Helmut, list, Helmut wrote: "Is ontologism really the problem? John Deely says, that relations are ontological (so also the triadic relations). Does the FOO claim, that concepts (eg. mind-relations of relations) are not a part of reality? But to say, that concepts are part of reality, even in inanimate nature there are concepts too. . ."
John Deely is not alone in opposing the FOO claim. Indeed, Frederik Stjernfelt's book,* Natural Propositions*, and many of the recent seminar posts on this and the biosemiotics list mean to refute it. And here is one example (of several) of Peirce's view of the matter: Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there. Consistently adhere to that unwarrantable denial, and you will be driven to some form of idealistic nominalism akin to Fichte's. Not only is thought in the organic world, but it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give "Sign" a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense to come within our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. CP 4.551 Best, Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 2:42 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Harry, List, > Is ontologism really the problem? John Deely says, that relations are > ontological (so also the triadic relations). Does the FOO claim, that > concepts (eg. mind-relations of relations) are not a part of reality? But > to say, that concepts are part of reality, even in inanimate nature there > are concepts too, or even to say, that maybe conceptuality is a synonym for > reality, would be a kind of ontologism that is in accord with Peirce, or > not? > Best, > Helmut > "Jon Awbrey" <[email protected]> wrote: > > Harry, List, > > Yes, that is the core idea of Peirce's approach to semiotics, > critical to his theory of inquiry and the whole perspective > of pragmatism. For the past 15 years or so, unfortunately, > I've watched the "fashion of ontologism" (FOO) obscure his > central insights. I can but hope that the days of FOO are > numbered and will quickly fade into fadish oblivion. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On 6/20/2015 6:51 AM, Harry Procter wrote: > > A sign is only a sign to the extent it is construed or interpreted as > > a sign. This interpretation connects the sign vehicle with the object. > > The three parts are interdependent and only assume their identity in > > the context of the three. A truly triadic systemic formulation. > > Best, > > Harry Procter > > > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:[email protected]] > >> Sent: 19 June 2015 20:40 > >> To: Helmut Raulien > >> Cc: Peirce List > >> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Survey of Relation Theory . 1 > >> > >> Helmut, List, > >> > >> I wasn't completely sure about the meaning of your question: > >> > >> • "Are interpretants an own class?" > >> > >> Is "own" a translation of "eigen" maybe? > >> > >> At any rate I went with my best guess and took you to be asking whether > >> interpretants (and the other two classes) were ontologically > distinctive in > >> some way. I rewrote my last reply as a blog post with this > interpretation > >> in mind: > >> > >> • Relations & Their Relatives : 9 > >> ( http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/06/19/relations-their-relatives-9/ > ) > >> > >> Please let me know if my reading of your sense is right or not. > >> > >> Regards, > >> > >> Jon > > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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