I am forwarding Joseph message which was sent only to the biosemiotics list. GR [image: Gary Richmond]
*Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Joseph Brenner <[email protected]> Date: Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 3:24 AM Subject: [biosemiotics:7448] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter To: [email protected] Gary F., Gary R., Colleagues, If Peircean semiotics, and semiotics in general, can acccept the following two of Gary F.'s formulations, I think this would an interesting point of departure for further discussion: >*just as the subject/predicate split is not absolute in Peircean semiotic logic (NP >§3.10).* *>the division into separate 'cycles' -- like the division of semiosis into separate >'signs' -- is somewhat artificial, an attempt to pin down these continuous >processes so that we can diagram them. . . * Assuming these, it now becomes a 'fair' question to probe more deeply into the physical basis for the interactions and the patterns of their evolution. *>Surely action and perception must be running in parallel in the brain, not taking >turns.)* Not necessarily, if the interaction provides for their never being totally separate, but one or the other predominating alternately Thank you. Joseph B. ----- Original Message ----- *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> *To:* [email protected] *Cc:* peirce List <[email protected]> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 18, 2014 2:07 AM *Subject:* [biosemiotics:7441] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter Mara, Gary F. Lists, Thank you for your recent, exhilarating and insightful dialogue on several key issues taken up in Chapter 5 as it helped clarify much which I just couldn't seem to get my head around regarding the dorsal stream and how Frederik employs the logical lessons which Hurford draws from the dorsal split, 'correcting' his logic in extrapolating adroitly to that of Peirce's and the dicisign. I can't say that I'm yet wholly secure in these matters, but your discussion was decidedly helpful A kind of model of the dialogical thinking you've been doing which helped me so much, to rather "break through" to a better understanding of some of the principal themes of Chapter 5, occurs at the conclusion of Gary's most recent post in the chapter thread. *GF. . . that's why the ventral/dorsal should not be regarded as an absolute split, but rather as a differentiation of the perception part of the cycle -- just as the subject/predicate split is not absolute in Peircean semiotic logic (NP §3.10).* *MW: Isn't that what makes objects in the Umwelt always have functional meaning, i.e., the lack of neutral objects in non-human species? In other words, wouldn't the Subjects of these natural propositions already be laden with some type of Predicate -- e.g., danger/GET AWAY FROM -- to enter the Innenwelt at all?* *GF Yes -- or if we regard the Innenwelt as the home base of predicates, and the Umwelt (or universe of discourse) as the domain of subjects, the dorsal stream would be providing feedback to the Innenwelt, which will then feed forward into perception in the next turn of the semiotic cycle, calling in more detailed information from the ventral stream. (Except that the division into separate 'cycles' -- like the division of semiosis into separate 'signs' -- is somewhat artificial, an attempt to pin down these continuous processes so that we can diagram them. . . Surely action and perception must be running in parallel in the brain, not taking turns.)* *I hope we're thinking along the same lines here, and perhaps clarifying the connection between dorsal/ventral and subject/predicate.* I would say that you are both most certainly "clarifying the connection between dorsal/ventral and subject/predicate." Indeed it occurs to me, as perhaps it does to some others on the Peirce list in particular, that while I find the discipline of biosemiotics fascinating, interesting, and important, and imagine that Frederik's book may contribute to expanding not only its but all semiotic horizons (which, of course, is why we're doing a seminar on it) that it is immensely helpful to read just the kind of exchange you've been having. In fact it proved considerably more valuable than reading the source material I excerpted and posted links to earlier in this thread, material which actually tended to complicate matters for me (and perhaps some other non-biosemioticians) and, so, muddy the waters a bit. So, thanks again. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* On Sun, Nov 16, 2014 at 9:06 AM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote: > Mara, that's a very good question you've raised. I'll insert my > responses below. > > > > > > *From:* Mara Woods [mailto:[email protected] <[email protected]>] > *Sent:* 14-Nov-14 3:45 PM > > All, > > In section 5.2, Stjernfelt brings up the "Adaptation to Rationality" > hypothesis in conjunction with the issue of "logical constants" so > problematic in Hurford's account. The logical constants problem is mostly a > consequence of Hurford's limited view that reference to a dynamic object > requires omniscience. It is not necessary, I think, to go into much detail > here, except to mention that Hurford conflates mistake making in animal > cognition with the inability to perceive concrete individuals across space > or time. The immediate object of the individual in one scene does not bind > with the immediate object of the same individual in another scene to make a > sign that refers to the dynamic object of the concrete individual. > Stjernfelt solves this problem in Hurford's work by bringing in the concept > of the "Universe of Discourse", a subset of all possible referents in the > universe that are brought to bear on a particular proposition (or, > presumably, set of propositions). He quotes Boole in a footnote on p. 131 > of NP: > > "In every discourse, whether of the mind conversing with its own thoughts, > or of the individual in his intercourse with others, there is an assumed or > expressed limit within which the subjects of its operation are confined. > The most unfettered discourse is that in which the words we use are > understood in the widest possible application, and for them the limits of > discourse are co-extensive with those of the universe itself. But more > usually we confine ourselves to a less spacious field. (...) Now, whatever > may be the extent of the field within which all the objects of our > discourse are found, that field may properly be termed the universe of > discourse. Furthermore, this universe of discourse is in the strictest > sense the ultimate subject of the discourse" (Boole, from *The Laws of > Thought*, 1852). > > GF: We should notice here that *discourse* is essentially communicative, > or *dialogic* as Peirce would say, and is usually applied to > communication carried out through a linguistic medium. This makes it > problematic to apply the "universe of discourse" concept to phenomena > closer to the other end of the semiotic spectrum, such as perception in > animals. > > What I am curious about in this section is how the Universe of Discourse > concept overlaps with Umwelt theory. For one, it is clear from Stjernfelt's > words that he sees the Universe of Discourse as a restriction on the > referent objects of discourse. In Umwelt theory, though, it is not just > that a species only attends to certain dynamic objects in the environment. > All perception and interaction with the environment is already loaded with > meaning. It seems that the limitation of an Umwelt is not just on what > objects can be detected by a perceptual apparatus but rather what meaning > the objects have or potentially could have for the animal. In Uexkull's > work this is mediated by the functional tone of the object -- the "what can > I do with this"-ness that the object radiates with from the point of view > of the perceiver. Thus, if anything, a Universe of Discourse would be the > subset of Immediate Objects, the signs of which are picked up because of > the framing or priming effects of the interpretants rising from the > animal's Innenwelt. > > Yes indeed. The interpretant of a momentary perception feeds forward into > the next moment of perception; what we see affects what we look for next. > > I wonder the indexical relation that the immediate object has with the > proposition (the perception-action cycle in question) could be said to > point to an iconic relation in the Innenwelt between the physiological > goals and the psychological drives of the animal. > > I think that could be said; and thus every act of perception (if I may > call it that) modifies in turn the iconic relation between Innenwelt and > Umwelt (regarding the former as a model of the latter). Such iconic signs > have to be involved in an index in order to inform the animal, i.e. there > has to be some *actual* connection between sign and object. I think the > index within the syntax of the dicisign points to that connection, and > makes it the immediate object (NP p. 68). This amounts to a > self-referential loop within the loop of the action-perception cycle. > > Regardless, a Universe of Discourse would not be limited only by the set > of possible dynamic objects but also which interpretants are applicable to > the discourse in the first place. This may be domain specific (e.g., the > concept of "subject" in the various disciplines, or framing or priming > effects of the previous thought) or level specific (e.g., explaining an > inference chain to a first year university student or to an expert in the > discipline) or application specific (e.g., having a casual conversation > versus a problem solving discussion). Whether the immediate objects > produced by these different Universes of Discourse may be intelligently > brought together to form a referent to the same dynamic object is another > issue. > > In any case, given that Umwelt theory does see the Umwelt as already > populated with meaning, or at least counterpoints to meaning "inside" the > organism, I am a little concerned that the ventral-dorsal split discussion > in *NP* has the organism scanning the entire perceptual field for "things > out there" for further processing without considering the internal > affective or even functional need to go looking for somethings out there. > Wouldn't we expect that the search image have some influence on which "that > out there" is selected/prioritized for further detailed processing? > > Indeed we would, and that's why the ventral/dorsal should not be regarded > as an absolute split, but rather as a differentiation of the perception > part of the cycle -- just as the subject/predicate split is not absolute in > Peircean semiotic logic (NP §3.10). > > Isn't that what makes objects in the Umwelt always have functional > meaning, i.e., the lack of neutral objects in non-human species? In other > words, wouldn't the Subjects of these natural propositions already be laden > with some type of Predicate -- e.g., danger/GET AWAY FROM -- to enter the > Innenwelt at all? > > Yes -- or if we regard the Innenwelt as the home base of predicates, and > the Umwelt (or universe of discourse) as the domain of subjects, the dorsal > stream would be providing feedback to the Innenwelt, which will then feed > forward into perception in the next turn of the semiotic cycle, calling in > more detailed information from the ventral stream. (Except that the > division into separate 'cycles' -- like the division of semiosis into > separate 'signs' -- is somewhat artificial, an attempt to pin down these > continuous processes so that we can diagram them. I'm Surely action and > perception must be running in parallel in the brain, not taking turns.) > > I hope we're thinking along the same lines here, and perhaps clarifying > the connection between dorsal/ventral and subject/predicate. > > Mara Woods > > gary f. >
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