Hi, I forgot to add "signless" in the first column of Table A. So, according to QMS, there are four categories of signs -- qualisign, sinsign and legisign as usual and the new member "signless" that is thought to be the source of all the other signs.
With all the best. Sung > Edwina wrote: > > "Therefore, to disagree with Sung, there is no such (7596-1) > thing as 'Signlessness' - and Peirce himself has said > as such, in rejecting the existence of nothing." > > My conclusion that the Singlessness and the associated category called > Zeroness are real is based on the quark model of the Peircean sign (QMS) > that I posted on this list almost 2 years ago (see the attached files) and > partially reproduce below: > > > QMS specifies three distinct groups of signs (i) interpretant-less > signs, (ii) object-less signs, and (iii) the representamen-less sign to be > called simply the signless. Peirce identified interpretant-less signs as > icons and indexes, and objectless signs as sinsigns [2] (see the figure > attached). However, to the best of my knowledge, Peirce never discussed > the concept of the representamen-less sign, which would have been the > logical extension of the interpretant-less and the object-less signs. > > According to QMS, the Peircean signs can be represented as S_ijk, where > the indexes obey the so-called the Peircean selection rule, i </ j </ > k , the symbol, A </ B, being read as A is less than or equal to B or > equivalently A is not greater than B. (See APPENDIX below for a more > detailed explanation). The ten classes of signs defined by Peirce can be > generated from S_ijk following the Peircean selection rule as shown in > the figure attached, which is reproduced in a simplified form as Table 1 > below. > > In the original QMS, the numerical values of indexes, i, j, and k, were > confined to 1, 2 and 3. To generate the representamen-less sign, which > would be the logical extension of the interpretant-less and object-less > signs that Peirce already discussed [2], it is necessary only to expand > the numerical range of the indexes, i, j and k to include the zero, 0. > The following three propositions then follow logically: > > S_ijk generates the interpretant-less signs (1224-1) > when i = 0. > > S_ijk generates the object-less signs (1224-2) > when j = 0. > > S_ijk generates the representamen-less signs (1224-3) > when k = 0. > > The interpretnat-less signs are what remains of (1224-4) > Table 1 after removing Column III, i.e., sinsigns > and qualisigns. > > The object-less signs are what remains of Table 1 (1224-5) > after removing both Columns III and II, i.e., > qualisigns. > > "The representamen-less signs are what remains (1224-6) > of Table 1 after removing Columns III, II and I, > i.e., NOTHING or NO SIGNS, which is here > referred to as the SIGNLESS. > > Thus, QMS predicts the existence of the Signless, which may belong to the > same class of entities as the NAMELESS, the INEFFABLE in the Taoist > philosophy or the UNKNOWABLE in the Hindi philosophy. The connection > between the Dao (also called the Tao) and the Signless can be inferred > on the basis of the following sentences from Chapter 25 of the Tao Te > Ching [3], where the word Way is the English translation of the Chinese > character that is pronounced as Dao or Tao and means > a way or a road: > > Something undifferentiated was born before > (1224-7) > heaven and earth; still and silent, standing > alone and unchanging, going through cycles > unending, able to be mother to the world. I > do not know its name; I label it the Way. > Imposing on it a name, I call it Great. > > Based on Statements (1224-6) and (1224-7), it may be concluded that > > The Signless or the Dao is the origin of all signs" (1224-8) > > > Propositions (1224-1) through (1224-6) are diagrammatically represented in > Table A , which contains one addition column labeled Zeroness which is > absent in the Peirces theory of signs, most probably because his theory > of signs did not consider the ontological origin of signs. In contrast, > the QMS includes the speculation on the origin of signs as expressed in > (1224-8). > > > _____________________________________________________________________ > Table A. The logical extension of the QMS to k = 0 (in addition > to i = 0 and j = 0) leads to the prediction that there exists the > new category called the Zeroness and the new sign called Signless > (see the empty column in Table A). Including these new entities > allows the Peircean semiotics to make contact with the zero-totality > theory of everything in physics [1, see the Appendix]. > _____________________________________________________________________ > > 'Zeroness' Firstness Secondness Thirdness > (Nothing) (Quality) (Fact) (Law) > _____________________________________________________________________ > > 1 (Representamen) signless qualisign sinsign legisign > (k = 0) > _____________________________________________________________________ > > 2 (Object) - icon index symbol > (j = 0) > _____________________________________________________________________ > > 3 (Interpretant) - rheme dicisign argument > (i = 0) > _____________________________________________________________________ > > > Please note that, although QMS originated in the Peircean theory of signs > of the 19th-early 20th centuries, it does not hesitate to go beyond its > origin in order to accommodate new developments in physics and mathematics > in the 21st century. > > With all the best. > > Sung > ___________________________________________ > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net > > > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Appendix - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - > > > Rowlands, P. (2007). Zero to Infinity: The Foundations of Physics. > World Scientific, New Jersey. > > <Preface> > Physics appears to be the only source of fundamental knowledge about the > natural world. No other system of thought or methodology has shown any of > its > systematic explanatory or predictive power. This success has been achieved > by a > continued attempt at minimalism and reductionism, and it appears that the > greatest success has been achieved from the simplest possible foundations. > Yet, > because we have been obliged to approach the subject by an inductive > method, > working back from complicated observations to simple explanations, we have > still to discover the ultimate foundations on which this whole conceptual > scheme > has been based. We know that the ultimate theory must be simple, probably > extremely simple, but, because it must also be unique, we have no > precedent > which would help us to make the discovery. Yet the belief that the > discovery is > possible remains, and has led to many approaches towards a unified theory > of > physics or a theory of everything, none of which seems to be close to > success. > Obviously, no one expects to succeed instantly with a theory that will > simply > explain everything. What we would hope to do is to find a process, a > systematic > way of proceeding with strong indications that we were on the right track. > This is > what is being aimed at in this book. Positions that are rejected from the > outset in > the search include model-dependent theories of any kind; the aim of the > work is > resolutely abstract. One of the particular approaches avoided is the > restructuring > of particle physics in terms of multidimensional space-time strings or > membranes. We can, of course, do this as a mathematical representation, > and the > procedure for doing so is sketched out in chapters 4, 15 and 18, but a > string > theory would not be a unified theory, even if we should chance to find out > the > correct one from the many thousands of possible alternatives. A unified > theory > has to explain the concept of dimension, as well as the number (why 10? > why > 11?); it also has to explain space and time, their similarities and > differences, and > even the use of mathematics to explain physics. But there are also > intrinsic > difficulties with the approach which explain why it does not offer a true > unity. > Even the first stage of combining space and time in the simplest way, by > adding > the single time dimension to spaces three in special relativity, causes > us > problems when we look at quantum mechanics, a theory which appears to be > an > essential starting-point for all foundational work in physics. Time, > unlike space, > is simply not an observable in quantum mechanics, though the two > quantities are > assumed to have identical status in the relativistic space-time concept. > When we > make the space-time part of an even-more complicated structure, as in > general > relativity, where curvature is used to eliminate mass or gravity, the > problems > multiply, and we find singularities, nonlinearity, unrenormalizable > infinities, and > the violation of fundamental physical laws. We solve some problems, but > create > others. > Again, we must reject the idea that a single cosmic creation event has > structured the laws of physics in a particular way, and that they could > have been > different in different circumstances. The idea could, in principle, be > true, but then > we would have no abstract subject of physics, no generality, no absolute > mathematics, and no meaningful concept of conservation, the process which > makes physics universal. The very idea that we could discover a unified > theory of > physics is impossible in such a context. Physics is fractured in the very > act of > creation. In addition, such explanations have the habit of becoming > self-fulfilling > prophecies. We simply refer difficulties to special conditions that > occurred in the > early universe, and deprive ourselves of understanding fundamental > physical > phenomena which ought to be valid at all places in all epochs. This does > not, of > course, mean that we cannot discover historical evolution over time for > structures > such as stars and galaxies, and galactic clusters. What it does mean is > that > physics, if it is to be a truly unified subject, should not be determined > by cosmic > history, whether or not this turns out to be true. The laws of physics > cannot be the > result of an accident. > Even the very successful approach to physics using symmetry groups, as > employed extensively, for example, in particle physics, should be treated > with > caution. It is assumed that, if we find a group structure which > accommodates all > four known physical interactions, then we will have solved the problem of > their > relationship, and we will have a Grand Unified theory of particle > interactions. > Of course, such a result would be a very significant step, and the idea is > discussed in some detail in chapter 15, but we would not have solved the > problem > from a fundamental point of view unless we could explain why we have this > particular group structure, and, indeed, why we have a group structure at > all. > Obviously, we have to proceed in understanding nature by stages, but a > group > structure will never be an end stage, nor will any structure. As long as > anything > complicated remains unexplained in our theory, we will not be able to > describe it > as a theory of everything. > So it is far from obvious how we would construct such a theory, but there > is > one important clue as to where we should start. One fundamental idea, and > one > only, has the necessary simplicity and intrinsic inexplicability to be the > foundation for everything else. This is nothing, zero in mathematical > terms. We > could imagine creating a theory of everything if it was also a theory of > nothing. > The question is: can it be done? Can we start from zero, and use it to > structure > nature as we understand it today? The proposition would seem to be > impossible, > but, in fact, it is not, and it is the aim of the present research > programme to justify > this statement. > It would probably be impossible to do this by purely logical development > from first principles, though, in a sense, mathematics attempts such an > approach. > Mathematics certainly provides a very powerful formalism, of which physics > makes extensive use, but its own logical foundations, as Gödel proved, > remain > insecurely based on a seemingly empirical process of counting. Computing > provides another alternative, and Wolfram and others have seen the > development > of complexity from simplicity in systems governed by cellular automata;1 > with > the further assumption that the right complex structures will somehow > finally > emerge, but, again, the empirical counting process is assumed, along with > the > idea that only discrete concepts matter. Why discreteness is to be > privileged and > what discreteness actually is remain unexplained. Physics allows us a very > different route to the foundations, through the application of inductive > methodology to masses of empirical data, and a ruthless Darwinian > selection of > the only formalisms which work, and it is in seeing what mathematical > structures > are essential to physics at its very foundations that we see what > structures are also > essential to mathematics and computing. By finding the common origin of > mathematics, physics and computing and the way they deal with zero > totality, > using the dual processes of induction and deduction, we can finally track > down > the route through which everything finally comes from nothing. > The structure of the book reflects this process. The first chapter > develops a > computing analogy to see how a zero totality can be used to create a > universal > rewrite system, which then allows us to structure mathematics without > first > assuming the number system or discreteness. This exercise leads us to a > very > definite mathematical structure, with zero conceptual totality, which we > can then > work towards in a deductive context. The next chapter is inductive, and > takes > physics as far as we can towards its ultimate foundations by analysing the > most > fundamental concepts that we are capable of imagining in a physical > context. The > procedures used in the mathematical structure can then be seen to > correspond > with the ones we have derived by induction as the basic components of > physics. > Further analysis of the physical context then shows us, in chapter 3, that > the most > convenient packaging of the mathematical structure is the one that > provides the > shortest route to zero totality, at the same time as presenting us with > the > fundamental equation that drives the whole of physics. Most of the > remaining > chapters then present the working out of the consequences of chapters 1, 2 > and 3 > in all the detail necessary to show that the structure is sufficient to > generate the > results which are considered foundational to physics, even to the point of > numerical detail. Chapters 19 and 20, however, stand apart in showing that > the > kind of information processing structures that make physics and > mathematics > spontaneously emerge in nature also apply (in a fractal sense) to > biological and > other large-scale systems. Only by creating the most efficient information > processing possible could these large-scale systems be created against the > natural > tendency to disorder or increased entropy, and it is difficult to imagine > that any > information processing could be more efficient than the one produced by > Natures own rewrite code. > If this process is true to any considerable degree, then it will be of > significance to everyone, scientist and nonscientist alike, with or > without > mathematical training. So, the book has been written in such a way that > there are > long sections of conceptual argument, which should appeal to the general > reader > as well as the professional scientist. However, there is no disguising the > fact that > mathematics lies at the heart of this book, and that credible results, in > many > areas, can only be achieved by using the full mathematical formalisms. So, > these > are also given in full detail where required. The idea has been to develop > all the > ideas from as foundational a position as possible, but the presentation > concentrates generally on results which may be considered original in some > respect, and only makes use of established work where it is absolutely > necessary > to the argument. Since the mathematics of quaternions and multivariate > vectors is > essential to the argument, an appendix is included at the end of the first > chapter > giving an elementary treatment of these algebras. > Despite the obvious novelty of the fundamental position, and some of the > specific formalisms employed, most of the results generated certainly > support > orthodox or mainstream science, where existing work is available for > comparison. Of course, there are new results and predictions, but there is > no > challenge here to the bases of quantum mechanics, classical physics, > particle > physics, or anything else now universally accepted. New ideas are > certainly put > forward in areas which are still highly speculative, such as certain > aspects of > cosmology, and some of the physical interpretations (for example, in > relation to > the emergent nature of fractional charges in quarks, or the > gravitational-inertial > explanation of general relativity) differ from the usual (though not > exclusively > accepted) ones, while retaining the overall mathematical formalisms which > really > define the theories. However, nothing here proposes deviations from the > experimental evidence as now understood, though some new predicted results > are > available for testing, and some have already been confirmed since they > were first > predicted. In addition, many speculative concepts now in the literature > would be > ruled out by the analysis, while a few might be vindicated. A complete > reading of > the book should indicate that every position adopted is founded on the > results > incorporated in chapters 1, 2 and 3. The theoretical position is put > forward as an > organic whole, and every statement within it, in a sense, reinforces every > other. > Important links are shown through a system of cross-referencing. > To aid the reader, there is a synopsis of the contents of the chapters at > the > beginning of each, and a summary of the entire argument at the end. These > can > be used to get a general idea of the argument where details prove > troublesome or > appear to require too much specialised knowledge. As with all > presentations of > novel results, readers will have to make up their own minds about the > thesis > being proposed, but the book is intended to contain the minimum of > speculation, in the ordinary sense of that word. Only a few of the mass > calculations and the section at the end dealing with the derivation of the > cosmic > background radiation are consciously put forward as speculative proposals, > and, > in the latter case, it could be argued that Ockhams razor ought to favour > an > argument that leaves fewer unexplained facts than any known alternative. > Many > parts of the book (chapters 5, 6, 10 and 11, especially) are the working > out of the > consequences of new formalisms with the appropriate degree of mathematical > rigour, the physical consequences following on directly from the > mathematics, > while the ideas on algebra and rewrite alphabets in chapters 1 and 3 leave > plenty > of scope for further development in the direction of practical > application. > Elsewhere, it is hoped that the sheer simplicity of the basic ideas, and > their > apparent ability to explain a great number of seemingly diverse facts, > will > recommend them to the readers attention. > The project has a long history. I can write here in detail only of my own > trajectory; those of my colleagues would, of course, be different and > would have > different emphases. The germ of several significant ideas began with > student > speculations.2 The essential philosophy was developed between the last > years at > school and the first years at university. The group symmetry of space, > time, mass > and charge was in place by the mid-1970s, along with the first particle > physics > ideas based on charge structures, and some of the gravitational and > cosmological > ideas outlined in chapters 18 and 21. The first publications came at the > end of the > 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, but success in respected > publication > outlets was a long time coming. > Lee Smolin has described how the philosophical way of doing theoretical > physics of the 1920s gradually lost out to a more pragmatic, hard-nosed > style of > research, which was completed when the center of gravity of physics > moved to > the United States in the 1940s.3 By the 1970s, at the exact moment when > the > first ideas in this book were being developed, the transition was > complete. > Smolin reports that: As a graduate student, I was told by my teachers > that it was > impossible to make a career working on problems in the foundations of > physics. > My mentors pointed out that there were no interesting new experiments in > that > area, whereas particle physics was driven by a continuous stream of new > experimental discoveries. The experiments, of course, led to the > establishment > of the Standard Model of particle physics, around 1973, but, since that > time, no > really new unifying principle seems to have been discovered, and the > abandonment of research into the foundations of the subject has made such > a > discovery increasingly unlikely. The remarkable thing is that the pattern > that has > set in over the last half century or so has made many physicists seemingly > unable > to conceive of the concept of researching the foundations. Work of this > kind > seems to create bafflement in many and downright hostility in others. > Serious publication outlets were certainly minimal during the 1980s, but > the > situation improved towards the end of the decade when the PIRT series of > conferences (Physical Interpretations of Relativity) were started in > London, by > Michael Duffy. I first attended in 1990, and, as a result of these > meetings (which > are also now held in Moscow, Calcutta and Budapest), I came into contact > with > the Vigier conferences (Toronto-Berkeley-Paris), organised from 1995 by > Geoffrey Hunter, Stanley Jeffers and Richard Amoroso, the ANPA conferences > at Cambridge, organised by Keith Bowden and Arleta Ford, which I attended > from 1998, and the CASYS conferences at Liège, organised by Daniel Dubois, > which I first attended in 2003. All these meetings, in their different > ways, have > been concerned with the foundations of the subject, and with tackling > important > questions in a freely inquiring spirit; and it is largely through contacts > made > through these and related events that I first met the collaborators, who > are named > on the title page of this book. During these years, also, I published > three books, > summarising my work from the 1980s, and consolidated the new view of > relativistic quantum mechanics I had been developing as a result of my > theories > of symmetry. I managed to publish the first paper on this topic in 1994, > and set > about relating the particle physics consequences with my earlier work on > this > subject. > John Cullerne was my first real collaborator, and worked with me for many > hours, principally during 1997-2000, on Dirac algebra and the derivation > of the > Standard Model and other aspects of particle physics. (See 5, 6, 14, 15.) > Our > intense weekly discussions were always a source of great and mutual > intellectual > stimulation. After this time, Johns other commitments took hold and our > collaboration became less intense, although it still continues on an > occasional > basis. In particular, John has acted as adviser on parts of chapters > 10-13, the > orthodox making a potent combination with the unorthodox. A new departure > was the universal rewrite system, which was the result of my collaboration > with > my computer science colleague, Bernard Diaz, from about 1997 (see 1, 3, > 20, > Appendix B). Because of its extremely fundamental nature, this has proved > a > difficult area in which to work, one needing endless examination and > reexamination > of the concepts. Brian Koberlein, whom I met through ANPA, > worked with me intensely for a few days in Cambridge, and then via email, > on > groups and dual systems, and, separately, on the comparison of the > nilpotent and > idempotent versions of quantum mechanics (see 4, 7, 15). Presentations by > Brian > also stimulated the work which appears in 18.9. > Peter Marcer (see 20) was another ANPA contact and we have now had a > wide-ranging collaboration for many years, on many subjects, beginning as > informal discussion, and continuing under the auspices of the British > Computer > Societys Cybernetics Machine Group and the CASYS conferences in Liège. > Through Peter, I have also had a fruitful interaction with Edgar Mitchell > and > Walter Schempp, our co-authors on the ground-breaking paper, Zenergy > (see > 20). Finally, through a London frontiers meeting, organized by Simon > Daniel, as > a result of an earlier Vigier meeting in Paris, I met the biologist > Vanessa Hill, and > we soon realised that we had a potentially powerful collaboration on > applying > algebraic and geometric concepts in biology (see 19). Both of these > collaborations (as recorded in chapters 19 and 20) are developing rapidly > and > expanding into areas that we had not previously connected with the > project. > Apart from these formal collaborations, I have had stimulating discussions > and contacts with many other researchers, including Ruggero Santilli, Erik > Trell, > Stein Johansen, Jeremy Dunning-Davies, Clive Kilmister, Ted Bastin, Lou > Kauffman, Dan Kurth, Mark Curtis, Sarah Bell, Cynthia Whitney, John > Spencer, > John Valentine, Mark Stuckey, Jose Almeida, Otto van Nieuwnehuijze, Tolga > Yarman, Tuomo Suntola, Sergey Siparov, Vladimir Gladyshev and Tatyana > Gladysheva.4 Besides these there are a huge number of people to whom I and > my > collaborators are indebted. In particular, there are the organizers and > participants > of PIRT, Vigier, ANPA and CASYS, for many stimulating presentations and > discussions; the Swansea / Bristol / Keele group (Viv and Mary Pope, Alan > Winfield, Anthony Osborne); my colleagues David Edwards, Mike Houlden, > Dominic Dickson, John Fry and Christos Touramanis, for their support and > interest over many years. Mike, in particular, has been an endless source > of new > problems for me to challenge, and his advice and encouragement has been > without parallel. Apart from my collaborators, he is the person of all to > whom I > am most indebted. The British Computer Society have been generous in their > financial support for the Cybernetics Machine Groups activities; and I > have been > a beneficiary on several occasions, along with Peter and Vanessa. I am > also > grateful for funding to Dmitri Pavlov, and to the British Council, as well > as to the > Universitys Physics and Computer Departments. > > Peter Rowlands > Oliver Lodge Laboratory > University of Liverpool > > > > >> Gary R - agreed; the categories are modes of organization and are not, >> in >> themselves, signs. A Sign is a triad of Relations. And I note further, >> Gary R's statement: >> >> "As with the categories, all three relations (to the sign itself, to its >> object, to its interpretent) are always involved in any semiosis: they >> are >> aspects of the sign (as Frederik phrases it) and not independent >> entities." >> >> And agree that there are three relations (and I've been chastized on >> this >> list both for using the term 'relation' and for making it plural!). >> Agreed >> - they are certainly not independent entities but are 'aspects' of the >> Sign. >> >> Therefore, to disagree with Sung, there is no such thing as >> 'Signlessness' >> - and Peirce himself has said as such, in rejecting the existence of >> nothing. Indeterminacy is not the same as zero (see 1.412). >> >> Edwina >> >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: Gary Richmond >> To: Sungchul Ji >> Cc: Peirce-L ; [email protected] >> Sent: Monday, December 15, 2014 10:30 PM >> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7596] Re: Peirce categories >> >> >> Sung, lists, >> >> >> Sung quoted my snippet of Peirce, then my comment: >> >> >> CSP: Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it >> and, it is clear to me, that >> >> >> GR: ". . . any abstract definition of it 'must be false to >> (121514-1) >> it' as well." >> >> >> then wrote: >> >> >> SJ: Since Statement (121514-1) is also an abstract definition of >> Firstness", >> "Firstness" must be Un-representable, and hence "Signless". I wrote >> a >> post a while ago (which I may dig up later) in which I was logically >> led >> to conclude that >> >> >> "There must be 'Signlessness' which may be the semiotics >> (121514-2) >> analog of mathematical 'Zero'". >> >> >> I certainly don't see it that way at all. >> >> >> 1. As Edwina and others have pointed out, the Peircean categories are >> not themselves signs. >> 2. None of the categories appear independently of each other (except >> extracted for the purposes of analysis). >> 3. 1ns in consideration of (or 'applied' to) sign analysis: as the >> sign >> is in itself, qualisign; as the sign resembles its object in some way, >> icon; as the sign expresses itself as a rheme, or term, or ordinary name >> or noun, etc. (apart from its involvement in an proposition or an >> argument) for its interpretent sign. >> 4. As with the categories, all three relations (to the sign itself, to >> its object, to its interpretent) are always involved in any semiosis: >> they are aspects of the sign (as Frederik phrases it) and not >> independent entities. >> 5. The pure icon is a "limit case" (which I'll remark on when we begin >> the discussion of Chapter 8 of NS next week) and all other signs >> involving icons, the vast majority of such signs, are iconic in their >> relation to the object. >> >> >> Best, >> >> >> Gary R >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> C 745 >> 718 482-5690 >> >> >> On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 8:19 PM, Sungchul Ji <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> Gary R wrote: >> >> Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it >> and, it is clear to me, that >> >> ". . . any abstract definition of it 'must be false to >> (121514-1) >> it' as well." >> >> Since Statement (121514-1) is also an abstract definition of >> Firstness", >> "Firstness" must be Un-representable, and hence "Signless". I wrote >> a >> post a while ago (which I may dig up later) in which I was logically >> led >> to conclude that >> >> "There must be 'Signlessness' which may be the semiotics >> (121514-2) >> analog of mathematical 'Zero'". >> >> With all the best. >> >> Sung >> __________________________________________________ >> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. >> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy >> Rutgers University >> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 >> 732-445-4701 >> >> www.conformon.net >> >> >> > >> > GR >> > : >> > The Peirce quotation >> > [Howard] >> > offered concerns only an "absolute" first and *that*, no doubt, >> is >> an >> > abstraction and, as such, cannot be experienced. >> > >> > HP: If it cannot be experienced how do you know this abstraction >> is >> more >> > than an artifact of language? >> > >> > H >> > oward, the thrust of my post was exactly that firstness *can be* >> and >> > *is* experienced. >> > Peirce offers an abstract definition of firstness in the passage >> you >> > earlier quoted in the interest of clarifying the kind of >> phenomenon >> it is >> > " >> > Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it >> > " and, it is clear to me, that any abstract definition of it "must >> be >> > false to it" as well. >> > >> > >> > Were there such a phenomenon as absolute firstness which could >> stand >> apart >> > from its participation in a reality which involves all three >> categories, >> > it >> > might look like Peirce's abstract definition. There is no such >> abstract >> > firstness in reality--there are only the embodied firstnesses such >> as >> > those >> > I described. >> > >> > Peirce concluded the passage you quoted by saying that what is >> first >> is " >> > present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, >> free, >> > vivid, conscious, and evanescent. >> > " >> > >> > My personal example was meant to suggest just that presentness, >> immediacy, >> > freshness, newness, spontaneity, vividness, consciousness, and >> > evanescence. >> > >> > B >> > est, >> > >> > Gary R >> > >> > [image: Gary Richmond] >> > >> > *Gary Richmond* >> > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> > *Communication Studies* >> > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> > *C 745* >> > *718 482-5690* >> > >> > On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 1:44 PM, Howard Pattee >> <[email protected]> >> > wrote: >> > >> >> At 09:54 PM 11/29/2014, Gary Richmond wrote: >> >> >> >> The Peirce quotation you offered concerns only an "absolute" >> first >> and >> >> that, no doubt, is an abstraction and, as such, cannot be >> experienced. >> >> >> >> >> >> HP: If it cannot be experienced how do you know this abstraction >> is >> more >> >> than an artifact of language? >> >> I would say that Firstness now belongs to the ongoing *qualia* >> >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia> problem >> >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia>. >> >> >> >> >> The question arises for any abstract verbal distinctions. For >> example, >> >> Edwina's "three 'pure' or 'genuine' modes, 1-1, 2-2, 3-3, or >> Firstness >> >> as >> >> Firstness, Secondness as Secondness; Thirdness as Thirdness." >> >> >> >> Just as confusing are the converse failures to make distinctions >> that >> >> have >> >> empirical content. For example, Peirce's lumping abduction with >> logic. >> >> >> >> Qualia problems will require more than philosophical and >> linguistic >> >> distinctions to clarify. We will need to know more about what is >> going >> >> on >> >> in brains. >> >> >> >> Howard >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> > > >
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