Edwina, List: I must admit that, contrary to my initial expectations, this exchange has been quite helpful; especially the notions of more information vs. more ambiguity, which I assume correspond to more determinate (less vague) vs. more vague (less determinate).
EDWINA: I find your use of the phrase 'rule of determination' a 'bit much'. I'm cautious about the agential force implied by this phrase, and I don't think that Peirce meant such a deterministic linearity. JON: My intent is not to use that phrase with any "agential force" or to imply determinism, but rather simply as shorthand for the underlying logic of constraint when moving from one trichotomy to another. Again, in Peirce's words, "It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant." (EP2:481) Another way of saying it is that a Third can determine a First, a Second, or a Third; a Second can determine either a First or a Second; and a First can determine only a First. EDWINA: Well, here, I'm not so sure. I don't accept that 'would be' has any reality. I acknowledge that it certainly has no existence, but, I'm not sure that one could even declare that it has a reality. That, to me, is too deterministic and I feel you are moving into Platonism, and the point of evolution is that it is OPEN, adaptive, unknown..and NOT final or determined. JON: Not Platonism, but Peircean "extreme realism." My understanding is that Peirce held that "would-bes" are REAL, but only Actuals EXIST. For example, "... the external world ... does not consist of existent objects merely, nor merely of these and their reactions; but on the contrary, its most important reals have the mode of being of what the nominalist calls 'mere' words, that is, general types and would-bes." (CP8.191) Even more to the point, "... a true 'WOULD BE' is as real as an actuality. For what is it for a thing to be Real? ... To say that a thing is Real is merely to say that such predicates as are true of it, or some of them, are true of it regardless of whatever any actual person or persons might think concerning that truth. Unconditionality in that single respect constitutes what we call Reality. Consequently, any habit, or lasting state that consists in the fact that the subject of it would, under certain conditions, behave in a certain way, is Real, provided this be true whether actual persons think so or not; and it must be admitted to be a Real Habit, even if those conditions never actually do get fulfilled ... I call 'truth' the predestinate opinion, by which I ought to have meant that which WOULD ultimately prevail if investigation were carried sufficiently far in that particular direction." (EP2:456-457) Per Ben Udell, Peirce's use of "predestinate" here is one piece of evidence that "destinate interpretant" is another name for final interpretant; which leads to ... EDWINA: Obviously, these are within the three modal categories. Now - you ask IF the Final Interpretant, which I consider as operating only within 'mind-analysis' and using reason (the mode of Thirdness) , is in a mode of Secondness (and thus, 'tinged' with action) and, since it is linked to the earlier two Interpretants - then, this could be Thirdness-as-Secondness. So, you ask if the earlier Dynamic Interpretant in this same situation can be in a mode of Firstness? Yes, it could be in Thirdness-as-Firstness or Thirdness-as-Secondness. And the Immediate Interpretant, still linked to that Final Interpretant in its mode of Thirdness-as-Secondness, could be in a mode of 3-1 or 3-2. But most certainly not in pure Thirdness or 'Significative' or 'Relative'. That is, the earlier Interpretants cannot contain MORE information than the later ones. They can contain MORE ambiguity than the later ones. Just as the Immediate Object cannot contain MORE information than the external Dynamic Object - but it can exhibit MORE ambiguity...and usually, almost always, does just that. After all, as Peirce says, we can't know our external world directly! JON: This actually suggests the reverse order from my guess based on your last message. You are saying that if the final interpretant is a Second (to produce action), then the dynamic interpretant can only be a First (sympathetic/congruentive) or a Second (shocking/percussive), and likewise the immediate interpretant can only be a First (hypothetic) or a Second (categorical). Would you also say that if the final interpretant is a Second (to produce action) and the dynamic interpretant is a First (sympathetic/congruentive), then the immediate interpretant must also be a First? I think so, but I want to make sure. If so, then that means If>Id>Ii, and the rationale is similar to those offered by Ralf Mueller in 1994 and Bernard Morand in 2009 ( http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16954). It is also consistent with Peirce's own ordering (EP2:481), assuming that destinate=final and explicit=immediate. EDWINA: I might be misunderstanding your notation. I'm just considering that your Ii>Id>If notation simply means 'order of processing'. But I'm beginning to think that you mean something MORE. Your use of > might be saying that Ii contains MORE information than Id; and that Id contains MORE information than If. I certainly would disagree with that! The Immediate Interpretant can be more ambiguous than the Dynamic Interpretant..and that more ambiguous than the Final Interpretant. JON: Yes, in my notation, ">" means "determines"; and conveniently--given that in mathematics it means "greater than"--it corresponds to "has more information than." So If>Id>Ii means that the final interpretant determines (has more information than) the dynamic interpretant, which determines (has more information than) the immediate interpretant. It looks like we are on the same page now. Regards, Jon
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