Stan, lists,
You may be right. Peirce is complex on perception (percept, percipuum,
perceptual judgment, etc.). He generally makes the following
correlations between (A) the categories and (B) the psyche's faculties;
and perception seems not to fall neatly into just one of them:
(A) Firstness, quality of feeling - (B) feeling, sensation (such as a
feeling of red).
(A) Secondness, reaction/resistance - (B) volition, sense of reaction
(taking pleasure and pain as second-order feelings or generalizations of
such, indicative of real determinations of one's subconscious volition
being).
(A) Thirdness, mediation/representation - (B) general conception (in
1903 he associates - not identifies, but associates - pleasure with
generalization).
Best, Ben
On 12/1/2014 10:43 AM, Stanley N Salthe wrote:
Ben -- Yiou wrote:
Peirce did not regard pleasure, pain, and other kinds of affectivity
mainly as qualities of feeling. By "feeling" Peirce seems to mean
something more like sensation, although across his work it has seemed
to me that he doesn't mean only sensation.
S: I think t may be useful here to contrast sensation with perception.
The latter is a reworked, interpreted reaction to sensations,
involving the play of interpretants. Sensation might be viewed as
presenting Firstness, while Seconds and Thirds play important roles in
perception.
STAN
On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:39 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
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