Jerry, list,
On mental action as always having the form of inference (i.e., inference
as the form of all mental action): Peirce goes even further and says
that all mental action conforms to the formula of _/valid/_ inference.
See "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" (1868), CP5.264-317, also
W2:211-41, in particular CP 5.266-79,
beginning
"In accepting the first proposition",
continuing through
"It is a consequence, then, of the first two principles whose results we
are to trace out, that we must, as far as we can, without any other
supposition than that the mind reasons, reduce all mental action to the
formula of valid reasoning."
and ending with
"In every fallacy, therefore, possible to the mind of man, the procedure
of the mind conforms to the formula of valid inference."
On the sample as index of the whole:
1867 | On a New List of Categories | W 2:58; CP 1.559
http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-new-list-categories-5
In an argument, the premises form a representation of the
conclusion, because they indicate the interpretant of the argument,
or representation representing it to represent its object. The
premises may afford a likeness, index, or symbol of the conclusion.
In deductive argument, the conclusion is represented by the premises
as by a general sign under which it is contained. In hypotheses,
something like the conclusion is proved, that is, the premises form
a likeness of the conclusion. [—]
That it is different with induction another example will show.
/S/′, /S/″, /S/‴, and /S^iv / are taken as samples of the collection
/M/;
/S/′, /S/″, /S/‴, and /S^iv / are /P/:
.·. All /M/ is /P/.
Hence the first premise amounts to saying that "/S/′, /S/″, /S/‴,
and /S^iv //^/" is an index of /M/. Hence the premises are an index
of the conclusion.
[End quote]
See also this remark by Peirce in 1903
http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-harvard-lectures-pragmatism-lecture-v-deleted-passage-0
.
Best, Ben
On 11/7/2015 8:20 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
List:
Does anyone have the citations for the two statements with respect to
indices and mental acts as "forms" of inferences? I am curious about
the textual origins in view of the following feelings.
The first suggests a role for the connection between sin-sign and
index as a consequence of the antecedent analysis of the sin-sign.
The latter is stunning from the perspective that inferences require a
conclusion (!) and for me, at least, passing thoughts float by without
apparent motivation and often without a hint of closure, just a gentle
fade.
Cheers
Jerry
On Nov 7, 2015, at 1:53 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
Ben, list,
You wrote:
If the sample is an index, as he later said, of the whole, what
sort of actual index indicates a hypothetical, potential whole?
Yes, that is a good point. He must have changed his views, but I'm
not sure exactly how. I just re-read the paragraph in Kaina Stoicheia
where he introduces depth, breadth, and information, but there is not
much there, and certainly nothing about how they relate to inference.
He clearly still has the basic ideas there so many decades later, but
how to apply them in light of changes to his views in semiotics?
If all mental action has the form of inference, then they all
must be related to inferences in some way.
Yes, exactly my thought.
Franklin
On Sat, Nov 7, 2015 at 12:03 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote
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