Jeff,
Well, the only good way I know of understanding one of Peirce’s distinctions is
to observe exactly how he applies it, and hope that the object he’s applying it
to is something like what we find in our collateral experience as objects for
the interpretants that Peirce’s applications determine in our minds.
If MS 7 isn’t clear enough on what makes a “sufficiently complete” sign, I
think we have to supplement it with some excerpts from Kaina Stoicheia:
EP2:303-4: “Every sign that is sufficiently complete refers to sundry real
objects. All these objects, even if we are talking of Hamlet's madness, are
parts of one and the same Universe of being, the “Truth.” But so far as the
“Truth” is merely the object of a sign, it is merely the Aristotelian Matter of
it that is so. In addition however to denoting objects, every sign sufficiently
complete signifies characters, or qualities.”
…
“The purpose of every sign is to express “fact,” and by being joined with other
signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which
would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may
use this language) would be the very Universe. Aristotle gropes for a
conception of perfection, or entelechy, which he never succeeds in making
clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign
which should be quite perfect, and so identical,—in such identity as a sign may
have,—with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified by it.
The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe qua fact, will be
that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the “Truth” of being. The “Truth,” the
fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every
sign.”
EP2:305: “ … A pure icon is independent of any purpose. It serves as a sign
solely and simply by exhibiting the quality it serves to signify. The relation
to its object is a degenerate relation. It asserts nothing. If it conveys
information, it is only in the sense in which the object that it is used to
represent may be said to convey information. An icon can only be a fragment of
a completer sign.”
EP2:307: “It is remarkable that while neither a pure icon nor a pure index can
assert anything, an index which forces something to be an icon, as a
weather-cock does, or which forces us to regard it as an icon, as the legend
under a portrait does, does make an assertion, and forms a proposition. This
suggests the true definition of a proposition, which is a question in much
dispute at this moment. A proposition is a sign which separately, or
independently, indicates its object. No index, however, can be an
argumentation. It may be what many writers call an argument; that is, a basis
of argumentation; but an argument in the sense of a sign which separately shows
what interpretant it is intended to determine it cannot be.”
EP2:313: ”… I maintain that every sufficiently complete symbol governs things,
and that symbols alone do this. I mean that though it is not a force, it is a
law.”
The tentative conclusion I would draw from this is that a symbol can be
“sufficiently complete” if it is a dicent symbol (proposition) or an argument,
while an icon is necessarily fragmentary, and an index is somewhere in between
those two, in terms of completeness. But what makes a symbol “complete” is
precisely that it involves both an icon and an index (or involves an index
involving an icon), and is thus able to convey information, which neither an
index nor an icon can do by itself. I would also note that the degree of
incompleteness of a sign corresponds directly to its degree of degeneracy
(EP2:306).
Peirce doesn’t use this language of “sufficiently complete” outside of MS 7 and
Kaina Stoicheia (as far as I know), and both of these are framed as essays on
the logic/semeiotic of mathematics — but i’m not sure how those two facts are
related. Anyway that’s about all I can say for now in response to your question.
Gary f.
} The eternal mystery of the world is its comprehensibility. [Einstein] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 19-Dec-15 13:33
To: 'PEIRCE-L' <[email protected]>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Hello Gary F., List,
In MS 7, Peirce says: "Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of a
sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a
more complete sign." How should we understand this distinction between a
sufficiently complete sign and those parts of a sign that are less complete?
--Jeff
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