Jerry - but a Sign IS meaning. If a sign has no meaning then it isn't a
sign. It's noise.
With regard to your 'meta-language' doesn't that have some similarity to
General Terms, which do allow multiple CONTEXT-based meanings?
You note that chemical symbols and propositions are particular. But is a
symbol- let's say a rhematic symbolic legisign - is it particular? Or is it
an 'iconic image of a universal'...a possible example would be the Sign of
'O' where that letter is the general term for oxygen.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: "Jerry LR Chandler" <[email protected]>
To: "Peirce List" <[email protected]>
Cc: "Määttänen Kirsti" <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 11:02 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy,
Inquiry
List, Kirsti:
Interesting perspective!
May I extend your insight a bit? In a more general tone, it is not merely
the meaning of daily communication, but the meanings of daily communications
as well as logical, mathematical, chemical and other forms of scientific
communication.
The critical obstacle to the consistency of meanings of communication across
multiple disciplines was his views of chemistry. He sought to remodel the
logic and mathematics of his day in such a way as to be consistent with his
personal experiences in the chemical laboratory, the language of elements,
molecules and valence, and the diagrammatic logic of chemistry. Chemistry
was his scientific “mother tongue”.
He had some success in mathematics of relatives and logical diagrams. But,
the inconsistencies of the meaning of chemical language, chemical symbols
and chemical diagrams with the meaning of daily communication remains today.
Eventually (ca. 1930’s), Tarski introduced the concept and logic of
“meta-languages” which facilitates improved communications among the logical
disciplines and provides pathways for comparing the meanings of logical
terms. Tarski’s method of communication within meta-languages allows for
MULTIPLE exact meaning for logical terms, depending on constraints and
contexts. (see Malatesta, The Primary Logic (1999?)
An example of the meaning I seek to communicate here is the logic of
relatives as counts or numbers.
The meaning of the concept of an integer can be context dependent - as a
simple count of objects, as an ordinal number and as atomic numbers,
representing both an ordinal and cardinal numbers as well as the mereology
of the electrical counts of both the positive and negative charges.
While this example is only one of many possible examples of the logic of
relatives, it is a critical one because the meaning of a number is central
to nearly all scientific units of measurement - such as in quantum physics,
quantum chemistry and thermodynamics.
I think that we agree that the nature of meaning is one of the central
issues in all of philosophy. As you note, CSP’s approach to meaning
develops slowly over the course of decades as he struggles to incorporate
the meaning of chemical facts into a broader perspective, relying on
metaphors related to chemical phenomenology. Today, we understand, at a
very deep level, how his chemical premises were insufficient to bridge the
“meaning gap”. Chemical symbols and chemical propositions are necessarily
particular.
Cheers
Jerry
On Mar 1, 2016, at 7:39 AM, [email protected] wrote:
List, Jerry, Stephen,
It seems to be commonly assumed that CSP created a theory of signs. -
Well, amongst other things, he did. - But it was not what he was after. -
He was after a theory, or rather a method and methodogy of finding out
meanings.
By the end of 1800, there was a kind of mania to classification - and
standardisation. - CSP was not immunune to that.
Still, to reave what he achieved, the focus has to remain in his later
works, after 1900.
It was not about signs, it was about meaning.
Kirsti
Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 27.2.2016 23:12:
List, Stephen:
On 2/26/2016 5:38 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
> I see abduction as guessing (and approved by CP), induction as having
> some
> evidence but less than deduction which is fallible but the best we can
> do
> to prove something. I have been cautioned against writing brief notes
> to
> the list. Cheers, S
>
Have you considered the difference that distinguishes constrained
guessing from mere indexing the possibilities in one’s mind and
randomly choosing a member of the index as a guess?
Is that you mental image of CSP’s usage of the term “abduction” in logic?
If so, then I suggest you are missing a critical component of CSP’s
description of how to interpret signs in relation to its deictic
actions.
In CSP’s view, a sign necessarily has both denotative and connotative
actions; the capabilities of the observer may constrain his (her)
interpretative capacities to one set of indices or another set of
indices, depending on the prior experiences. The nature of the index
assigned to a sinsign is a personal choice of the individual observer
of the sign, is it not? And, the form of the index itself may include
ethical and moral values, can it not?
In one field of inquiry, the indices from the sinsign, qualisigns and
legisigns may generate a discrete set of abductive choices. CSP named
these choices the dicisigns. The choices are, in modern terminology,
cybernetic choices in that they form a circular argument with a
bounded set of symbols, legisigns and sinsigns. These choices can
also be expressed as logical diagrams in CSP assertions about logical
systems.
Cheers
Jerry
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