Ben, list, Well thank you so much for the diligent researching!
That is really something, about the eight forms of induction. Although, from what he said, it sounds like there are eight other forms of induction, so there would total nine or maybe ten forms, depending on how one reads what he said there. I suppose he had written about them elsewhere, but for the time being there is likely nothing published beyond the memoir, and I don't have access to the mss.; nor would I relish trying to swim in that ocean to find the drop or two I'm looking for. Hopefully as the Writings continue to be published, something will come out that addresses the nine or ten forms of induction. It's at least helpful to know that these other eight forms are supposed to be of lower forms, and my guess is that qualitative and quantitative are the two he referred to as the first two. Perhaps crude induction is supposed to represent the other eight forms in some general way. Then again, in 1883, I don't think he had changed his idea of abduction, so perhaps crude and quantitative induction are the two he meant, and qualitative somehow addresses the other eight. Well, it's all nothing but wild speculation on my part until something gets published about it. As for the paragraphs 232 and 233, I think you're right that it refers to the last clause, but then I don't understand why it's qualitative induction, and not simply induction. Even accepting your point about including evidential values, that doesn't explain why it should normally be restricted to qualitative induction in the first place. Perhaps I just need to revise my understanding of Peirce's view of scientific method, and accept that it typically involves qualitative induction, and not quantitative induction or crude induction. As for abduction, you make some interesting points. Perhaps I have attempted to too rigidly understand the tripartite classification of semiotic logic into stechiology, critic, and methodeutic. My understanding up to this point had been that critic would, well, critique inferences and/or arguments from a formal perspective. I also believed that this meant the analysis of changes in logical quantity belongs to critic, since in his 1867 paper on information, inferences play the role of representing changes in the state of information, and the various ways of changing the state of information offers a somewhat finer-grained approach to classifying inferences/arguments. Thus I would expect that abduction would still play some role in understanding changes in the state of information, because it is an inference. Maybe this is wrong headed, I'm not sure, and I should consider such changes to be restricted to induction and deduction now. Actually, since deduction doesn't technically change the state of information, perhaps it should really only be restricted to understanding forms of induction. On the other hand, you wrote: If you mean Peirce's theory of information (comprehension × extension), > Peirce said in 1902 that he had previously made the syllogistic forms and > the doctrine of comprehension and extension more fundamental than they > really are for understanding abductive inference. I notice that although they were made more fundamental than they really are, that doesn't imply that they don't play a role in understanding abductive inference at all. Even the importance of the syllogistic forms is still upheld by Peirce into his last years, and the logical quantities are discussed (though in a short way) in Kaina Stocheia, so both syllogistic forms and logical quantities possibly still have some significance for the understanding of abduction. As far as logical quantity goes, I simply have no idea how. Franklin On Sun, Nov 1, 2015 at 1:02 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Franklin, list, on your other questions, > > You wrote, > > [CP 8.]232. Or, what is usually the best way, he may turn to the > consideration of the hypothesis, study it thoroughly and deduce > miscellaneous observable consequences, and then return to the phenomena to > find how nearly these consequences agree with the actual facts. > > [CP 8.]233. This is not essentially different from induction. Only it is > most usually an induction from instances which are not discrete and > numerable. I now call it Qualitative Induction. It is this which I used to > confound with the second line of procedure, or at least not to distinguish > it sharply. > > [....] > > [Franklin] So my difficulty is with paragraph 233. When he says "[t]his is > not essentially different from induction," I'm not sure what 'this' he > means.I would think that it refers to the subject of paragraph 232, but > paragraph 232 looks to me as though it simply describes ideal scientific > method--abduce a hypothesis, deduce its consequences, and then induce the > consequents and compare whether the consequents induced conform to the > consequents expected to follow from the antecedents. [....] > [End quote] > > In 233, I think Peirce is referring simply to the last clause in 232: > "then return to the phenomena to find how nearly these consequences agree > with the actual facts". > > You go on to ask, > > I don't understand why the instances are not usually discrete and > numerable, and I do not understand why this is qualitative induction. Why > is this restricted to qualitative induction, and why are the instances not > usually discrete and numerable? If you could enlighten me here about how > I'm misinterpreting the passage, I would be thankful. > [End quote] > > I'm not too clear on it myself. Qualitative induction involves evidentiary > weighting. In a discussion crude, quantitative, and qualitative inductions, > Peirce says: > > 1905, CP 2.759. The remaining kind of induction, which I shall call > _*Qualitative > Induction*_, is of more general utility than either of the others, while > it is intermediate between them, alike in respect to security and to the > scientific value of its conclusions. In both these respects it is well > separated from each of the other kinds. It consists of those inductions > which are neither founded upon experience in one mass, as Crude Induction > is, nor upon a collection of numerable instances of equal evidential > values, but upon a stream of experience in which the relative evidential > values of different parts of it have to be estimated according to our sense > of the impressions they make upon us. > [.... End quote] > > It makes more sense to me to say that Qualitative Induction is based on > instances that are not discrete, numerable, and of equal evidential value, > than to say that it is based on instances that are not discrete and > numerable. Maybe, in the letter to Carus, Peirce accidentally omitted the > part about "equal evidential value"? My expertise on Peirce's views on > induction is not strong. > > You wrote: > > In general, I find Peirce much more focused on understanding abduction > from the standpoint of methodeutic in his later work (I have read some > literature which makes just this point), and wonder how he could have given > a fuller treatment of abduction from the standpoint of critical logic once > he changed his views about how abduction and induction differ. What is the > place of abduction in the theory of information, if not the induction of > characters? I suspect that getting clearer about this will also help in > getting clearer about induction. > [End quote] > > If you mean Peirce's theory of information (comprehension × extension), > Peirce said in 1902 that he had previously made the syllogistic forms and > the doctrine of comprehension and extension more fundamental than they > really are for understanding abductive inference. > <http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-minute-logic-chapter-i-intended-characters-treatise> > http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-minute-logic-chapter-i-intended-characters-treatise > . Maybe he changed his mind again later, I don't know. He eventually says > that the pragmatic maxim provides the necessary and sufficient rule for > abductive inference, to the extent that it needs rules at all. Besides > that, at the level of critique of arguments (the 'critical level') he > discusses plausibility, instinctual simplicity, naturalness. > https://sites.google.com/site/cspmem/terms#simple and > http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/plausibility . He sees > methodeutical considerations as completing the justification of particular > abductive inferences - not as explanations _*per se*_, but as > explanations _*worth testing*_ - whereas deductive and inductive > inferences are fully justified at the critical level prior to methodeutical > considerations, in Peirce's view. There seems more to say at a general > level about abductive inference in methodeutic, i.e., in the study of > inquiry and its interplay of the modes of inference. In some sort of > counterpoint, if I recall correctly, somebody said that Peirce sees the > main philosophical study of deductive inference as being in stechiotic > rather than in critique of arguments. Peirce tends to say that deductive > inference gets no real help from philosophy anyway, except when the topic > is probability, which he regards as a philosophical idea. (Also, in CP > 7.525, Peirce sees logic as helping mathematicians on things like the > definition of continuity). > > I can't help thinking that abductive inference relies on both experience > and instinct in the sense of inborn talent, and that whatever > not-strictly-instinctual procedures it has at the critical level as an > inference tend to be too tentative or context-bound or vague or the like, > to be worth formulating as general rules rather than as moves worth trying. > I suspect that psychology, sociology, and whatnot may throw some > interesting light on abductive inference as actually practiced at the > critical level by _*homo sapiens*_. > > Best, Ben > > Best, Ben > > On 11/1/2015 10:20 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > Franklin, list, > > I ran into a place where Peirce mentions eight forms of induction besides > two that he had discussed in the past. It's in the Carnegie Application, > though which I had looked the other day but somehow missed this: > > MEMOIR 19 > ON ARGUMENTS > 4th paragraph in "From Draft A - MS L75.35-39" (pp 35-39) > http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-06.htm#m19 > > [Begin quote] > Induction is the highest and most typical form of reasoning. In my essay > of 1883, I only recognized two closely allied logical forms of pure > induction, one of which in undoubtedly the highest. I have since discovered > eight other forms which include those almost exclusively used by reasoners > who are not adepts in logic. In fact, Norman Lockyer is the only writer I > have met with who in his best work, especially his last book, habitually > restricts himself to the highest form. Some of his work, however, as for > example, that on the orientation of temples, is logically poor. > [End quote] > > I'll catch up with your other questions later. > > Best, Ben > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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