Jon- I consider that you should not hold yourself up as The 
Master-Guru-of-Peirce. You are one person, with your own reading and analysis 
of Peirce. I am also one person, with my reading and analysis of Peirce. We 
have the right and ability to disagree with our interpretations of Peirce. 
Therefore, I object to your declaration, when I disagree with you - that I 
therefore ALSO disagree with Peirce. That is merely your view; it is not 
necessarily The Truth.

And your statement that I am 'more than welcome to disagree with Peirce' is 
really quite arrogant on your part. You, again, are not the Ultimate-Master of 
Peirce.

Edwina
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2016 11:17 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


  Edwina, List:


    ET:  Actually, my quotes came from that section, but, there is no evidence 
that Peirce discarded the Scotus view of realism in later life and there are 
plenty of quotes from elsewhere that support it.


  I never claimed that Peirce "discarded the Scotus view of realism."  In fact, 
Peirce still calls himself a "scholastic realist" in drafts of "A Neglected 
Argument."  However, he did write the following in about 1905.


    CSP:  Even Duns Scotus is too nominalistic when he says that universals are 
contracted to the mode of individuality in singulars, meaning, as he does, by 
singulars, ordinary existing things.  The pragmaticist cannot admit that.  I 
myself went too far in the direction of nominalism when I said that it was a 
mere question of the convenience of speech whether we say that a diamond is 
hard when it is not pressed upon, or whether we say that it is soft until it is 
pressed upon.  I now say that experiment will prove that the diamond is hard, 
as a positive fact.  That is, it is a real fact that it would resist pressure, 
which amounts to extreme scholastic realism. (CP 8.208)


  He basically says here that his own realism goes beyond that of Scotus, and 
calls it "extreme scholastic realism"!  Both "may-bes" and "would-bes" are 
real, as well as actual facts.


    ET:  Furthermore, the Three Categories are NOT identical with the terms of 
'universal' and 'particular' - even though you seem to use them that way.


  Where have I ever used the words "universal" and "particular"?  I try to 
follow Peirce's lead by using "general" for Thirdness and "individual" or 
"singular" for Secondness, as well as possible/actual/habitual for the 
modalities of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness.


    ET:  I consider that the three Categories are processes of semiosis - 
period.


  Then you disagree with Peirce.


    ET:  I disagree with your outline that 'Firstness' and 'Thirdness' are 
examples of 'the real'.


  Then you disagree with Peirce.


    ET:  I think that a great problem is with the definition of the terms of 
'real', 'reality', 'realism'.


  Then you disagree with Peirce.


  As I have said before, you are more than welcome to disagree with Peirce; but 
then, please do not pretend that your views and terminology are consistent with 
his.


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 9:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:

    Jon, list

    Actually, my quotes came from that section, but, there is no evidence that 
Peirce discarded the Scotus view of realism in later life and there are plenty 
of quotes from elsewhere that support it.

    Furthermore, the Three Categories are NOT identical with the terms of 
'universal' and 'particular' - even though you seem to use them that way. I 
consider that the three Categories are processes of semiosis - period. The 
concept of  'the universal' as the definition of 'reality' is quite another 
outline and analysis. Therefore, I disagree with your outline that 'Firstness' 
and 'Thirdness' are examples of 'the real' .  Helmut's question, after all, was 
on the difference between reality and existence. And a universal is not a 
possibility or a habit.

    I think that a great problem is with the definition of the terms of 'real', 
'reality', 'realism'. 

    Edwina


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