Edwina, List,

There are a number of claims that you make about how we should read Peirce's 
texts that call out for some digging in the texts to see whether they fit with 
what Peirce says.  Let me start with this one about the character of relatively 
degenerate signs.  ET:  "Therefore, I reject your view that the "Qualisign is 
degenerate relative to the Sinsign and to the Legisign ".  It's the Relations 
in their categorical modes that are genuine or degenerate; i.e., the modes are 
genuine/degenerate. Not the Signs.

It is clear that Peirce treats the classification of the relations between sign 
and dynamical object as more or less degenerate.  He says, for instance, that: 
Of these three genera of representamens, the Icon is the Qualitatively 
degenerate, the Index the Reactionally degenerate, while the Symbol is the 
relatively genuine genus. CP 5.73

What textual evidence do we have for thinking that the distinction between 
signs based on the mode in which they are apprehended (i.e., qualisign, 
sinsign, legislign) is or is not based on more and less degenerate kinds?  I 
think the question is pretty clearly answered in CP 2.265 where he applies the 
notions of degenerate and genuine to each of the three main classifications 
that he considers in NDTR. 

In a separate remark, you claim that all signs are embodied.  Having looked at 
what Peirce says about the embodiment of a sign, the basic idea is that a sign 
is embodied when it is realized in an instance where the sign is a token (i.e., 
a sinsign).  Peirce makes it clear that a sign does not need to be embodied in 
token instance in order for it to be a sign.  A qualisign, for instance, is an 
abstraction that represents possible feelings. 

--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Edwina Taborsky [[email protected]]
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 2:13 PM
To: [email protected]; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Gary F-  I'm aware that Peirce used the term 'sign' to refer to both the 
Representamen and the full triadic semiosic process. As you know, your 
confining the term to mean ONLY the Representamen, is a problem I have, not 
with Peirce, but with your outlines. I doubt that you and I will agree on this.

I don't think that the term 'peculiar' naturally leads to its being defined as 
'degenerate'. That's because I understand the terms 'genuine' and 'degenerate' 
to refer only to the modal categories. So, if the Relations between the three 
parts of the triad (Object-Representamen-Interpretant) are operating within the 
degnerate modes of (2-1, 3-1, 3-2) rather than the 'pure modes' (1-1, 2-2, 
3-3)...then, we can see them as 'degenerate relations'.

I do not know what Peirce meant by 'these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and 
only form a sign through being actually embodied" 2.245.  He might be saying 
that a Sinsign, which functions as a particularity, might have a qualitative 
relation (as well as a direct relation) with its Object in the mode of 2-1, or 
Secondness-as-Firstness.

Therefore, I reject your view that the "Qualisign is degenerate relative to the 
Sinsign and to the Legisign ".  It's the Relations in their categorical modes 
that are genuine or degenerate; i.e., the modes are genuine/degenerate. Not the 
Signs.

Qualisigns in themselves do not actually form a Representamen, for a 
Representamen is not a collection of particular relations, but is a 
transformation of these relations into generalities, into laws.  Qualisigns are 
connected to the object by an 'embodiment' process that is descriptive rather 
than denotative. . But, since no qualisign exists 'per se' but functions within 
a relation to its object (which could be also be in a mode of Firstness)  then, 
it could be that the 'peculiar' mode of a qualisign as related to a Sinsign 
(which is in a mode of Secondness) is in a categorical mode of 2-1, or, 
Secondness as Firstness.

Peirce also, in 2.246, refers to the Legisign, as requiring Sinsigns, but 
again, 'these are not ordinary Sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences that 
are regarded as significant'. Same thing. In a Legisign Representamen, the 
Relations between the Representamen and the Object and Interpretant could be in 
a mode of 3-2, or Thirdness operating in Secondness.

Again - how can a 'normal Qualisign' be disembodied? What's your meaning of 
this statement?

Edwina


----- Original Message -----
From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
To: 'Peirce-L'<mailto:[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 3:20 PM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Edwina, in my study of NDTR, I am using Peirce’s definition of “Sign” exactly 
as given in that work; I quoted it (again) in the post you are responding to. 
If you have a problem with it, you’ll have to take it up with Peirce, not with 
me. As for what you choose to place into your pigeonholes of “Saussurean sign”, 
“Platonism” etc., that has no relevance to NDTR that I can see.

Peirce says that a Sinsign “involves a qualisign, or rather, several 
qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind” — and I suggested an 
explanation of why Peirce calls them “peculiar” (implying of course that there 
is another kind of Qualisign that is not peculiar). My suggestion is prompted 
by Peirce’s statement about the Qualisign that its “embodiment has nothing to 
do with its character as a sign.” You don’t like my suggestion, which is fine, 
but you’ve offered no alternative. Why are the qualisigns involved in sinsigns 
“of a peculiar kind”?

Gary f.

}  {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 3-Dec-15 14:41
To: [email protected]; 'Peirce-L' <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Gary F - I certainly consider all ten classes as genuine Signs. I don't  think 
this suggests an ambiguity in the meaning of 'genuine' and 'degenerate' but 
rather, an ambiguity in your definition of the Sign.

You, as I understand it, confine the meaning of 'Sign' to be a synonym for 
'Representamen.  This leads, I think, to an understanding of the Sign as really 
a Saussurian Sign, with the Signifier=Object; and the Signified=Interpretant. 
Obviously, I reject this dyadism. I  consider the Peircean Sign to be an 
integral triad of three Relations: That between the Representamen and Object; 
that of the Representamen in itself; and that between the Representamen and the 
Interpretant. [See 8.344--]

So, if you consider only the Representamen as the Sign, then, I don't see how 
you can define it, on its own, as genuine or degenerate.  It isn't that the 
Representamen can't act as a sign [Representamen] unless it is embodied; it 
isn't a Representamen UNLESS it is embodied. Otherwise, you are moving into 
Platonism which does accept non-embodied Forms. [And yes, I'm aware of Peirce's 
terms of "it cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied" 2.244.

I don't see how a Sign (the triad) with all three Relations in a mode of 
Firstness is  degenerate or even 'doubly degenerate'. After all, Firstness as a 
categorical mode, has no nature of degeneracy.

The genuine and degenerate forms of the Categories, is another issue, where, as 
we know, Peirce considers that Firstness has no degeneracy; Secondness has both 
a genuine and degenerate mode (2-2 and 2-1); and Thirdness has both a genuine 
and two degenerate modes (3-3, 3-2, 3-1).

When Peirce refers to a genuine or degenerate index, he is referring to its 
categorical mode of Secondness. That is, the modal categories in themselves are 
genuine or degenerate not the Relation.

I don't see that a Qualisign, which is in a mode of pure Firstness (and not 
3-1) can be degenerate as compared to a Sinsign or Legisign.

How can 'a normal Qualisign' be disembodied? There's no such thing in Peirce as 
a 'free-floating Representamen'.  That's Platonism.

Edwina


----- Original Message -----
From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
To: 'Peirce-L'<mailto:[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 11:31 AM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Moving on to the first trichotomy of sign types in “Nomenclature and Divisions 
of Triadic Relations”:

CP 2.244: According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a Qualisign, a 
Sinsign, or a Legisign.
A Qualisign is a quality which is a Sign. It cannot actually act as a sign 
until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character 
as a sign.
[As a Sign, this “quality” must be a correlate of a triadic relation with its 
Object and Interpretant, “by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant 
is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the 
same Object, and for some possible Interpretant” (CP 2.242). Yet it cannot act 
as a sign until it is embodied, i.e. until it becomes involved in at least a 
dyadic relation, and thus enters the universe of existence. Yet its 
significance is its quality (not its embodiment), and qualities being monadic, 
there is no real difference between Sign and Object (or Interpretant either). 
So I think we might call this a doubly degenerate kind of triadic relation, 
where the Sign is virtually self-representing, and self-determining as its own 
Interpretant. Compare the “self-sufficient” point on a map which Peirce offers 
as an example of doubly degenerate Thirdness in his third Harvard Lecture, 
EP2:162.) Or, since this degeneracy is relative, we can say that the Qualisign 
is degenerate relative to the Sinsign and to the Legisign (just as the Icon is 
degenerate relative to the Index and the genuine Symbol, according to Peirce in 
both the third Harvard lecture of 1903 and “New Elements” of 1904).

On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign types defined 
in NDTR, including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a possible 
ambiguity in the concepts of genuine and degenerate; and possibly this problem 
is related to the concepts of embodiment, just introduced, and of involvement, 
which is introduced in the next paragraph:]

245. A Sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken as meaning “being only once,” 
as in single, simple, Latin semel, etc.) is an actual existent thing or event 
which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a 
qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a 
peculiar kind and only form a sign through being actually embodied.
[Evidently it is the involvement of qualisigns in a Sinsign — which, I suppose, 
constitutes their embodiment — that makes them “peculiar,” because a “normal” 
Qualisign is disembodied (and does not act as a Sign). But perhaps this will be 
clarified by the definition of Legisign, which I’ll leave for the next post.]

Gary f.

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