List, Kirsti: Interesting perspective!
May I extend your insight a bit? In a more general tone, it is not merely the meaning of daily communication, but the meanings of daily communications as well as logical, mathematical, chemical and other forms of scientific communication. The critical obstacle to the consistency of meanings of communication across multiple disciplines was his views of chemistry. He sought to remodel the logic and mathematics of his day in such a way as to be consistent with his personal experiences in the chemical laboratory, the language of elements, molecules and valence, and the diagrammatic logic of chemistry. Chemistry was his scientific “mother tongue”. He had some success in mathematics of relatives and logical diagrams. But, the inconsistencies of the meaning of chemical language, chemical symbols and chemical diagrams with the meaning of daily communication remains today. Eventually (ca. 1930’s), Tarski introduced the concept and logic of “meta-languages” which facilitates improved communications among the logical disciplines and provides pathways for comparing the meanings of logical terms. Tarski’s method of communication within meta-languages allows for MULTIPLE exact meaning for logical terms, depending on constraints and contexts. (see Malatesta, The Primary Logic (1999?) An example of the meaning I seek to communicate here is the logic of relatives as counts or numbers. The meaning of the concept of an integer can be context dependent - as a simple count of objects, as an ordinal number and as atomic numbers, representing both an ordinal and cardinal numbers as well as the mereology of the electrical counts of both the positive and negative charges. While this example is only one of many possible examples of the logic of relatives, it is a critical one because the meaning of a number is central to nearly all scientific units of measurement - such as in quantum physics, quantum chemistry and thermodynamics. I think that we agree that the nature of meaning is one of the central issues in all of philosophy. As you note, CSP’s approach to meaning develops slowly over the course of decades as he struggles to incorporate the meaning of chemical facts into a broader perspective, relying on metaphors related to chemical phenomenology. Today, we understand, at a very deep level, how his chemical premises were insufficient to bridge the “meaning gap”. Chemical symbols and chemical propositions are necessarily particular. Cheers Jerry > On Mar 1, 2016, at 7:39 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > List, Jerry, Stephen, > > It seems to be commonly assumed that CSP created a theory of signs. - Well, > amongst other things, he did. - But it was not what he was after. - He was > after a theory, or rather a method and methodogy of finding out meanings. > By the end of 1800, there was a kind of mania to classification - and > standardisation. - CSP was not immunune to that. > Still, to reave what he achieved, the focus has to remain in his later works, > after 1900. > It was not about signs, it was about meaning. > Kirsti > > Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 27.2.2016 23:12: >> List, Stephen: >>> On 2/26/2016 5:38 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: >>> > I see abduction as guessing (and approved by CP), induction as having some >>> > evidence but less than deduction which is fallible but the best we can do >>> > to prove something. I have been cautioned against writing brief notes to >>> > the list. Cheers, S >>> > >> Have you considered the difference that distinguishes constrained >> guessing from mere indexing the possibilities in one’s mind and >> randomly choosing a member of the index as a guess? >> Is that you mental image of CSP’s usage of the term “abduction” in logic? >> If so, then I suggest you are missing a critical component of CSP’s >> description of how to interpret signs in relation to its deictic >> actions. >> In CSP’s view, a sign necessarily has both denotative and connotative >> actions; the capabilities of the observer may constrain his (her) >> interpretative capacities to one set of indices or another set of >> indices, depending on the prior experiences. The nature of the index >> assigned to a sinsign is a personal choice of the individual observer >> of the sign, is it not? And, the form of the index itself may include >> ethical and moral values, can it not? >> In one field of inquiry, the indices from the sinsign, qualisigns and >> legisigns may generate a discrete set of abductive choices. CSP named >> these choices the dicisigns. The choices are, in modern terminology, >> cybernetic choices in that they form a circular argument with a >> bounded set of symbols, legisigns and sinsigns. These choices can >> also be expressed as logical diagrams in CSP assertions about logical >> systems. >> Cheers >> Jerry >
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