See comments below: 1) JON: Next question--given that If>Id>Ii, where do the three interpretant relation trichotomies fit?
S-Id = Relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Interpretant = Manner of Appeal to the Dynamic Intepretant - Presented/Suggestive, Urged/Imperative, Submitted/Indicative. S-If = Relation of the Sign to the Normal/Final Interpretant = Nature of the Influence of the Sign - Rheme/Seme, Dicent/Pheme, Argument/Delome. S-Od-If = Triadic Relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Object and Its Normal/Final Interpretant = Nature of the Assurance of the Utterance - Instinct, Experience, Form. EDWINA: We must acknowledge that the Peircean Sign is triadic; it is NOT made up of dyads. Therefore, it is not made up of the Relation of the Representamen-DO, or Representamen-DI...etc. We can, however, analyze these internal-to-the-triad Relations. And, the Relations are obviously in any one of the three modal categories. BUT - again, within the full set of Six interactions DO-IO- Representamen-II-DI-FI....these must be in harmony - as has been slightly explained in previous posts. 2) JON: According to Peirce (CP8.338), we also know that S-If>S-Id. Here are some arrangements, consistent with this, that I have seen. EDWINA: I'm not sure of the above as a general truth. You are saying, if I understand your notations, that the Relation between the Representamen and the Final Interpretant has more information than the Relation between the Representamen and the Dynamic Interpretant. But they could be equal. 3) JON: (a) If>Id>Ii>S-If>S-Id>S-Od-If. EDWINA:What about Representamen<->DO>IO-Representamen-II<DO<FO-->Representamen.. Understanding the above within Peirce's "Thought..is more without us than within. It is we that are in it, rather than it in any of us". 8.256. Understanding 'Thought' as 'Mind' and as held within the Representamen. That is, semiosis operates within Mind and its generalized universals...which are articulated/made existential within a triad of interactions: Object-Representamen-Interpretant. 4) JON: (b) If>S-If>Id>S-Id>Ii>S-Od-If. EDWINA: Seems to be a set of dyads...? The FI and DI and II have more information than the Representamen? Or just more particularized information? Your triad of S-Od-If, which I read as Representamen-Dynamic Object-Final Interpretant...Do you agree with my outline in point 3 above, which I copy here as: "That is, semiosis operates within Mind and its generalized universals...which are articulated/made existential within a triad of interactions: Object-Representamen-Interpretant." (c) S-Od-If>S-If>If>S-Id>Id>Ii. All of the correlates come before all of the relations in (a), and each correlate comes right before its corresponding relation in (b), except that the triadic relation is last. What bothers me about (c)--which has been advocated in years past by Ben Udell and Bernard Morand, perhaps others--is that it involves relation trichotomies determining their constituent correlate trichotomies. It seems to me that, just as S-Od comes after both Od and S, likewise S-If must come after both S and If, S-Id must come after both S and Id, and S-Od-If must come after Od, S, If, and S-If. The problem is that I can offer no good reason for such a restriction, other than the common-sense notion that a relation cannot be more determinate than any of its relata. Am I wrong about this? EDWINA: You've begun with the triad. And with the Representamen as 'the ground'. You've left out the Immediate Object....and have the Representamen in three dyads: R-FI; R-DI; R-II (I think). Sorry- but I don't understand what you are trying to get across. You state: "just as S-Od comes after both Od and S, likewise S-If must come after both S and If,"....and I don't understand your point.
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
