List, John:
On Dec 2, 2015, at 11:39 AM, John Collier wrote: > Jerry, there is some very convoluted reasoning in this, but I will try to > explain. See interspersed comments. > The message was only questions, with one except. What reasoning you find convoluted is of your making, not mine. > > I'm not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where > structures are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in > itself without relations. Firstness is a term. I see no reason to infer that it is structureless. Nor, featureless. > [John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when > we get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds. Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical perspective. > [John Collier] Following Stjernfelt's treatment of dicents, nouns are indices > (qualities and predicates in general are basically iconic, though), and hence > seconds at least. Stjernfelt argues that this is a consequence of grammar, > construed broadly, or alternatively and equivalently, by their role in > dicents. Can abstract the noun part to a quality (E.G., Platoness, or > horseness), but then this removestheir grammatical role and turns them into > qualities, Well... FS wrote a fine book. He is very knowledgable and articulate. But, I disagree with the basic premise of his book and many, many of his arguments. Technically, FS gives little attention to the logic concept of extension in various forms of diagrams / mereology. To me, the nature of EXTENSION is the critical distinction between CSP's view of logic and other forms / formal logics, such as the logics the physics / mathematics communities use. CSP, in the three triads, is, in my opinion, laying out nine vaguely related terms, and his definitions of the interrelated meanings of these terms. The goal, if I may use this term, is a self-consistent style of argumentation that is recursive. In other words, 8 terms are generalized (non-mathematical terms) premises for constructing consistent arguments. The index is the central term in the diagram. Qualisigns are one of the origin of indices. The construction of the logic of the rhema is critically based on logical premises intimately connected to the indices. It plays a necessary role in the system of premises. That is, any number of forms of indices can be inserted as representamen of the sin-sign into rhema The proposed self-consistency of the sentences (propositions) arise from adherences to the appropriate legisigns. Yet, the open structure of these premises is so stated that the set of legisigns can be extended as new inquiry generates new sinsigns with new qualisigns and new indices. As CSP notes in 3.420-1. In modern propositional logic, one would probably use conditional premises augmented with hybrid and sortal logics to express the meaning of these nine terms in a way that would be consistent with mathematical logic and semantics such that recursive calculations would be consistent, complete and decidable. As I have previously noted here, I have used these semantics for pragmatic purposes. Rather clumsy, to say the least! [JLRC] If a molecule is a noun, is it a "firstness"? does it inherently have a structure? Is modal logic necessary to describe the relationship between atoms and molecules? Is the inherence of "thing in itself" necessary for this relation? > > [John Collier] No, see my last interjection. Is a molecule divisible? Or, is it a context dependent question? > [John Collier] No, for the reasons above, if I understand what you mean here > by your use of 'metaphysical' which is a very broad term. I phrased this question is such a way as to be consistent in multiple symbol systems. If I understand your physical perspective, then I can easy understand why you answer in this way. Cheers Jerry > John Collier > Professor Emeritus, UKZN > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: Wednesday, 02 December 2015 6:57 PM > To: Peirce-L > Cc: Clark Goble > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union > of units unify the unity. > > List, Clark: > > On Dec 2, 2015, at 10:18 AM, Clark Goble wrote: > > > I'm not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where > structures are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in > itself without relations. > > > From my perspective, this argument, ignores the nature of nature - that is, > of part whole relationships, known as mereology in logic and philosophy and > as "scaling" in physics. > > [John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when > we get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds. > > A noun is what? a part of a sentence? an object? a singularity? a relative? > a grammatical structure? > > [John Collier] Following Stjernfelt's treatment of dicents, nouns are indices > (qualities and predicates in general are basically iconic, though), and hence > seconds at least. Stjernfelt argues that this is a consequence of grammar, > construed broadly, or alternatively and equivalently, by their role in > dicents. Can abstract the noun part to a quality (E.G., Platoness, or > horseness), but then this removestheir grammatical role and turns them into > qualities, > > If an atom is a noun, does it inherently have a structure? When was the > concept of the structure of an atom introduced into science? philosophy? > > [John Collier] If an atom is a noun then it is a second, and there is no > reason why it can't have a structure. Atomness, though, is iconic, and cannot > signify a structure in itself. > > If a molecule is a noun, is it a "firstness"? does it inherently have a > structure? Is modal logic necessary to describe the relationship between > atoms and molecules? Is the inherence of "thing in itself" necessary for this > relation? > > [John Collier] No, see my last interjection. > > In short, does a concept of "firstness", as a "thing in itself" inherently > require a metaphysical view of all nouns? > > [John Collier] No, for the reasons above, if I understand what you mean here > by your use of 'metaphysical' which is a very broad term. > > If a unit is a firstness, then: > > The union of units unifies the unity. > > Is this logically True? or False? > What is your reasoning for your conclusion? > > [John Collier] Clark will have to address this. I find it very obscure. > > Best, > John > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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