Sung, lists, Sung quoted my snippet of Peirce, then my comment:
CSP: Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it and, it is clear to me, that GR: ". . . any abstract definition of it 'must be false to (121514-1) it' as well." then wrote: SJ: Since Statement (121514-1) is also an abstract definition of Firstness", "Firstness" must be Un-representable, and hence "Signless". I wrote a post a while ago (which I may dig up later) in which I was logically led to conclude that "There must be 'Signlessness' which may be the semiotics (121514-2) analog of mathematical 'Zero'". I certainly don't see it that way at all. 1. As Edwina and others have pointed out, the Peircean categories are not themselves signs. 2. None of the categories appear independently of each other (except extracted for the purposes of analysis). 3. 1ns in consideration of (or 'applied' to) sign analysis: as the sign is in itself, *qualisign*; as the sign resembles its object in some way, *icon*; as the sign expresses itself as a rheme, or term, or ordinary name or noun, etc. (apart from its involvement in an proposition or an argument) for its *interpretent* sign. 4. As with the categories, all three relations (to the sign itself, to its object, to its interpretent) are always involved in any semiosis: they are *aspects* of the sign (as Frederik phrases it) and not independent entities. 5. The pure icon is a "limit case" (which I'll remark on when we begin the discussion of Chapter 8 of NS next week) and all other signs involving icons, the vast majority of such signs, are iconic in their relation to the object. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 8:19 PM, Sungchul Ji <[email protected]> wrote: > > Gary R wrote: > > Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it > and, it is clear to me, that > > ". . . any abstract definition of it 'must be false to (121514-1) > it' as well." > > Since Statement (121514-1) is also an abstract definition of Firstness", > "Firstness" must be Un-representable, and hence "Signless". I wrote a > post a while ago (which I may dig up later) in which I was logically led > to conclude that > > "There must be 'Signlessness' which may be the semiotics (121514-2) > analog of mathematical 'Zero'". > > With all the best. > > Sung > __________________________________________________ > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net > > > > > > GR > > : > > The Peirce quotation > > [Howard] > > offered concerns only an "absolute" first and *that*, no doubt, is an > > abstraction and, as such, cannot be experienced. > > > > HP: If it cannot be experienced how do you know this abstraction is more > > than an artifact of language? > > > > H > > oward, the thrust of my post was exactly that firstness *can be* and > > *is* experienced. > > Peirce offers an abstract definition of firstness in the passage you > > earlier quoted in the interest of clarifying the kind of phenomenon it is > > " > > Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it > > " and, it is clear to me, that any abstract definition of it "must be > > false to it" as well. > > > > > > Were there such a phenomenon as absolute firstness which could stand > apart > > from its participation in a reality which involves all three categories, > > it > > might look like Peirce's abstract definition. There is no such abstract > > firstness in reality--there are only the embodied firstnesses such as > > those > > I described. > > > > Peirce concluded the passage you quoted by saying that what is first is " > > present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, > > vivid, conscious, and evanescent. > > " > > > > My personal example was meant to suggest just that presentness, > immediacy, > > freshness, newness, spontaneity, vividness, consciousness, and > > evanescence. > > > > B > > est, > > > > Gary R > > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *C 745* > > *718 482-5690* > > > > On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 1:44 PM, Howard Pattee <[email protected]> > > wrote: > > > >> At 09:54 PM 11/29/2014, Gary Richmond wrote: > >> > >> The Peirce quotation you offered concerns only an "absolute" first and > >> that, no doubt, is an abstraction and, as such, cannot be experienced. > >> > >> > >> HP: If it cannot be experienced how do you know this abstraction is more > >> than an artifact of language? > >> I would say that Firstness now belongs to the ongoing *qualia* > >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia> problem > >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia>. > >> > >> The question arises for any abstract verbal distinctions. For example, > >> Edwina's "three 'pure' or 'genuine' modes, 1-1, 2-2, 3-3, or Firstness > >> as > >> Firstness, Secondness as Secondness; Thirdness as Thirdness." > >> > >> Just as confusing are the converse failures to make distinctions that > >> have > >> empirical content. For example, Peirce's lumping abduction with logic. > >> > >> Qualia problems will require more than philosophical and linguistic > >> distinctions to clarify. We will need to know more about what is going > >> on > >> in brains. > >> > >> Howard > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > >
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