Clark, list:
Finally, some sanity! You said: “The idea of something, like say Sherlock Holmes, can be a dynamic object if that is the object of discussion. Again because of our culture’s more nominalistic tendencies, we often want some core material entities as dynamic objects.” Plato said: “*Athenian.* We do not want many illustrations about such matters:— What aim would the general of an army, or what aim would a physician propose to himself, if he were seeking to attain salvation?” Strauss said: “*It is safer to try to understand the low in the light of the high than the high in the light of the low.* In doing the latter one necessarily distorts the high, whereas in doing the former one does not deprive the low of the freedom to reveal itself as fully as what it is.” Best, Jerry Rhee PS: You said: "i.e. it’s signs all the way down." The little old lady said: "It's no use, Mr. James – it's turtles all the way down." On Tue, Aug 23, 2016 at 4:26 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Aug 23, 2016, at 2:31 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > If this is the case, then what accounts for Peirce's consistent > assignment of "Dynamic" to the actual Object and Interpretant, rather than > the possible (Immediate) Object and Interpretant? > > Because the possible objects and interpretants are determined by this > original object. So the potential is in this original. The possible objects > are instantiations of possibilities. > > One can debate how platonic Peirce actually is. Or what ontologically > these original objects are. As I’ve noted it’s here in his basic ontology > and cosmology he’s most controversial. Although perhaps that’s true of any > foundational ontology if only because the arguments for it will always be > exceedingly weak. I don’t think one need adopt that cosmology to deal with > Peirce’s semiotics. > > As a more practical matter though we must remember that anything can be a > dynamic object. We aren’t necessarily talking of tangible things. The idea > of something, like say Sherlock Holmes, can be a dynamic object if that is > the object of discussion. Again because of our culture’s more nominalistic > tendencies, we often want some core material entities as dynamic objects. > Once you reject nominalism though then the types of objects open for > dynamic objects increases a great deal. Further, for Peirce, material > objects are themselves thought of only as habits in semiotic processes. > i.e. it’s signs all the way down. > > Without getting into the discussion of “objective idealism” (I’ve not yet > had a chance to read the thread) I’ll just say that whatever Peirce’s > preferences in adopting Schelling’s term I much prefer “semiotic realism” > as my term. > > > >> CG: In this case the dynamic object sets at the start of semiosis but > contains within it virtually all the ways it can be represented. Now the > actual mechanics of that representing are of course unique and tied to > chance. But in terms of potential the original dynamic object determines > the immediate object and then the interpretant through the sign. > >> > > Would it then be accurate to say that the Dynamic Object virtually > contains the Immediate Object, which virtually contains the Sign, which > virtually contains the Immediate Intepretant, which virtually contains the > Dynamic Interpretant, which virtually contains the Final Interpretant? I > am still getting a handle on what exactly we (and Peirce) mean by "virtual.” > > Since the semiotic process is continuous there’s virtuality all the way > back. > > Again Scotus’ example is worthwhile considering. He noted a circle is > virtually in the sphere. If one things of the possible ways a sphere could > be represented, then a circle is an obvious 2D representation. So if you > start at the object and go forward all the representations are virtually > present. > > This is important in phenomenology (especially if one is applying Peirce > to more traditional phenomenology of the Husserl or Heidegger varieties). > It means that we have a direct perception of these representations in the > encounter with the object. This avoids a lot of problems that Husserl ran > into when trying to deal with how we experience objects. Again, as is so > often the case, Peirce’s terminology offers a huge degree of clarity. That > clarity in turn helps one avoid philosophical mistakes. While it may be > hyperbole, I like to imagine that a lot of the philosophical dead ends of > the 20th century could have been avoided with that clarity. > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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