I do also think that this must be what synechism means. But what then is the
habit that drives evolution and the growth if mind. I have sometime compared it
to Schopenhauer’s Will.
Søren
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 22. august 2016 18:40
To: Søren Brier; 'Jon Alan Schmidt'
Cc: Peirce-L; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation
Dear Soren:
Thank you for your comments - I agree; I think that the debate on 'which is
first' rests within our dualism, derived from Cartesianism.
That's why I see Peirce's objective idealism as NOT the same as idealism, which
does present Mind as primordial/primary. Nor is it materialism for the same
reason. My view is that, within Peirce's philosophy, Mind cannot exist except
as matter; and Matter cannot exist except within the organizational habits of
Mind. Neither is first in either existentiality or, certainly, reality. This,
to me, is also an Aristotelian analysis.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Søren Brier<mailto:[email protected]>
To: 'Jon Alan Schmidt'<mailto:[email protected]> ; Edwina
Taborsky<mailto:[email protected]>
Cc: Peirce-L<mailto:[email protected]> ;
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> ;
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> ; Lucia Santaelle Braga
([email protected])<mailto:[email protected])>
Sent: Monday, August 22, 2016 12:22 PM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation
Dear Jon and Edwina
In a way I think that you are both right. But I think the focus on if matter or
mind was first is not very fruitful and may come from our dualistic upbringing.
I view Peirce as a synechist triadic process philosopher. He has accepted the
term objective idealist for his philosophy and accepted that there are some
similarities with Hegel’s philosophy, but that his own was much more realistic.
I think his semiotic philosophy makes him produces something for which we may
not have a concept yet. I discussed it with Lucia Santaella some years ago, who
told me that she was looking into this problem. But I have never seen anything
from her in English on the matter so far. But maybe she can enlighten us? Ivo
Ibri have a chapter on it in Vinicius and Eliseo’s new book: Peirce and
Biosemiotics: A guess at the riddle of life, on which I have just finished a
review to CHK. But I do not think he solved this problem, but developed another
view. Personally I am still wondering what kind of force it is that a sign (not
its tokens) is? In a way it neither physical or psychological.
Best
Søren
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 22. august 2016 15:19
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L; [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation
Edwina, List:
I try to be careful to use appropriate disclaimers when I am expressing a
subjective opinion, but the issue here is an objective fact--in CP 6.24-25,
Peirce explicitly defines idealism as the view that the psychical law is
primordial, while the physical law is derived and special, and then declares
that this is precisely his view. Other passages in his writings shed further
light on it, including some important nuances; but unless you can show me one
where he clearly and definitively refutes this position, I rest my case. I
leave it to the judgment of the List community which of us has the more
persuasive argument.
Regards,
Jon
On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 7:53 AM, Edwina Taborsky
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Jon, list
With regard to the reality/fact, that we are BOTH reasonably intelligent
explorers and analysts of Peircean semiosis - then, I think such an opinion is
made clear by the liberal use of such phrases as 'in my view', in my opinion,
in my analysis'...rather than assertions YOU are misreading etc...
With regard to the objective idealism of Peirce - you are right - I didn't
explain myself well. I did not mean neutralism, where both materialism and
idealism are originating forces and thus cancel each other; I meant that both
co-exist; neither can exist without the other. I simply don't read his
objective idealism - which i consider as NOT equivalent to idealism [while it
appears that you do] - as considering that idealism is primordial.As to which
is first - his outline of the emergence of the universe is that - before matter
- there was nothing. [1.411] That means - no Mind. No matter and no mind-
instead; just nothing.
And "it would be a mistake to conceive of the psychical and the physical
aspects of matter as two aspects absolutely distinct" 6.268. Since they are not
distinct - then, I don't see how idealism is primordial. Objective idealism, on
the other hand, merges the psychical and physical. It doesn't define them as
ONE force; it acknowledges they are two - but - they were never separate.
Therefore, my reading of Peirce sees his objective idealism as quite different
from your reading of him as an idealist.
Actually, if one wants to discuss primordial forces, one can consider the Three
Categories, where 'three elements are active in the world; first, chance;
second, law; and third, habit-taking' 1.409. Before the forces of matter
[Secondness] and mind [Thirdness], there was chance/randomness [Firstness].
This too suggests that neither the material nor mental forces are primordial.
But - "Out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come
something, by the Principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by
the principle of habit there would have been a second flash. Though time would
not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense after the first, because
resulting from it. Then thre would have come other successions ever more and
more closely connected, the habits and the tendency to take them ever
strengthening themselves, until the events would have been bound together into
something like a continuous flow" 1.412.
My view of the above is that neither the mental nor the material are
primordial; they co-develop. To me - that is what objective idealism means.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt<mailto:[email protected]>
To: Edwina Taborsky<mailto:[email protected]>
Cc: Peirce-L<mailto:[email protected]> ;
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, August 21, 2016 10:01 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation
Edwina, List:
With all due respect--I am not lecturing you, I never suggested that you are
dumb or ignorant, and I am certainly not self-designating myself as The
Authority. Your claim, which you even underlined for emphasis, was that
"Peirce rejects all three outlines and considers 'both the psychical and the
physical as primordial'." This is simply not the case, and the words that you
implied to be quoted directly from Peirce never appear in the actual text of CP
6.24-25, which Gary F. helpfully provided in full. In fact, Peirce flatly
rejected this notion as the essence of neutralism.
CSP: Neutralism is sufficiently condemned by the logical maxim known as
Ockham's razor, i.e., that not more independent elements are to be supposed
than necessary. By placing the inward and outward aspects of substance on a
par, it seems to render both primordial. (emphasis added)
As for the view that he espoused as his own, here are the key portions again.
CSP: ... the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as
primordial, which is idealism ... The one intelligible theory of the universe
is that of objective idealism ...
By deductive inference--really, just simple substitution--Peirce's stated view
here is that the one intelligible theory of the universe is that (objectively)
the psychical law alone is primoridial, while the physical law is derived and
special. The whole structure of the passage is that there are only three
alternatives, and he explicitly rejects the other two (neutralism and
materialism). There is no legitimate way to justify any other reading.
You seem to think that Peirce's use of "objective idealism" in CP 6.25, rather
than just "idealism," is significant. Maybe so, but whatever he meant by
"objective idealism," he still meant idealism in the sense that the psychical
law is primoridial, and the physical law is derived and special. There is
nothing whatsoever in the text that suggests otherwise. As for the other
passage that I quoted ...
CSP: ... idealism [is] the doctrine that ideas are everything ... I have
proposed to make synechism mean the tendency to regard everything as
continuous. (CP 7.565, EP 2.1; 1893)
Here the "idealism" that he specifically rejects is "the doctrine that ideas
are everything"; in other words, that the psychical laws are exclusive, rather
than just primordial, such that there really is no such thing as matter at
all--only mind. Synechism, by contrast, is the doctrine that mind and matter
are continuous--but still, the psychical law is primordial, and the physical
law is derived and special. That is precisely why and how "matter is effete
mind."
Now, if you want to argue that Peirce was wrong about this--i.e., that the
psychical law and physical law are somehow both primoridial (neutralism), or
that neither is--then you are welcome to make your case. However, as
demonstrated above, it is false to claim that this was Peirce's own view as
expressed in these two passages.
Regards,
Jon
On Sun, Aug 21, 2016 at 7:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Jon - I would appreciate it if, rather than lecturing me on my 'misreading' or
misunderstanding of Peirce, you would acknowledge that we are both explorers in
Peircean analysis and that it is quite possible that I am not quite as dumb and
ignorant as you suggest I am - and that we are both, equally, continuously
exploring and analyzing his works. We may indeed disagree with each other's
explorations and analysis - but I don't think that either one of us should
self-designate oneself as The Authority.
i agree with your clarification of neutralism: the two, Mind and Matter are not
independent of each other - and I've been saying that all along - but, with
regard to Peirce's view - his objective idealism does not, in my view, posit
that the psychical is primordial - which is Platonism. His Objective idealism
is not identical with 'idealism' but quite different from it. He's quite clear
that Mind operates within Matter but nowhere does he separate them. He's
Aristotelian, not a Platonist. I'm sure you also know the equally famous
quotation:
4.551. "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the
work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world".
I don't consider that he ever thought of Mind and Matter as equivalent - and
I've no idea why you come up with such a supposition that I think that way. BUT
- they do not exist, in my view, separately.
You wrote: "However, this reflects more of a change in emphasis than a change
of position. What he specifically rejected here was that ideas are everything,
not that psychical laws are primordial. So once again, your disagreement is
with Peirce--in this case, a very sharp and fundamental one."
What do you understand by the phrase 'ideas are everything'? And again - I
don't see where he supports the concept that 'psychical laws are primordial'. I
don't see him separating the two, Mind and Matter - and to posit that psychical
laws are primordial - requires a separation - which he rejects. He acknowledges
that Mind and Matter are not identical; after all - his whole set of categories
is based around such an analysis - but- i don't see where he posits that either
one exists separately from the other.
His Objective Idealism is not the same as idealism because of this entanglement
of Mind and Matter. For 'there cannot be a General without Instances embodying
it" 4.551. [Now, that's pure Aristotle right there!!]
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt<mailto:[email protected]>
To: Edwina Taborsky<mailto:[email protected]>
Cc: Peirce-L<mailto:[email protected]> ;
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, August 21, 2016 8:11 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation
Edwina, List:
I know that you did not make it up; I am quite familiar with the citation from
Peirce, since it is one of his most famous remarks. Your statement, "Mind only
exists as articulated within Matter," is fine as far as it goes if you mean
"exists" strictly in the Peircean sense that is confined to Secondness; but it
is certainly NOT the case, according to Peirce, that "Mind only has Being as
articulated in Matter," or that "there is only Mind as articulated in Matter."
Again, why would he say that "matter is effete mind" if he believed that there
is no other kind of mind? That would mean that matter and mind are equivalent,
whereas he viewed them as continuous (more below).
More seriously, it seems that you are completely misreading CP 6.24-25 (also EP
1.293; 1891). Please review it again carefully. Notice that the subject
heading is "Objective Idealism." Peirce proposes exactly three options for the
relation between physical and psychical laws--neutralism if they are
independent, materialism if the physical laws are primordial, or idealism if
the psychical laws are primordial. He then dismisses materialism as "quite as
repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense," and eliminates neutralism by
means of Ockham's razor. He then concludes with precisely what you quoted--he
unambiguously embraces idealism, which in his own words means that he held "the
physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial."
Now, only a couple of years later, Peirce distinguished his synechism from
idealism.
CSP: For two centuries we have been affixing -ist and -ism to words, in order
to note sects which exalt the importance of those elements which the stemwords
signify. Thus, materialism is the doctrine that matter is everything, idealism
the doctrine that ideas are everything, dualism the philosophy which splits
everything in two. In like manner, I have proposed to make synechism mean the
tendency to regard everything as continuous. (CP 7.565, EP 2.1; 1893)
However, this reflects more of a change in emphasis than a change of position.
What he specifically rejected here was that ideas are everything, not that
psychical laws are primordial. So once again, your disagreement is with
Peirce--in this case, a very sharp and fundamental one.
Finally, I never said that the Representamen is identical with Thirdness. What
I said is "that Representation is Peirce's paradigm example of Thirdness, and
that Signs [i.e., Representamens] are the means by which all Representation
takes place."
Regards,
Jon
On Sun, Aug 21, 2016 at 6:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Jon - I didn't make up the sentence 'matter is effete mind'. It's Peirce's
phrase.
"The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism;
that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws" 6.25.
And as he says in 6.24, 'The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so
prominent in Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, will
hardly find defenders today"...and he goes on to describe whether physical laws
and the psychical law are to be taken as a) 'independent of each other; , or b)
the psychical law as derived [with the physical as primordial], or c) the
physical law as derived with the psychical as primordial'.....6.24. Peirce
rejects all three outlines and considers 'both the psychical and the physical
as primordial'.
i totally disagree with any notion that there is such a thing as
non-materialized Mind, i.e., that there is such a thing as 'non-effete' Mind.
And I don't agree with your view that Peirce thinks such a thing for that would
be to put the psychical as primordial and he rejects that...Read his outline of
Objective Idealism 6.24
And the Representamen is not identical with Thirdness. As you can see in the
ten classes of Signs, [8.341] the Representamen is in a mode of Thirdness in 6
of these classes, in a mode of Secondness in 3 and in a mode of Firstness in 1
class. And - yet, he defines them ALL as Signs.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt<mailto:[email protected]>
To: Edwina Taborsky<mailto:[email protected]>
Cc: Peirce-L<mailto:[email protected]> ;
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, August 21, 2016 6:38 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation
Edwina, List:
I think that we are still stumbling on the term "exists." Again, we agree that
Qualisigns and Legisigns only exist in their instantiations (Replicas or
Tokens); but those instantiations are all actually Sinsigns. A Qualisign or
Legisign as such has no brute reactions with anything else, which means that it
does not satisfy Peirce's definition of existence (e.g., CP 1.431-433).
ET: Mind only exists as articulated within Matter ... Again 'matter is effete
Mind'.
This right here is why I find myself wondering if you are a materialist, rather
than a synechist as Peirce was, along with your flat denial previously that the
inner and outer worlds belong to a single continuum. The statement that
"matter is effete mind" implies, to me, that mind is the more fundamental
concept--and that there is such a thing as mind that is not effete, and
therefore not "articulated within matter." Although it might be improper to
say that such non-effete mind "exists," it certainly does have Being in
Peirce's way of thinking. After all, he famously offered "A Neglected Argument
for the Reality [not existence] of God," and God is clearly an example of mind
that is not "articulated within matter."
ET: I disagree with your insistence that the Sign is 'Peirce's paradigm
example of Thirdness'.
I suppose that it might have been more accurate for me to say that
Representation is Peirce's paradigm example of Thirdness, and that Signs are
the means by which all Representation takes place. But really, your
disagreement is with Peirce; here is a longer excerpt of the entire passage
from which Jerry quoted only a snippet.
CSP: The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists in active
power to establish connections between different objects, especially between
objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is essentially a
Sign--not the mere body of the Sign, which is not essentially such, but, so to
speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in its power of serving as
intermediary between its Object and a Mind. (CP 6.455, EP 2.435; 1908)
A soul is another example of mind that is not "articulated within matter."
EW: I refer to the full triad of three Relations as a Sign; and the
Representamen as a 'sign'. See Peirce's discussion of these Relations in 8.335,
8.337.
The Sign is triadic, but that does not mean that it is itself a triad of
relations. Those two passages have to do with the classification of Signs
based on their relations. The Sign itself is always still the Representamen
that has those relations, rather than another entity that is those relations.
I do not expect to convince you, but your usage here is simply not Peircean,
and only serves to confuse matters because he did consistently interchange Sign
with Representamen--and once distinguished them only by saying, "A Sign is a
Representamen with a mental Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens
that are not Signs" (EP 2.273; 1903). In other words, all Signs are
Representamens, but some Representamens may not be Signs. In particular, any
Representamen that does not determine a mental "effect upon a person" (EP
2.478; 1908) is not a Sign.
Regards,
Jon
On Sun, Aug 21, 2016 at 3:43 PM, Edwina Taborsky
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Jon, list
Yes - I guess we'll have to 'agree to disagree'. I feel the same way towards
you - as you do to me; that is, I feel that your way of thinking is
'inconsistent with Peirce's writings' (as I read them"..and also, unpersuasive.
Just a few comments.
I think that your insistence that existence refers only to entities in states
of Secondness rejects the individual experience and realities of several of the
10 classes of Signs: the rhematic iconic qualisign; the rhematic iconic
legisign; the rhematic symbolic legisign, and of course, the argument symbolic
legisign.
I note also that Peirce himself wrote: 'generals must have a real existence"
5.312. Their existence is within instantiations - a very Aristotelian view
[rather than Platonic] and Peirce was an Aristotelian.
No, I don't give priority to matter over mind. How do you come to such a
conclusion? I consider that matter only exists as organized by/within Mind. And
Mind only exists as articulated within Matter. And I don't see where in Peirce
you could conclude that he considered that Mind has priority over matter. He
doesn't see them, as you seem to do, as two different entities. Again 'matter
is effete Mind'.
Yes, meaning is embodied as Thirdness. Thirdness refers to the laws, the
habits of organization - and such habits are 'embodied meaning'. They are the
generalization of habits of the formation of, eg, protoplasm and as such,
provide the TRUTH/meaning..of 'how to be a protoplasm. See 6.250-255. Meaning
is also found in the Interpretant - which in its turn, will affect and evolve
the habits of Thirdness.
I disagree that these normative habits are not 'embodied' within matter. Where
else could they be other than within the instantiations? As habits, as
generals, they are real; as articulated in instances, they exist.
The rhematic iconic qualisign exists 'as a state in itself' within an
individual's experience. It is a Sign - and there is no Secondness nor
Thirdness - it operates entirely within the mode of Firstness. So, I disagree
with your insistence that the Sign is 'Peirce's paradigm example of Thirdness'.
Yes, we have two different meanings of 'sign'. I refer to the full triad of
three Relations as a Sign; and the Representamen as a 'sign'. See Peirce's
discussion of these Relations in 8.335, 8.337. See also where Peirce often
refers to the Representamen alone as a sign, and also, INCLUDES its 'two
objects' and its 'three interpretants' 8.333. My use of the capitalized Sign
INCLUDES these Relations; that is, again - my use of 'sign' refers only to the
Representamen. My use of 'Sign' refers to the Relations the sign/representamen
has with the objects and interpretants.
I use both terms: triadic semiosic process and semiosis - but I do want to
emphasize that when I refer to Sign, I refer not to the Representamen, but to
the Relations the sign/representamen has with the objects and interpretants.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt<mailto:[email protected]>
To: Edwina Taborsky<mailto:[email protected]>
Cc: Peirce-L<mailto:[email protected]> ;
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, August 21, 2016 3:57 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation
Edwina, List:
We may just have to let our disagreements stand at this point, because I find
your way of thinking highly inconsistent with Peirce's writings (as I read
them) and wholly unpersuasive. Still, I am glad for the opportunity to sharpen
my own thinking, and thank you (again) for the discussion.
Strictly speaking, Qualisigns and Legisigns never exist; only Sinsigns,
although they can and do function as Replicas of Qualisigns and Legisigns.
Furthermore, since all Symbols are Legisigns, Symbols never exist, either. The
actual spoken or written or thought word, "man," is not a Symbol per se; it is
a Replica of a general Symbol. The Real Symbol that is instantiated as "man"
still has Being independently of those instantiations, even though it does not
exist apart from them.
You state a couple of times that you do not separate mind and matter, but you
seem to give priority to matter over mind, whereas I think that Peirce clearly
took the opposite view. How can Meaning--or anything else--be "embodied in
Thirdness"? Embodiment is Secondness by definition. This is why I have so
much trouble with your statements like, "the Sign operates only within
individuals!" Individuals are also Secondness by definition, but Signs are
Peirce's paradigm example of Thirdness.
Finally, terminological ethics dictates that you really need to come up with a
different term for "the triadic semiosic process," or whatever it is that you
mean by "Sign," because it clearly deviates from Peirce's consistent usage, as
others have often pointed out to you. Why not just call it "semiosis"?
Regards,
Jon
On Sun, Aug 21, 2016 at 8:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Jon, list, see my replies below
1) JON: It sounds like you take the view that the immediate/dynamic/final
interpretants are the same as the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants. I
have not definitively made up my mind about that, but lean more toward seeing
them as distinct trichotomies.
EDWINA: Yes, I consider the two sets of terms to refer to the same actions. I
disagree with adding more Interpretants to the process.
2) JON: The English word "man" is a Symbol, which makes it a Legisign or Type,
which means that its Being is general. While it indeed only "exists" in its
instantiations--Replicas, which are Sinsigns or Tokens--it is Real
independently of them. This is NOT Platonism, it is Peircean three-category
Realism.
EDWINA: Yes, the word man is a symbol. But the symbol exists only within the
triadic semiosis; that is, the Legisign doesn't exist 'per se'. It is REAL as a
general but generals only exist within instantiation. So, the word 'man' only
functions as a symbol when it is instantiated in a particular triad - whether
it be the single man or the Argument referring to Man.
3) JON: One thing on which we do agree is that "the full range of meaning falls
within the purview of Thirdness." But this says nothing more than that meaning
is a matter of the Interpretants--all three of them--rather than the Sign or
the Objects. I am not aware of anything in Peirce's writings that warrants
characterizing the Immediate Interpretant as internal to the individual, rather
than internal to the Sign.
EDWINA: But the Sign operates only within individuals! The semiosic triad
doesn't operate outside of matter - whether that matter be a man, a tree, an
insect....Mind is not separate from matter. That's Cartesian and Peirce is not
a Cartesian.
And I consider that meaning is embodied within the Object - after all, as
Peirce wrote, 'matter is effete Mind'. 6.25; and 'matter is mind hidebound with
habits' 6.158. Meaning is embodied within Thirdness. The object is a Form of
Meaning..and makes more meaning in its interactions with other Signs
[instantiations of matter]...and these develop the Habits even more.
4) JON: Regarding determination, as I said before, I understand it mainly as
constraint, not causation. The Dynamic Object can only generate certain
Immediate Objects, and each of those can only be represented by certain Signs.
The Final Interpretant will be one or more of the Dynamic Interpretants, which
will all fall within the range of the Immediate Interpretant, which is dictated
by the Sign.
EDWINA: I consider that the semiosic process is more complex than you outline.
The DO may indeed, in its own nature, have a limited range of data output that
can become an IO - IF THAT DO were singularly causal of that IO. But it isn't.
For example, when I, who am processing input data from an external DO, arrive
at my own IO [and I maintain it is internal to me]...that same input data is
merged with other input data. How do I separate them?
And I don't agree that the IO 'can only be represented by certain Signs' [I
presume you mean the Representamen]. If I am receiving input data, a noise and
a visual image, then, my ability to process this sensual input....is
transformed by my habits/knowledge [Representamen]...and I can come up with
various Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants. 'It's just noise; it's a bird;
it's a plane; it's Superman. The Final Interpretant involves a community.
5) JON: I am not sure what you mean when you say, "But a Sign operates within
matter!" Are you suggesting that Signs ONLY operate within matter? I am
pretty sure that Peirce would never condone such a statement.
EDWINA: Yes - I do suggest that Signs [by which I mean the triadic semiosic
process as well as the category of Thirdness]...only operates within
instantiations. And instantiations are existential in time and space. That
means that they are material. That includes mental concepts which operate
within the frog's leg as well as the human mind. I simply don't see Signs, both
the triad and the Thirdness...operating outside of such particularization.
6) JON: Again, the Immediate
Object is internal to the Sign itself. I took "individual site-of-semeiosis"
as a substitute for "human mind"; if this is not how you are using that term,
then I guess that I need you to explain it.
EDWINA: No- I don't separate Mind and Matter. Nor does Peirce. See his The Law
of Mind, 6.150 and on; 6.255 and on. 6.277 and on.....
Regards,
Jon
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