List: As is becoming my habit, I will merely pose some questions directed toward furthering the inquiry.
1. How can one articulate the kinship of "degeneracy" and "percept"? (I have struggled with CSP's usage of the term "degeneracy" for over a decade; his meaning remains unsettled in my mind.) 2. In the Commens dictionary, one finds two terms from the same root as "percept". Both terms apparently come from the same paper, Telepathy, CP 7.648. http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/ponecept 1903 | Telepathy | CP 7.648 It is a difficult question whether the serial principle permits us to draw sharp lines of demarcation between the percept and the near anticipation, or say the antecept, and between the percept and the recent memory (may I be permitted to call this the ponecept, a distant and dubious memory being perhaps quite another thing?), or whether the percept is at once but an extreme case of an antecept and an extreme case of a ponecept. Are these terms used elsewhere? 3. Do these terms tie the concept of "percept" to a dynamic interpretation of the continuing emergence of a percept or a family of percepts? (Here, I am thinking of biological entailments of meanings of percepts.) 4. How does the triad, ponecept, percept and antecept relate to the form of symbols? 5. How does this triad, ponecept, percept and antecept, relate to the emergence of fresh legisigns? Cheers Jerry On Dec 16, 2015, at 1:19 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: > Edwina, List, > > There are a number of claims that you make about how we should read Peirce's > texts that call out for some digging in the texts to see whether they fit > with what Peirce says. Let me start with this one about the character of > relatively degenerate signs. ET: "Therefore, I reject your view that the > "Qualisign is degenerate relative to the Sinsign and to the Legisign ". It's > the Relations in their categorical modes that are genuine or degenerate; > i.e., the modes are genuine/degenerate. Not the Signs. > > It is clear that Peirce treats the classification of the relations between > sign and dynamical object as more or less degenerate. He says, for instance, > that: Of these three genera of representamens, the Icon is the Qualitatively > degenerate, the Index the Reactionally degenerate, while the Symbol is the > relatively genuine genus. CP 5.73 > > What textual evidence do we have for thinking that the distinction between > signs based on the mode in which they are apprehended (i.e., qualisign, > sinsign, legislign) is or is not based on more and less degenerate kinds? I > think the question is pretty clearly answered in CP 2.265 where he applies > the notions of degenerate and genuine to each of the three main > classifications that he considers in NDTR. > > In a separate remark, you claim that all signs are embodied. Having looked > at what Peirce says about the embodiment of a sign, the basic idea is that a > sign is embodied when it is realized in an instance where the sign is a token > (i.e., a sinsign). Peirce makes it clear that a sign does not need to be > embodied in token instance in order for it to be a sign. A qualisign, for > instance, is an abstraction that represents possible feelings. > > --Jeff > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Edwina Taborsky [[email protected]] > Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 2:13 PM > To: [email protected]; 'Peirce-L' > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > Gary F- I'm aware that Peirce used the term 'sign' to refer to both the > Representamen and the full triadic semiosic process. As you know, your > confining the term to mean ONLY the Representamen, is a problem I have, not > with Peirce, but with your outlines. I doubt that you and I will agree on > this. > > I don't think that the term 'peculiar' naturally leads to its being defined > as 'degenerate'. That's because I understand the terms 'genuine' and > 'degenerate' to refer only to the modal categories. So, if the Relations > between the three parts of the triad (Object-Representamen-Interpretant) are > operating within the degnerate modes of (2-1, 3-1, 3-2) rather than the 'pure > modes' (1-1, 2-2, 3-3)...then, we can see them as 'degenerate relations'. > > I do not know what Peirce meant by 'these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind > and only form a sign through being actually embodied" 2.245. He might be > saying that a Sinsign, which functions as a particularity, might have a > qualitative relation (as well as a direct relation) with its Object in the > mode of 2-1, or Secondness-as-Firstness. > > Therefore, I reject your view that the "Qualisign is degenerate relative to > the Sinsign and to the Legisign ". It's the Relations in their categorical > modes that are genuine or degenerate; i.e., the modes are genuine/degenerate. > Not the Signs. > > Qualisigns in themselves do not actually form a Representamen, for a > Representamen is not a collection of particular relations, but is a > transformation of these relations into generalities, into laws. Qualisigns > are connected to the object by an 'embodiment' process that is descriptive > rather than denotative. . But, since no qualisign exists 'per se' but > functions within a relation to its object (which could be also be in a mode > of Firstness) then, it could be that the 'peculiar' mode of a qualisign as > related to a Sinsign (which is in a mode of Secondness) is in a categorical > mode of 2-1, or, Secondness as Firstness. > > Peirce also, in 2.246, refers to the Legisign, as requiring Sinsigns, but > again, 'these are not ordinary Sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences > that are regarded as significant'. Same thing. In a Legisign Representamen, > the Relations between the Representamen and the Object and Interpretant could > be in a mode of 3-2, or Thirdness operating in Secondness. > > Again - how can a 'normal Qualisign' be disembodied? What's your meaning of > this statement? > > Edwina > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > To: 'Peirce-L'<mailto:[email protected]> > Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 3:20 PM > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > Edwina, in my study of NDTR, I am using Peirce’s definition of “Sign” exactly > as given in that work; I quoted it (again) in the post you are responding to. > If you have a problem with it, you’ll have to take it up with Peirce, not > with me. As for what you choose to place into your pigeonholes of “Saussurean > sign”, “Platonism” etc., that has no relevance to NDTR that I can see. > > Peirce says that a Sinsign “involves a qualisign, or rather, several > qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind” — and I suggested an > explanation of why Peirce calls them “peculiar” (implying of course that > there is another kind of Qualisign that is not peculiar). My suggestion is > prompted by Peirce’s statement about the Qualisign that its “embodiment has > nothing to do with its character as a sign.” You don’t like my suggestion, > which is fine, but you’ve offered no alternative. Why are the qualisigns > involved in sinsigns “of a peculiar kind”? > > Gary f. > > } { > http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway > > From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: 3-Dec-15 14:41 > To: [email protected]; 'Peirce-L' <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > Gary F - I certainly consider all ten classes as genuine Signs. I don't > think this suggests an ambiguity in the meaning of 'genuine' and 'degenerate' > but rather, an ambiguity in your definition of the Sign. > > You, as I understand it, confine the meaning of 'Sign' to be a synonym for > 'Representamen. This leads, I think, to an understanding of the Sign as > really a Saussurian Sign, with the Signifier=Object; and the > Signified=Interpretant. Obviously, I reject this dyadism. I consider the > Peircean Sign to be an integral triad of three Relations: That between the > Representamen and Object; that of the Representamen in itself; and that > between the Representamen and the Interpretant. [See 8.344--] > > So, if you consider only the Representamen as the Sign, then, I don't see how > you can define it, on its own, as genuine or degenerate. It isn't that the > Representamen can't act as a sign [Representamen] unless it is embodied; it > isn't a Representamen UNLESS it is embodied. Otherwise, you are moving into > Platonism which does accept non-embodied Forms. [And yes, I'm aware of > Peirce's terms of "it cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied" > 2.244. > > I don't see how a Sign (the triad) with all three Relations in a mode of > Firstness is degenerate or even 'doubly degenerate'. After all, Firstness as > a categorical mode, has no nature of degeneracy. > > The genuine and degenerate forms of the Categories, is another issue, where, > as we know, Peirce considers that Firstness has no degeneracy; Secondness has > both a genuine and degenerate mode (2-2 and 2-1); and Thirdness has both a > genuine and two degenerate modes (3-3, 3-2, 3-1). > > When Peirce refers to a genuine or degenerate index, he is referring to its > categorical mode of Secondness. That is, the modal categories in themselves > are genuine or degenerate not the Relation. > > I don't see that a Qualisign, which is in a mode of pure Firstness (and not > 3-1) can be degenerate as compared to a Sinsign or Legisign. > > How can 'a normal Qualisign' be disembodied? There's no such thing in Peirce > as a 'free-floating Representamen'. That's Platonism. > > Edwina > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > To: 'Peirce-L'<mailto:[email protected]> > Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 11:31 AM > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > Moving on to the first trichotomy of sign types in “Nomenclature and > Divisions of Triadic Relations”: > > CP 2.244: According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a Qualisign, > a Sinsign, or a Legisign. > A Qualisign is a quality which is a Sign. It cannot actually act as a sign > until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character > as a sign. > [As a Sign, this “quality” must be a correlate of a triadic relation with its > Object and Interpretant, “by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant > is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the > same Object, and for some possible Interpretant” (CP 2.242). Yet it cannot > act as a sign until it is embodied, i.e. until it becomes involved in at > least a dyadic relation, and thus enters the universe of existence. Yet its > significance is its quality (not its embodiment), and qualities being > monadic, there is no real difference between Sign and Object (or Interpretant > either). So I think we might call this a doubly degenerate kind of triadic > relation, where the Sign is virtually self-representing, and self-determining > as its own Interpretant. Compare the “self-sufficient” point on a map which > Peirce offers as an example of doubly degenerate Thirdness in his third > Harvard Lecture, EP2:162.) Or, since this degeneracy is relative, we can say > that the Qualisign is degenerate relative to the Sinsign and to the Legisign > (just as the Icon is degenerate relative to the Index and the genuine Symbol, > according to Peirce in both the third Harvard lecture of 1903 and “New > Elements” of 1904). > > On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign types > defined in NDTR, including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a > possible ambiguity in the concepts of genuine and degenerate; and possibly > this problem is related to the concepts of embodiment, just introduced, and > of involvement, which is introduced in the next paragraph:] > > 245. A Sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken as meaning “being only once,” > as in single, simple, Latin semel, etc.) is an actual existent thing or event > which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves > a qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a > peculiar kind and only form a sign through being actually embodied. > [Evidently it is the involvement of qualisigns in a Sinsign — which, I > suppose, constitutes their embodiment — that makes them “peculiar,” because a > “normal” Qualisign is disembodied (and does not act as a Sign). But perhaps > this will be clarified by the definition of Legisign, which I’ll leave for > the next post.] > > Gary f. > > ________________________________ > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, > send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to > [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> with the line "UNSubscribe > PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > ________________________________ > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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