such as perception in animals. What I am curious about in this section is how the Universe of Discourse concept overlaps with Umwelt theory. For one, it is clear from Stjernfelt's words that he sees the Universe of Discourse as a restriction on the referent objects of discourse. In Umwelt theory, though, it is not just that a species only attends to certain dynamic objects in the environment. All perception and interaction with the environment is already loaded with meaning. It seems that the limitation of an Umwelt is not just on what objects can be detected by a perceptual apparatus but rather what meaning the objects have or potentially could have for the animal. In Uexkull's work this is mediated by the functional tone of the object -- the "what can I do with this"-ness that the object radiates with from the point of view of the perceiver. Thus, if anything, a Universe of Discourse would be the subset of Immediate Objects, the signs of which are picked up because of the framing or priming effects of the interpretants rising from the animal's Innenwelt. Yes indeed. The interpretant of a momentary perception feeds forward into the next moment of perception; what we see affects what we look for next. I wonder the indexical relation that the immediate object has with the proposition (the perception-action cycle in question) could be said to point to an iconic relation in the Innenwelt between the physiological goals and the psychological drives of the animal. I think that could be said; and thus every act of perception (if I may call it that) modifies in turn the iconic relation between Innenwelt and Umwelt (regarding the former as a model of the latter). Such iconic signs have to be involved in an index in order to inform the animal, i.e. there has to be some actual connection between sign and object. I think the index within the syntax of the dicisign points to that connection, and makes it the immediate object (NP p. 68). This amounts to a self-referential loop within the loop of the action-perception cycle. Regardless, a Universe of Discourse would not be limited only by the set of possible dynamic objects but also which interpretants are applicable to the discourse in the first place. This may be domain specific (e.g., the concept of "subject" in the various disciplines, or framing or priming effects of the previous thought) or level specific (e.g., explaining an inference chain to a first year university student or to an expert in the discipline) or application specific (e.g., having a casual conversation versus a problem solving discussion). Whether the immediate objects produced by these different Universes of Discourse may be intelligently brought together to form a referent to the same dynamic object is another issue. In any case, given that Umwelt theory does see the Umwelt as already populated with meaning, or at least counterpoints to meaning "inside" the organism, I am a little concerned that the ventral-dorsal split discussion in NP has the organism scanning the entire perceptual field for "things out there" for further processing without considering the internal affective or even functional need to go looking for somethings out there. Wouldn't we expect that the search image have some influence on which "that out there" is selected/prioritized for further detailed processing? Indeed we would, and that’s why the ventral/dorsal should not be regarded as an absolute split, but rather as a differentiation of the perception part of the cycle — just as the subject/predicate split is not absolute in Peircean semiotic logic (NP §3.10). Isn't that what makes objects in the Umwelt always have functional meaning, i.e., the lack of neutral objects in non-human species? In other words, wouldn't the Subjects of these natural propositions already be laden with some type of Predicate -- e.g., danger/GET AWAY FROM -- to enter the Innenwelt at all? Yes — or if we regard the Innenwelt as the home base of predicates, and the Umwelt (or universe of discourse) as the domain of subjects, the dorsal stream would be providing feedback to the Innenwelt, which will then feed forward into perception in the next turn of the semiotic cycle, calling in more detailed information from the ventral stream. (Except that the division into separate ‘cycles’ — like the division of semiosis into separate ‘signs’ — is somewhat artificial, an attempt to pin down these continuous processes so that we can diagram them. I’m Surely action and perception must be running in parallel in the brain, not taking turns.) I hope we’re thinking along the same lines here, and perhaps clarifying the connection between dorsal/ventral and subject/predicate. Mara Woods gary f.
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