Jon, Lists, I think that rationalism normally and traditionally means accepting that there are truths that can be known a priori that are not merely matters of convention. This can allow for truths that don't require knowledge of any specific particular instances to know, but require knowledge of some particular instances. At the very least that is how I understand the term, and it is the basis for the distinction between rationalists and empiricists. But reason and observation can certainly complement each other in both cases. Philosophies rejecting reason in other aspects than the epistemological sense above do exist. Some versions of existentialism and of postmodernism fit that bill. They tend to focus on unfortunate and even destructive uses of reason (a useful type of scepticism, I think, when done in what Hume called the academic mode), but less useful I think when the critiques is grounded in a rejection of the association of reason with power, as when some feminists adopt antirationalism (in this sense) as masculine and demeaning to women. I think this gets more into psychological and social issues than philosophical ones, though there is no clear boundary between the two. The extremes of each are fairly different, however. I think men appropriated reason (and religion, and a number of other sources of power) rather than their being strictly masculine, as we see in some world views, for example some interpretations of Yin and Yang. There is enough empirical connection there to make the assimilation fit observation, but I think this is only because of the appropriation, e.g., of reason by men, is widespread.
Isms tend to exaggerate tendencies, so I would agree that they can be systematically misleading, but there are also real historical characters who occupy the various isms, even if only in their systematic writing. One thing I have always liked about Peirce is that although he is systematic methodologically (as a virtue), he is not obsessed with consistency in this trend, and isn't afraid of tensions in his thinking. His fallibilism and some other isms he adopts are all tentative hypotheses rather than a priori truths, as Gary recently noted. John Collier Professor Emeritus, UKZN http://web.ncf.ca/collier > -----Original Message----- > From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] > Sent: Thursday, 19 November 2015 9:04 PM > To: John Collier > Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L > Subject: Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments > > Terms, Propositions, Arguments: > FR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17582 > FR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17626 > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17629 > JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17639 > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17640 > JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17642 > JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17644 > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17645 > JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17646 > > Jeff, John, all, > > It may be that different people have different things in mind under the > heading of rationalism. > > I think of "the empirical" and "the rational" as pointing to complementary > aspects of an adequate worldview, not as isms that mark a philosophical > watershed, in other words, an exclusive either-or that we have to choose > between. > > Taken that way, rationalism allows for the possibility of rational concepts > having extensions that include but exceed any enumeration of empirical > instances. > > So I see Peirce as sharing that much rationalism with Descartes. > Cartesian dualism or dyadic reductionism is where their ways part. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On 11/19/2015 11:37 AM, John Collier wrote: > > OK, thanks Jon. That is clear enough. You are right on all counts, I > > think. I would think that Russell and Frege come out as rationalists > > (my version) on this account, but Peirce does not (on these grounds at > > least). That would put Peirce closer to my position than I could argue > > for previously, though I suspected it. I was strongly influenced by > > reading Peirce as an undergrad, though I did it without guidance and > > paid more attention to how it influenced my own thinking than to what > > the correct interpretation of Peirce was. My 1984 PhD thesis refers to > > Peirce as an influence, but I am a bit cagey on this, and remarked in > > a footnote that it depended on how Peirce was interpreted. People like > > Nicholas Rescher and Hilary Putnam were also influenced by Peirce, but > > drew some conclusions diametrically opposite to what I was arguing. > > Our 2007 book, Every Thing Must Go, opens with a Peircean positivism > > that is also present in my thesis (not to be confused with either that of > Comte or the Logical Positivists like A.J. Ayer, which are considerably more > strict in rejecting metaphysics). The only paper I have published from my > thesis so far was titled “Pragmatic Incommensurability”, a take on Kuhn. Both > Kuhn and Phillip Kitcher praised it, but a number of more radical idealists > were more critical. My own approach lends itself to naturalism rather than > the anti-psychologism you mention, which I tend to associate with > rationalism. Another place I deviate from Russell, but perhaps not Peirce, if > you are right. > > > > John Collier > > > > Professor Emeritus, UKZN > > > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: > http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
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