Jon, List,
yes. And I just think that I must add, that what I have written below is likely to be wrong: Somewhere in the internet I have just read, that Peirces reduction hypothesis has been proven by mathematics (which proof I dont think that I will ever understand). That would mean eg.: A 3-adic relation cannot be reduced to 1-adic and/or 2-adic relations. But a 4-adic relation can be reduced to relations not higher than 3-adic. So, obviously it has nothing to do with naturalism and so on.
Best,
Helmut
On 6/21/2015 3:31 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> Supplement:
> Because I dont want to pass over my below mentioned confusion, or start a
> tangent, I try to answer my own question: There are concepts, that are a product
> of reflexion (eg. by having looked at nature), and there are other concepts that
> come from praeflexion. Mathematics does praeflect, and then prove these
> concepts, and the Peircean logic of relatives is reflecting nature. Because
> nature is triadic, the Peircean logic is also. Mathematics is not only
> reflecting nature, but itself and then preaflecting all that might be possible
> to justifiedly do with numbers and other abstract (reflected) units, so it is
> k-adic.
> Jon, Gary, List,
> Gary has confirmed, I think, that with ontologism you have meant the FOO, and
> that this FOO indeed denies the reality of concepts, so also denies triadic
> relations in nature. Now about the term "nature": Is it so, that in mathematics
> things are possible, which are not possible in nature? I am refering to the
> Peircean logic of relations, in which all higher-than-3-adic relations can be
> reduced to 3-adic relations. Now my question is: In mathematics 4-,5-,6-, and so
> on-adic relations are unique ones, are they not? Are they not in Peirces logic
> of relations, because it is a naturalistic thing, and in nature (or in the
> nature we can percieve), there is only the classes time, space, relation between
> time and space? Or events, ens (permanent units), 2-adic relations? (of which
> three the relation is 3-adic). So- is Peircean logic, in contrast to
> mathematical logic, naturalistic? Naturalism is often not nicely spoken about:
> "Naturalistic fallacy". But all this I wrote cannot be, because if I say, that
> concepts are real, then mathematics (which is a concept), is also real, so part
> of nature. So, higher-than-3-adic relations should be unique (not reducible to
> 3-adic, as claimed by Peirce). I am confused.
> Best,
> Helmut
Well, a state of confusion is one of the provinces that inquiry hails from.
And relation theory affords a handy atlas of maps to guide the exploration.
Regards,
Jon
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> Supplement:
> Because I dont want to pass over my below mentioned confusion, or start a
> tangent, I try to answer my own question: There are concepts, that are a product
> of reflexion (eg. by having looked at nature), and there are other concepts that
> come from praeflexion. Mathematics does praeflect, and then prove these
> concepts, and the Peircean logic of relatives is reflecting nature. Because
> nature is triadic, the Peircean logic is also. Mathematics is not only
> reflecting nature, but itself and then preaflecting all that might be possible
> to justifiedly do with numbers and other abstract (reflected) units, so it is
> k-adic.
> Jon, Gary, List,
> Gary has confirmed, I think, that with ontologism you have meant the FOO, and
> that this FOO indeed denies the reality of concepts, so also denies triadic
> relations in nature. Now about the term "nature": Is it so, that in mathematics
> things are possible, which are not possible in nature? I am refering to the
> Peircean logic of relations, in which all higher-than-3-adic relations can be
> reduced to 3-adic relations. Now my question is: In mathematics 4-,5-,6-, and so
> on-adic relations are unique ones, are they not? Are they not in Peirces logic
> of relations, because it is a naturalistic thing, and in nature (or in the
> nature we can percieve), there is only the classes time, space, relation between
> time and space? Or events, ens (permanent units), 2-adic relations? (of which
> three the relation is 3-adic). So- is Peircean logic, in contrast to
> mathematical logic, naturalistic? Naturalism is often not nicely spoken about:
> "Naturalistic fallacy". But all this I wrote cannot be, because if I say, that
> concepts are real, then mathematics (which is a concept), is also real, so part
> of nature. So, higher-than-3-adic relations should be unique (not reducible to
> 3-adic, as claimed by Peirce). I am confused.
> Best,
> Helmut
Well, a state of confusion is one of the provinces that inquiry hails from.
And relation theory affords a handy atlas of maps to guide the exploration.
Regards,
Jon
--
academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
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