Jon, Gary, List,
Gary has confirmed, I think, that with ontologism you have meant the FOO, and that this FOO indeed denies the reality of concepts, so also denies triadic relations in nature. Now about the term "nature": Is it so, that in mathematics things are possible, which are not possible in nature? I am refering to the Peircean logic of relations, in which all higher-than-3-adic relations can be reduced to 3-adic relations. Now my question is: In mathematics 4-,5-,6-, and so on-adic relations are unique ones, are they not? Are they not in Peirces logic of relations, because it is a naturalistic thing, and in nature (or in the nature we can percieve), there is only the classes time, space, relation between time and space? Or events, ens (permanent units), 2-adic relations? (of which three the relation is 3-adic). So- is Peircean logic, in contrast to mathematical logic, naturalistic? Naturalism is often not nicely spoken about: "Naturalistic fallacy". But all this I wrote cannot be, because if I say, that concepts are real, then mathematics (which is a concept), is also real, so part of nature. So, higher-than-3-adic relations should be unique (not reducible to 3-adic, as claimed by Peirce). I am confused.
Best,
Helmut
 "Jon Awbrey" <[email protected]> wrote:
 
Helmut, List,

Well, I see that my flippant remarks are likely to be mis-interpreted,
so I'll try to avert any mis-apprehensions before we go flying off on
a tangent that is not really essential to understanding the theory of
relations or its application to semiotics, inquiry, pragmatism, etc.

I concocted the term "ontologism" here to describe what I've elsewhere
called "absolutism", in the sense of using absolute terms way past the
point when it has become clear that relative terms are what's required.
I've also called that "essentialism" and would call it "monadicism" if
that weren't almost certain to be misunderstood.

So I hope it's clear that I'm not inditing any brand of of realism,
empirical, platonic, scholastic, or otherwise under this complaint.

The important thing here is how we decide when the phenomena at issue,
or any subject matters, are adequately covered by monadic predicates,
in their proper, non-vacuous use, and when it is time to call in the
resources of higher adic relative terms.

Regards,

Jon

On 6/20/2015 2:42 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> Jon, Harry, List,
> Is ontologism really the problem? John Deely says, that relations are
> ontological (so also the triadic relations). Does the FOO claim, that concepts
> (eg. mind-relations of relations) are not a part of reality? But to say, that
> concepts are part of reality, even in inanimate nature there are concepts too,
> or even to say, that maybe conceptuality is a synonym for reality, would be a
> kind of ontologism that is in accord with Peirce, or not?
> Best,
> Helmut
> "Jon Awbrey" <[email protected]> wrote:
> Harry, List,
>
> Yes, that is the core idea of Peirce's approach to semiotics,
> critical to his theory of inquiry and the whole perspective
> of pragmatism. For the past 15 years or so, unfortunately,
> I've watched the "fashion of ontologism" (FOO) obscure his
> central insights. I can but hope that the days of FOO are
> numbered and will quickly fade into fadish oblivion.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 6/20/2015 6:51 AM, Harry Procter wrote:
> > A sign is only a sign to the extent it is construed or interpreted as
> > a sign. This interpretation connects the sign vehicle with the object.
> > The three parts are interdependent and only assume their identity in
> > the context of the three. A truly triadic systemic formulation.
> > Best,
> > Harry Procter
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:[email protected]]
> >> Sent: 19 June 2015 20:40
> >> To: Helmut Raulien
> >> Cc: Peirce List
> >> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Survey of Relation Theory . 1
> >>
> >> Helmut, List,
> >>
> >> I wasn't completely sure about the meaning of your question:
> >>
> >> • "Are interpretants an own class?"
> >>
> >> Is "own" a translation of "eigen" maybe?
> >>
> >> At any rate I went with my best guess and took you to be asking whether
> >> interpretants (and the other two classes) were ontologically distinctive in
> >> some way. I rewrote my last reply as a blog post with this interpretation
> >> in mind:
> >>
> >> • Relations & Their Relatives : 9
> >> ( http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/06/19/relations-their-relatives-9/ )
> >>
> >> Please let me know if my reading of your sense is right or not.
> >>
> >> Regards,
> >>
> >> Jon
>

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