Jeff, Gary F, list, It's nice to see some clear textual proof for the presence of Firstness in the percept. However,
and then something like a diagram (what he will later call a percipuum) > comes in as the interpretant of the qualisign. Where does Peirce refer to the percipuum as a diagram? Or to a diagram as an interpretant of a qualisign? The latter case should be impossible, following the modal determination of the aspects of the sign; a qualisign can only be determined, and in turn determine, at the level of Firstness in each aspect, though a diagram is clearly representing relations, not qualities. If one wants to turn to the ten-trichotomy classification, I think it inadvisable to use the term qualisign, since it is unclear that in the ten-trichotomy system, a qualisign could not have a dynamical object that is in the mode of Secondness or Thirdness, and consequently that the immediate object is in such modes, prior to the determination of the sign in the aspect in which it is apprehended, which is properly the aspect of the qualisign (though Gary F's comments with respect to this identification are important to keep in mind). -- Franklin ------------------------------------------------------ On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 9:12 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > List, > > GF: There is no vagueness in a percept; it’s a singular. So I don’t see > how the concept of qualisign can serve the purpose you suggest here. I > think the qualisign is simply a necessary result of Peirce’s introduction > of the trichotomy of signs based on the sign’s mode of being in itself. It > has to be First in that trichotomy. > > Peirce does say that percepts are, in some respects, vague. Here is one > place in "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmatism: "But not to interrupt > our train of thought, let us go on to note that while the Immediate Object > of a Percept is excessively vague, yet natural thought makes up for that > lack (as it almost amounts to), as follows. A late Dynamical Interpretant > of the whole complex of Percepts is the Seme of a Perceptual Universe that > is represented in instinctive thought as determining the original Immediate > Object of every Percept.†2 Of course, I must be understood as talking not > psychology, but the logic of mental operations. Subsequent Interpretants > furnish new Semes of Universes resulting from various adjunctions to the > Perceptual Universe. They are, however, all of them, Interpretants of > Percepts. CP 4.539 I.e., A complex of percepts yields a picture of a > perceptual universe. Without reflection, that universe is taken to be the > cause of such objects as are represented in a percept. Though each percept > is vague, as it is recognized that its object is the result of the action > of the universe on the perceiver, it is so far clear." CP 4.539 Fn 2 p 425 > > Here is a place where he says that percepts have a singular character: > "the reader questions, perhaps, the assertion that conclusions of reasoning > are always of the nature of expectations. "What!" he will exclaim, "can we > not reason about the authorship of the Junius Letters or the identity of > the Man in the Iron Mask?" In a sense we can, of course. Still, the > conclusion will not be at all like remembering the historical event. In > order to appreciate the difference, begin by going back to the percept to > which the memory relates. This percept is a single event happening hic et > nunc. It cannot be generalized without losing its essential character. For > it is an actual passage at arms between the non-ego and the ego. A blow is > passed, so to say. Generalize the fact that you get hit in the eye, and all > that distinguishes the actual fact, the shock, the pain, the inflammation, > is gone. It is anti-general. The memory preserves this character, only > slightly modified. The actual shock, etc., are no longer there, the quality > of the event has associated itself in the mind with similar past > experiences. It is a little generalized in the perceptual fact. Still, it > is referred to a special and unique occasion, and the flavor of > anti-generality is the predominant one." CP 2.146 > > For the sake of understanding the division in NDTR between signs based on > the mode in which they are apprehended (i.e., qualisign, sinsign, > legislgn), I do think it would help to spell out the manner in which each > of these types of signs is determined by its object. For example, in the > Minute Logic, which was written in 1902 (one year before NDTR), Peirce says > the following about the relation between the percept and the perceptual > jugment: "The most ordinary fact of perception, such as "it is light," > involves precisive abstraction, or prescission. But hypostatic > abstraction, the abstraction which transforms "it is light" into "there is > light here," which is the sense which I shall commonly attach to the word > abstraction (since prescission will do for precisive abstraction) is a > very special mode of thought. It consists in taking a feature of a percept > or percepts (after it has already been prescinded from the other elements > of the percept), so as to take propositional form in a judgment (indeed, it > may operate upon any judgment whatsoever), and in conceiving this fact to > consist in the relation between the subject of that judgment and another > subject, which has a mode of being that merely consists in the truth of > propositions of which the corresponding concrete term is the predicate. > Thus, we transform the proposition, "honey is sweet," into "honey possesses > sweetness." CP 4.235 > > Is Peirce suggesting in this passage that a visual impression of light or > a taste impression of sweetness can function as a sign (e.g., a qualisign) > because the feeling is abstracted--both prescissively and > hypostatically--from the percept? Another possibility is that the > impressions of light and taste can function as qualisigns insofar as they > are precissively abstracted from the object, and then something like a > diagram (what he will later call a percipuum) comes in as the interpretant > of the qualisign. The remarks he makes about the conventional symbols > expressed as part of a perceptual judgment (e.g., "it is light" "honey is > sweet") are the data that we can analyze for the sake of sharpening our > account of how signs that are mere feelings (i.e., qualisigns) might > function in an uncontrolled inference to a perceptual judgment. > > --Jeff >  > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: [email protected] [[email protected]] > Sent: Wednesday, December 09, 2015 2:25 PM > To: [email protected] > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > Jon A.S., > > IF (I say If!) we can consider the percept as the subject of the > perceptual judgment, then I think rhematic indexical sinsign is probably > how I would classify it. However, I think we can just as well (maybe > better) consider the percept as the object of the sign (the perceptual > judgment). If we consider the percept as a sign, then it must have an > object of its own, and it’s hard to say how any phenomenon could be the > object of a percept. > > Remember we’re talking logic/semiotic here, not the psychology of > perception, which would probably locate the percept in the brain/mind and > its object in the external world. But that analysis makes all kinds of > metaphysical assumptions that phenomenology eschews. If we stick to > phenomenology, we can say that the percept appears, i.e. it is a > phenomenon, but it does not appear to mediate between some other phenomenon > and a perceiver, as a sign does. It certainly doesn’t mean anything. > > I think your questions are nice, in the sense used by Peirce when he wrote > in NDTR (CP 2.265): > “It is a nice problem to say to what class a given sign belongs; since all > the circumstances of the case have to be considered. But it is seldom > requisite to be very accurate; for if one does not locate the sign > precisely, one will easily come near enough to its character for any > ordinary purpose of logic.” > > Gary f. > > } Throughout the universe nothing has ever been concealed. [Dogen] { > http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway > > From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: 9-Dec-15 13:22 > > Gary, List: > > Based on the excerpt below, would a perceptual judgment be properly > classified as a dicent sinsign? And would the percept itself be a rhematic > indexical sinsign? Or is the percept not yet a sign at all? > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt< > http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt< > http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > > On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 11:39 AM, <[email protected]<mailto: > [email protected]>> wrote: > > GF: I can only assume that you are referring to CP 7.619, and observe that > Peirce does not say explicitly that the percept serves as immediate object. > That proposition seems at best dubious to me, because the percept is > precisely the point where the dynamic/immediate object distinction does not > apply. In fact it’s difficult to apply the sign/object distinction to the > percept. Moreover, Peirce has almost nothing to say about signs in that > entire long essay, and the little he does say is in reference to the > perceptual judgment considered as a kind of natural proposition: > > > > 633. The other mode of definiteness of the percept consists in its being > perfectly explicit. The perceptual judgment carelessly pronounces the chair > yellow. What the particular shade, hue, and purity of the yellow may be it > does not consider. The percept, on the other hand, is so scrupulously > specific that it makes this chair different from every other in the world; > or rather, it would do so if it indulged in any comparisons. > > 634. It may be objected that the terms of the judgment resemble the > percept. Let us consider, first, the predicate, 'yellow' in the judgment > that 'this chair appears yellow.' This predicate is not the sensation > involved in the percept, because it is general. It does not even refer > particularly to this percept but to a sort of composite photograph of all > the yellows that have been seen. If it resembles the sensational element of > the percept, this resemblance consists only in the fact that a new judgment > will predicate it of the percept, just as this judgment does. It also > awakens in the mind an imagination involving a sensational element. But > taking all these facts together, we find that there is no relation between > the predicate of the perceptual judgment and the sensational element of the > percept, except forceful connections. > > 635. As for the subject of the perceptual judgment, as subject it is a > sign. But it belongs to a considerable class of mental signs of which > introspection can give hardly any account. It ought not to be expected that > it should do so, since the qualities of these signs as objects have no > relevancy to their significative character; for these signs merely play the > part of demonstrative and relative pronouns, like “that,” or like the A, B, > C, of which a lawyer or a mathematician avails himself in making > complicated statements. In fact, the perceptual judgment which I have > translated into “that chair is yellow” would be more accurately represented > thus: “[cid:[email protected]] is yellow,” a pointing > index-finger taking the place of the subject. On the whole, it is plain > enough that the perceptual judgment is not a copy, icon, or diagram of the > percept, however rough. It may be reckoned as a higher grade of the > operation of perception. > > > > On that basis, I don’t think we can extract from this passage any good > information about what a qualisign is or how it works. What it does make > clear is that the perceptual judgment is not iconic. So at this point I’m > going to jump down to your concluding paragraph. > > GF: There is no vagueness in a percept; it’s a singular. So I don’t see > how the concept of qualisign can serve the purpose you suggest here. I > think the qualisign is simply a necessary result of Peirce’s introduction > of the trichotomy of signs based on the sign’s mode of being in itself. It > has to be First in that trichotomy. > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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