I had intended to send this to the list as well. But forgot. I see that Helmut has addressed my concern in a post to the list that crossed mine to him.
John Collier Professor Emeritus, UKZN http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: John Collier Sent: Monday, 21 December 2015 01:36 To: 'Helmut Raulien' Subject: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations Helmut, That is pretty close to my understanding, but I definitely would not refer to the “whole triadic sign” as a composition of three relations. That would suggest that a decomposition is possible, but it is not, according to Peirce. I take it that the contained (or implied) pairwise relations are abstractions, and cannot (do not) exist on their own. So talking about, say, the relation between the representamen and its object always has the interpretant in the background. I think that this is especially clear when we consider the relation of each kind to itself, say, the representamen to the representamen. As has been noted a number of times on this thread, a qualisign has the same thing playing all three roles. It contains its own object and its own interpretant. But to say that it is some composition of the three would be misleading. I agree with Edwina when she says that it is best to think of these as relations: the interpretant determines the object of the sign. So we can think of this determination (the – abstract -- relation) as being the interpretant. The interpretant, in the same way, determines the object of the representamen. The inverse relations give the object relation and the representamen relation, which in the light of the interpretant are the determination of the (abstract) relation between the representamen and its object. But none of this makes sense two by two; the whole sign can’t be broken up that way. The closest you can come is to put the third into the background in each case of what appears to be a dyadic relation, on the surface at least. This is a Lockean partial consideration, a Peircean prescinding, or, as I have called it, abstracting. I think that of the nine possible “types” some are not signs at all, or even abstractions from signs. All of the ten are signs. John Collier Professor Emeritus, UKZN http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: Monday, 21 December 2015 00:41 To: John Collier Cc: Sungchul Ji; PEIRCE-L Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations John, Sung, list, for me, as far as I understand, "types" and "classes" are synonyms. The difference between the "9 types of signs" and the "10 classes of signs" is not, as I understand it, a matter of "type" versus "class", but of what it is a type/class of. Id say, the 10 classes are classes of triadic signs, and the 9 types are classes (or types) of sign relations: 3 representamen relations, 3 object relations, and 3 interpretant relations. What I am not completely clear about, is, what the representamen, object, or interpretant, has a relation with: Is it the representamen, or the whole sign? I think it is the representamen, as Edwina often has said, because, if they were relations between the whole triadic sign and either element of its, this would be some circular affair, as the whole triadic sign already is a relation between (or composition of?) these three relations...A logical loop. So, my temporal understanding is to replace "9 types of signs" with "9 types of representamen relations". Is that correct? Best, Helmut 20. Dezember 2015 um 15:08 Uhr "John Collier" <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote: Sorry Sung, but this doesn'the help me. It seems to me that you are only picking out different ways of classifying the same things, which is fine, but they are not different things, as you seem to be saying. There is no difference in the dynamical objects involved. If there is, you have not shown this. You need tof show how the different classifications are grounded in different expectations about possible experiences. You haven't done that yet. From your response here it seems that you are confusing different ways of talking about the same things with different objects. I don't know of anyone who makes the mistake of confusing the objects of the classifications. Perhaps you could give an example. Of course someone could be misled by the difference in the immediate objects, which depends on how we are thinking, if they are confused about what Peirce is talking about with these classifications, I don't think that there are Peirce scholars who make that mistake. So perhaps you could provide examples. There is a good reason why Peirce didn't use different names. There is no need to. This is quite different from the baryon-quark case, where the difference has experimental consequences. John Sent from my Samsung device -------- Original message -------- From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu<mailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu>> Date: 20/12/2015 14:04 (GMT+02:00) To: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations John, List, You wrote: "So it seems to me that, unless you have a rather special meaning for “measurable” (or even “detectable”) in the case of signs that I cannot fathom without more clarity than I have now by what you mean by distinction you are trying to make, the distinction between elementary signs and composite signs have no basis in what exists; you would be making a distinction without a difference, and thus containing no information." The distinction between elementary signs and composite signs is the same as the distinction between the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of sign that Peirce himself made. (If you do not like these terms, any one is entitled to come up with better replacements.) So the distinction must have been in Peirce's mind whenever Peirce wrote about the 9 types and 10 classes. The only thing that I am trying to do here, since 2012, is to give "names" or "representamens" to these distinct objects, so that we can avoid conflating them, or so that we can have two different interpretants. Right now, we have only one representamen, "sign", to refer to two different objects (9 types and 10 classes) making them appear the same and yet they are not as you can plainly see in the fact that Peirce distinguished between 9 types and 10 classes. This is why many, if not all, students of Peirce, seem confused. All the best. Sung On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 4:02 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: Sung, Lists, I am unclear what you mean by measurable. The reason why this is important is that if there is no difference to possible experience, by the Pragmatic Maxim there is no difference in meaning. No elementary particle properties are directly measurable. The best we can do is to have evidence for them by way of properties that are directly measurable, together with the theory (the measurements of quark properties are what is called “theory-laden”). So the notion of measurement that you are using is void unless there is some measurable difference between “there are nine elementary signs” and “there are ten composite signs”). The same would, of course hold for quarks and baryons unless there is a detectable difference to experience. In this case the difference is, of course, by your notion of a baryon as isolatable, that we can isolate baryons but not quarks (for a combination of theoretical and experimental reasons). So it seems to me that, unless you have a rather special meaning for “measurable” (or even “detectable”) in the case of signs that I cannot fathom without more clarity than I have now by what you mean by distinction you are trying to make, the distinction between elementary signs and composite signs have no basis in what exists; you would be making a distinction without a difference, and thus containing no information. John Collier Professor Emeritus, UKZN http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Sungchul Ji Sent: Sunday, 20 December 2015 07:05 To: PEIRCE-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations Hi Gary R, You wrote : "As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite recently, I do not consider the 9 parameters (121915-1) as signs at all, so that when I am discussing signs as possibly embodied signs, I am always referring to the 10 classes." I have two comments on (121915-1) and a suggestion: (1) If 'qualisign' is not a sign, why do you think Peirce used the word "sign" in "qualisign" ? (2) The problem, as I see it, may stem from what seems to me to be an unjustifiably firm belief on the part of many semioticians that there is only one kind of sign in Peirce's writings, i.e., the triadic ones (or the 10 classes of signs). But what if, in Peirce's mind, there were two kinds of signs, i.e., the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of signs, although he used the same word "sign" to refer to both of them, just as physicists use the same word "particles" for both quarks and baryons. They are both particles but physicists discovered that protons and neutrons are not fundamental particles but are composed of triplets of more fundamental particles called quarks. (3) I think the confusions in semiotics that Peirce himself seemed to have contributed to creating by not naming the 9 types of signs and 10 classes of signs DIFFERENTLY may be removed by adopting two different names (belatedly) for these two kinds of signs, e.g., the "elementary signs" for the 9 types and the "composite signs" for the 10 classes of signs as I recommended in [biosemiotics:46]. The former is monadic and incomplete as a sign, while the latter is triadic and hence complete as a sign. Again this situation seems similar to the relation between quarks and baryons: Quarks are incomplete particles in that they cannot be isolated outside baryons whereas baryons (which are composed of three quarks) are complete particles since they can be isolated and experimentally measured. All the best. Sung On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 7:25 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: Sung, list, When I gave the example of the qualisign as a sign which " 'may not possess all the essential characters of a more complete sign', and yet be a part of that more complex sign," I was in fact referring to the rhematic iconic qualisign following Peirce's (shorthand) usage, since "To designate a qualisign as a rhematic iconic qualisign is redundant [. . .] because a qualisign can only be rhematic and iconic." http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/peirce.html As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite recently, I do not consider the 9 parameters as signs at all, so that when I am discussing signs as possibly embodied signs, I am always referring to the 10 classes. What I intended to convey in my last message was that the qualisign (that is, the rhematic iconic qualisign) *must* be part of a more complete sign (clear enough, I think, is Peirce's discussions of the 10 classes), that it simply cannot exist independently of that fuller sign complex (e.g., a 'feeling of red' doesn't float around in some unembodied Platonic universe). Now, I'm off to a holiday party, but I thought I'd best make this point clear before there was any further confusion. Best, Gary R [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 5:30 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: Hi Jeff, Gary R, List, I agree that "qualisigin" is not a complete sign because it is one of the 9 sigh types and not one of the 10 sign classes. It seems to me that in order for "qualisign" to be a complete sign, it has to be a part of one of the 10 classes of signs, e.g., a "rhematic iconic qualisign" such as "feeling of red", i.e., the "redness" felt by someone or some agent. However, "Redness", as a qualisign, can be there even though no one is there to feel it. (121915-1) For example, red color was there before we invented artificial signs and applied one of them to it." Peirce said that legisign is "a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no interpretant", and sinsign can be index or icon, but as index it is is "a sign which would, at once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object is removed , but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant". By extension, I wonder if we can say that "Qualisign is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no representamen." (121915-2) Statement (121915-2) seems to be supported by Statement (121915-1). Again I think the quark model of the Peircean sign is helpful in avoiding confusions resulting from not distinguishing the two kinds of signs, i.e., 9 types of signs vs. 10 classes of signs: "Both quarks and baryons are particles but only the latter are experimentally measurable; (121915-3) Similarly 9 types of signs and 10 classes of signs are both signs but only the latter can be used as a means of communicating information." In [biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2012, I referred to the 9 types of signs as "elementary signs" and the 10 classes of signs as "composite signs", in analogy to baryons (protons, neutrons) being composed of elementary quarks. A Happy Holiday Season and A Wonderful New Year to you all ! Sung On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: Jeff, Gary F. list, I think one need look no further than to the qualisign for a good example of a sign which "may not possess all the essential characters of a more complete sign," and yet be a part of that more complex sign. Best, Gary R [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 1:33 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: Hello Gary F., List, In MS 7, Peirce says: "Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a more complete sign." How should we understand this distinction between a sufficiently complete sign and those parts of a sign that are less complete? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: Friday, December 18, 2015 3:54 PM To: 'PEIRCE-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations NDTR is an acronym for “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations,” EP2:289-99, fifth section of the 1903 Syllabus, and the main text this thread has been referring to, so far. Since I included in my post a few quotes from MS 7, which we discussed at some length back in the spring of 2014, I’ll post my transcription of the manuscript here (from a photocopy of it posted to the list by Vinicius Romanini, I think). It’s an interesting text because it prefigures (or refigures?) many of the things Peirce says about signs in “New Elements,” which follows immediately after NDTR in EP2. The lack of paragraphing is Peirce’s. — gary f. On the Foundations of Mathematics MS 7, c. 1903 [gf transcription, 4 Apr 2014, Peirce's underlining rendered as italics] §1. Mathematics deals essentially with Signs. All that we know or think is so known or thought by signs, and our knowledge itself is a sign. The word and idea of a sign is familiar but it is indistinct. Let us endeavor to analyze it. It is plain at the outset, first, that a sign is not any particular replica of it. If one casts one's eye down a printed page, every ‘the’ is the same word, and every e the same letter. The exact identity is not clear. Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a more complete sign. Thirdly, a sign sufficiently complete must be capable of determining an interpretant sign, and must be capable of ultimately producing real results. For a proposition of metaphysics which could never contribute to the determination of conduct would be meaningless jargon. On the other hand, the cards which, slipped into a Jacquard loom, cause appropriate figures to be woven, may very properly be called signs although there is no conscious interpretation of them. If not, it can only be because they are not interpreted by signs. In fact, in the present condition of philosophy, consciousness seems to be a mere quality of feeling which a formal science will do best to leave out of account. But a sign only functions as a sign when it is interpreted. It is therefore essential that it should be capable of determining an interpretant sign. Fourthly, a sign sufficiently complete must in some sense correspond to a real object. A sign cannot even be false unless, with some degree of definiteness, it specifies the real object of which it is false. That the sign itself is not a definite real object has been pointed out under “firstly”. It is only represented. Now either it must be that it is one thing to really be and another to be represented, or else it must be that there is no such thing [a]s falsity. This involves no denial that every real thing may be a representation, or sign, but merely that, if so, there must be something more in reality than mere representation. Since a sufficiently complete sign may be false, and also since it is not any replica or collection of replicas, it is not real. But it refers to a real object. Consequently, a sign cannot have a sign as its sole object; though it may refer to an object through a sign; as if one should say, “Whatever the Pope, as such, may declare will be true,” or as a map may be a map of itself. But supposing the Pope not to declare anything, does that proposition refer to any real object? Yes, to the Pope. But, fifthly, even if there were no pope, still, like all other signs sufficiently complete, there is a single definite object to which it must refer; namely, to the ‘Truth,’ or the Absolute, or the entire Universe of real being. Sixthly, a sign may refer, in addition, and specially, to any number of parts of that universe. Seventhly, every interpretant of a sign need not refer to all the real objects to which the sign itself refers, but must, at least, refer to the Truth. Eighthly, an interpretant may refer to an object of its sign in an indefinite manner. Thus, given the sign, ‘Enoch was a man, and Enoch was translated,’ an interpretant of it would be ‘Some man was translated.’ Ninethly, a sign may refer to its interpretant in such a way that, in case the former sign is incomplete, the interpretant, being an interpretant of the completer sign, may refer to a sign to which the first sign does not specially refer, but only generally refers. Thus, the sign ‘Any man there may be is mortal’ does not refer to any real man, unless it so happens that it is a part of a sign which otherwise refers to such a real thing. But if it be a part of a sign of which another part is ‘some man sings,’ the sign ‘some man is mortal’ becomes an interpretant of it. This may be more conveniently expressed by speaking of an ‘utterer’ and an ‘interpreter.’ Then the utterer says to the interpreter, “you are at liberty to understand me as referring to any man [of] whom you can get any indication, and of him, I say, ‘he is mortal.’” Tenthly, a sign sufficiently complete must signify some quality; and it is no more important to recognize that the real object to which a sign refers is not a mere sign than to recognize that the quality it signifies is not a mere sign. Take the quality of the odor of attar. There is no difficulty in imagining a being whose entire consciousness should consist in this alone. But, it may be objected, if it were contrasted with nothing could it be recognized? I reply, no; and besides, such recognition is excluded by the circumstance that a recognition of the smell would not be the pure smell itself. It may be doubted by some persons, however, whether the feeling could exist alone. They are the persons whom it ought to be easiest for me to convince of my point. For they, at least, must admit that if such pure homogeneous quality of feeling were to exist alone, it would not be a sign. Everybody ought to admit it because it would be alone, and therefore would have no object different from itself. Besides, there would be no possible replica of it, since each of two such things would be nonexistent for the other; nor could there be any third who should compare them. So, then, the whole question of whether such a quality is a sign or not resolves itself into the question of whether there could be such a tinge upon the consciousness of a being, supposing the being could be conscious (for I shall show presently that the fact that he would be asleep is only in my favor). In order to decide this question, it will be sufficient to look at any object parti-colored in bright red and bright blue and to ask oneself a question or two. Would there be any possibility of conveying the idea of that red to a person who had no feeling nearer to it than that blue? Plainly not, the quality of the red is in the red itself. The proximity of the blue heightens the shock up[on] the seer[']s organism, emphasizes it, renders it vivid, perhaps slightly confuses the feeling. But the red quality is altogether positive and would remain if the blue were not there. If every other idea were removed, there would be no shock, and there would be sleep. But the quality of that sleep would be red, in this sense, that if it were taken away frequently and brought back so as to wake the being up, the tinge of his consciousness would be of that quality. A quality, in itself, has no being at all, it is true. It must be embodied in something that exists. But the quality is as it is positively and in itself. That is not true of a sign, which exists only by bringing an interpretant to refer to an object. A quality, then, is not a sign. Eleventhly, we may assume that this is as true of what is, with excusable inaccuracy, called a composite quality as of a simple one. In itself, one quality is as simple as another. A person who should be acquainted with none but the spectral colors would get no idea of white by being told that it was the mixture of them all. One might as well tell him to make a mixture of water, patriotism, and the square root of minus one. Find a man who has had no idea of patriotism; and if you tell him that it is the love of one's country, if he knows what love is, and what a man's country, in its social sense, is, he can make the experiment of connecting ideas in his imagination, and noting the quality of feeling which arises upon this composition. Tell him this in the evening, and he will repeat the experiment several times during the night, and in the morning he will have a fair idea of what patriotism means. He will have performed an experiment analogous to that of mixing colored lights in order to get an idea of white. If a treasure is buried in the midst of a plain, and there are four signal poles, the place of the treasure can be defined by means of ranges, so that a person who can take ranges and set up new poles can find the treasure. In like manner the name of any color may be defined in terms of four color disks so that a person with a color-wheel can experimentally produce the color and thereafter be able to use the name. Every definition to be understood must be treated as a precept for experimentation. The imagination is an apparatus for such experimentation that often answers the purpose, although it often proves insufficient. No point on the plain where the treasure is hid is more simple than other. Colors may be defined by various systems of coördinates, and we do not know that one color is in itself simpler than another. It is only in a limited class of cases that we can define a quality as simply a mixture of two qualities. In most cases, it is necessary to introduce other relations. But even when that is the case, if a quality is defined as being at once a and b, there will always be another way of defining it as that which is at once c and d. Now all that is either a or c will have a certain quality p, common and peculiar to that class; the class of possible objects that are b or c will be similarly related to a quality, r; and the class of possible objects that are either b or d will be similarly related to a quality, s. Then that quality which was defined as, at once, a and b, can be more analytically defined as that which is at once p, q, r, and s; and so on ad infinitum. We may not be able to make out these qualities; but there is reason to believe that any describable class of possible objects has some quality common and peculiar to it. It is certain that a pure quality, in its mode of being as a pure quality, does not cease to be because it is not embodied in anything. Every situation in life appears to have its peculiar flavor. This flavor is what it is positively and in itself. For the experiment by which it may be reproduced an adequate prescription may be given; but the definition will not itself have that flavor. To say that a flavor, or pure quality, is composed of two others, is simply to say that on experimentally mixing these others in a particular way, that first flavor will be reproduced. Every sufficiently complete sign determines a sign to the effect that on a certain occasion, that is, in a certain object a certain flavor or quality may be observed. This attempt to begin an analysis of the nature of a sign may seem to be unnecessarily complicated, unnatural, and ill-fitting. To that I reply that every man has his own fashion of thinking; and if such is the reader's impression let him draw up a statement for himself. If it is sufficiently full and accurate, he will find that it differs from mine chiefly in its nomenclature and arrangement. [Not unlikely he might insist on distinctions which I avoid as irrelevant.] He will find that, in some shape, he is brought to recognize the same three radically different elements that I do. Namely, he must recognize, first, a mode of being in itself, corresponding to my quality; secondly, a mode of being constituted by opposition, corresponding to my object; and thirdly, a mode of being of which a branching line Y is an analogue, and which is of the general nature of a mean function corresponding to the sign. §2. Partly in hopes of reconciling the reader to my statement, and partly in order to bring out some other points that will be pertinent, I will review the matter in another order. The reference of a sign to the quality which is its ground, reason, or meaning appears most prominently in a kind of sign of which any replica is fitted to be a sign by virtue of possessing in itself certain qualities which it would equally possess if the interpretant and the object did not exist at all. Of course, in such case, the sign could not be a sign; but as far as the sign itself went, it would be all that [it] would be with the object and interpretant. Such a sign whose significance lies in the qualities of its replicas in themselves is an icon, image, analogue, or copy. Its object is whatever that resembles it its interpretant takes it to be the sign of, and [it is a] sign of that object in proportion as it resembles it. An icon cannot be a complete sign; but it is the only sign which directly brings the interpretant to close quarters with the meaning; and for that reason it is the kind of sign with which the mathematician works. For not only are geometrical figures icons, but even algebraical arrays of letters have relations analogous to those of the forms they represent, although these relations are not altogether iconically represented. The reference of a sign to its object is brought into special prominence in a kind of sign whose fitness to be a sign is due to its being in a real reactive relation,—generally, a physical and dynamical relation,—with the object. Such a sign I term an index. As an example, take a weather-cock. This is a sign of the wind because the wind actively moves it. It faces in the very direction from which the wind blows. In so far as it does that, it involves an icon. The wind forces it to be an icon. A photograph which is compelled by optical laws to be an icon of its object which is before the camera is another example. It is in this way that these indices convey information. They are propositions. That is they separately indicate their objects; the weather-cock because it turns with the wind and is known by its interpretant to do so; the photograph for a like reason. If the weathercock sticks and fails to turn, or if the camera lens is bad, the one or the other will be false. But if this is known to be the case, they sink at once to mere icons, at best. It is not essential to an index that it should thus involve an icon. Only, if it does not, it will convey no information. A cry of “Oh!” may be a direct reaction from a remarkable situation. But it will convey, perhaps, no further information. The letters in a geometrical figure are good illustrations of pure indices not involving any icon, that is they do not force anything to be an icon of their object. The cry “Oh!” does to a slight degree; since it has the same startling quality as the situation that compells it. The index acts compulsively on the interpretant and puts it into a direct and real relation with the object, which is necessarily an individual event (or, more loosely, a thing) that is hic et nunc, single and definite. A third kind of sign, which brings the reference to an interpretant into prominence, is one which is fit to be a sign, not at all because of any particular analogy with the quality it signifies, nor because it stands in any reactive relation with its object, but simply and solely because it will be interpreted to be a sign. I call such a sign a symbol. As an example of a symbol, Goethe's book on the Theory of Colors will serve. This is made up of letters, words, sentences, paragraphs etc.; and the cause of its referring to colors and attributing to colors the quality it does is that so it is understood by anybody who reads it. It not only determines an interpretant, but it shows very explicitly the special determinant, (the acceptance of the theory) which it is intended to determine. By virtue of thus specially showing its intended interpretant (out of thousands of possible interpretants of it) it is an argument. An index may be, in one sense, an argument; but not in the sense here meant, that of an argumentation. It determines such interpretant as it may, without manifesting a special intention of determining a particular interpretant. It is a perfection of a symbol, if it does this; but it is not essential to a symbol that it should do so. Erase the conclusion of an argumentation and it becomes a proposition (usually, a copulative proposition). Erase such a part of a proposition that if a proper name were inserted in the blank, or if several proper names were inserted in the several blanks, and it becomes a rhema, or term. Thus, the following are rhematic: Guiteau assassinated ______ ______ assassinated ______ Logicians generally would consider it quite wrong for me to call these terms; but I shall venture to do so. From: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Sungchul Ji Sent: 18-Dec-15 16:22 Gary F, Jeff, List, Please excuse my ignorance. What is NDTR ? Thanks in advance. Sung ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 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