Terms, Propositions, Arguments: FR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17582 FR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17626 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17629 JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17639 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17640 JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17642 JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17644 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17645 JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17646 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17648 JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17658
John, all, I think that feature of à priori reasoning is handled well enough by Peirce's concept of exact reasoning, where we achieve exact conclusions (numerators) by working relative to prior hypotheses (denominators), achieving at most a form of self-consistency. Still, the formal models we form in that manner can be applied to empirical phenomena to much good effect. I think here of Chomsky (who understood Peirce better than most I've read). The brand of rationalism he promoted is essential to the generative aspect of grammar. Regards, Jon On 11/19/2015 4:06 PM, John Collier wrote:
Jon, Lists, I think that rationalism normally and traditionally means accepting that there are truths that can be known a priori that are not merely matters of convention. This can allow for truths that don't require knowledge of any specific particular instances to know, but require knowledge of some particular instances. At the very least that is how I understand the term, and it is the basis for the distinction between rationalists and empiricists. But reason and observation can certainly complement each other in both cases. Philosophies rejecting reason in other aspects than the epistemological sense above do exist. Some versions of existentialism and of postmodernism fit that bill. They tend to focus on unfortunate and even destructive uses of reason (a useful type of scepticism, I think, when done in what Hume called the academic mode), but less useful I think when the critiques is grounded in a rejection of the association of reason with power, as when some feminists adopt antirationalism (in this sense) as masculine and demeaning to women. I think this gets more into psychological and social issues than philosophical ones, though there is no clear boundary between the two. The extremes of each are fairly different, however. I think men appropriated reason (and religion, and a number of other sources of power) rather than their being strictly masculine, as we see in some world views, for example some interpretations of Yin and Yang. There is enough empirical connection there to make the assimilation fit observation, but I think this is only because of the appropriation, e.g., of reason by men, is widespread. Isms tend to exaggerate tendencies, so I would agree that they can be systematically misleading, but there are also real historical characters who occupy the various isms, even if only in their systematic writing. One thing I have always liked about Peirce is that although he is systematic methodologically (as a virtue), he is not obsessed with consistency in this trend, and isn't afraid of tensions in his thinking. His fallibilism and some other isms he adopts are all tentative hypotheses rather than a priori truths, as Gary recently noted. John Collier Professor Emeritus, UKZN http://web.ncf.ca/collier
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