Ben, list, You wrote:
If the sample is an index, as he later said, of the whole, what sort of > actual index indicates a hypothetical, potential whole? Yes, that is a good point. He must have changed his views, but I'm not sure exactly how. I just re-read the paragraph in Kaina Stoicheia where he introduces depth, breadth, and information, but there is not much there, and certainly nothing about how they relate to inference. He clearly still has the basic ideas there so many decades later, but how to apply them in light of changes to his views in semiotics? If all mental action has the form of inference, then they all must be > related to inferences in some way. Yes, exactly my thought. Franklin On Sat, Nov 7, 2015 at 12:03 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Franklin, list, > > Thanks for pointing out those subsequent passages and unraveling them for > us. It's been a while since I read "Upon Logical Comprehension and > Extension" from beginning to end. > > When Peirce previously in the same paper defined induction as increasing > the breadth without changing the depth, the idea seem to be that of > extending the character to a larger population which is asserted to exist, > i.e., induction's conclusion asserts an actual increase of breadth without > asserting a change of depth. But he comes to say of induction: > > [....] On the other hand, P is not yet found to apply to anything but S', > S'', S''', and Siv, but only to apply to whatever else may hereafter be > found to be contained under M. The induction itself does not make known any > such thing. [....] > [End quote] > > It is true that the induction does not _*make known*_ the truth of its > conclusion's claims, but in this picture the induction does not even _ > *assert*_ the existence of a larger, encompassing population, but instead > leaves it conditional and hypothetical, so the breadth increase is > potential, not assertedly actual. Moreover the conclusion isn't usually > framed like "whatever else may hereafter," it just says "Any M is P" and > this doesn't even entail that there are S's found to be M & P. This is a > question of what is the fairest way to frame an inference. You make a good > point about Peirce not bringing iconicity and indexicality much into the > account in that paper. If the sample is an index, as he later said, of the > whole, what sort of actual index indicates a hypothetical, potential whole? > You wrote, > > It is a bit unclear to me why some of the changes in information didn't > seem to correspond to one of the three inferences [....] > [End quote] > > I had that thought recently too. I once tried to make a table of all the > changes in information and I found that the potential size of the table was > rather larger than I expected. If all mental action has the form of > inference, then they all must be related to inferences in some way. > > Best, Ben > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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