Gary R wrote: Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it and, it is clear to me, that
". . . any abstract definition of it 'must be false to (121514-1) it' as well." Since Statement (121514-1) is also an abstract definition of Firstness", "Firstness" must be Un-representable, and hence "Signless". I wrote a post a while ago (which I may dig up later) in which I was logically led to conclude that "There must be 'Signlessness' which may be the semiotics (121514-2) analog of mathematical 'Zero'". With all the best. Sung __________________________________________________ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net > > GR > : > The Peirce quotation > [Howard] > offered concerns only an "absolute" first and *that*, no doubt, is an > abstraction and, as such, cannot be experienced. > > HP: If it cannot be experienced how do you know this abstraction is more > than an artifact of language? > > H > oward, the thrust of my post was exactly that firstness *can be* and > *is* experienced. > Peirce offers an abstract definition of firstness in the passage you > earlier quoted in the interest of clarifying the kind of phenomenon it is > " > Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it > " and, it is clear to me, that any abstract definition of it "must be > false to it" as well. > > > Were there such a phenomenon as absolute firstness which could stand apart > from its participation in a reality which involves all three categories, > it > might look like Peirce's abstract definition. There is no such abstract > firstness in reality--there are only the embodied firstnesses such as > those > I described. > > Peirce concluded the passage you quoted by saying that what is first is " > present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, > vivid, conscious, and evanescent. > " > > My personal example was meant to suggest just that presentness, immediacy, > freshness, newness, spontaneity, vividness, consciousness, and > evanescence. > > B > est, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690* > > On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 1:44 PM, Howard Pattee <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> At 09:54 PM 11/29/2014, Gary Richmond wrote: >> >> The Peirce quotation you offered concerns only an "absolute" first and >> that, no doubt, is an abstraction and, as such, cannot be experienced. >> >> >> HP: If it cannot be experienced how do you know this abstraction is more >> than an artifact of language? >> I would say that Firstness now belongs to the ongoing *qualia* >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia> problem >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia>. >> >> The question arises for any abstract verbal distinctions. For example, >> Edwina's "three 'pure' or 'genuine' modes, 1-1, 2-2, 3-3, or Firstness >> as >> Firstness, Secondness as Secondness; Thirdness as Thirdness." >> >> Just as confusing are the converse failures to make distinctions that >> have >> empirical content. For example, Peirce's lumping abduction with logic. >> >> Qualia problems will require more than philosophical and linguistic >> distinctions to clarify. We will need to know more about what is going >> on >> in brains. >> >> Howard >> >> >> >
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