Edwina, List: I trust our fellow List participants to judge for themselves, but I think that a fair reading of my posts would not come close to suggesting that I "hold [my]self up as The Master-Guru-of-Peirce," or have been "arrogant," or have behaved as if I were "the Ultimate-Master of Peirce." In this thread, I was even careful to state more than once that I was expressing "my understanding of Peirce," although that should really go without saying. The fact that you have a different "reading and analysis of Peirce" does not entail that your resulting views are entirely consistent with HIS views, which are quite clear on these matters as expressed in his voluminous writings. It seems incontrovertible to me that Peirce DID NOT confine the three Categories to "processes of semiosis," DID consider Firstness (after about 1890) and Thirdness (his whole adult life) to be examples of "the real," and DID (repeatedly) define "the real" in precisely the way that I have summarized it (see http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/real and, for good measure, http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/existence). Your disagreements on these three points are not merely disagreements with my interpretation of Peirce, they are disagreements with Peirce himself, plain and simple--not that there is anything wrong with that! You have taken *some *ideas from Peirce and developed your *own *system of thought, which is obviously *not *identical to his. Why not simply acknowledge this and move on, rather than being so defensive about it and resorting to name-calling?
Regards, Jon On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 10:42 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon- I consider that you should not hold yourself up as The > Master-Guru-of-Peirce. You are one person, with your own reading and > analysis of Peirce. I am also one person, with my reading and analysis of > Peirce. We have the right and ability to disagree with our interpretations > of Peirce. Therefore, I object to your declaration, when I disagree with > you - that I therefore ALSO disagree with Peirce. That is merely your view; > it is not necessarily The Truth. > > And your statement that I am 'more than welcome to disagree with Peirce' > is really quite arrogant on your part. You, again, are not the > Ultimate-Master of Peirce. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Thursday, September 08, 2016 11:17 AM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > Edwina, List: > > ET: Actually, my quotes came from that section, but, there is no evidence > that Peirce discarded the Scotus view of realism in later life and there > are plenty of quotes from elsewhere that support it. > > > I never claimed that Peirce "discarded the Scotus view of realism." In > fact, Peirce still calls himself a "scholastic realist" in drafts of "A > Neglected Argument." However, he did write the following in about 1905. > > CSP: Even Duns Scotus is too nominalistic when he says that universals > are contracted to the mode of individuality in singulars, meaning, as he > does, by singulars, ordinary existing things. The pragmaticist cannot > admit that. I myself went too far in the direction of nominalism when I > said that it was a mere question of the convenience of speech whether we > say that a diamond is hard when it is not pressed upon, or whether we say > that it is soft until it is pressed upon. I *now* say that experiment > will prove that the diamond is hard, as a positive fact. That is, it is a > real fact that it *would *resist pressure, which amounts to extreme > scholastic realism. (CP 8.208) > > > He basically says here that his own realism goes *beyond *that of Scotus, > and calls it "*extreme *scholastic realism"! Both "may-bes" and > "would-bes" are real, as well as actual facts. > > ET: Furthermore, the Three Categories are NOT identical with the terms of > 'universal' and 'particular' - even though you seem to use them that way. > > > Where have I ever used the words "universal" and "particular"? I try to > follow Peirce's lead by using "general" for Thirdness and "individual" or > "singular" for Secondness, as well as possible/actual/habitual for the > modalities of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness. > > ET: I consider that the three Categories are processes of semiosis - > period. > > > Then you disagree with Peirce. > > ET: I disagree with your outline that 'Firstness' and 'Thirdness' are > examples of 'the real'. > > > Then you disagree with Peirce. > > ET: I think that a great problem is with the definition of the terms of > 'real', 'reality', 'realism'. > > > Then you disagree with Peirce. > > As I have said before, you are more than welcome to disagree with Peirce; > but then, please do not pretend that your views and terminology are > consistent with his. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 9:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, list >> >> Actually, my quotes came from that section, but, there is no evidence >> that Peirce discarded the Scotus view of realism in later life and there >> are plenty of quotes from elsewhere that support it. >> >> Furthermore, the Three Categories are NOT identical with the terms of >> 'universal' and 'particular' - even though you seem to use them that way. I >> consider that the three Categories are processes of semiosis - period. The >> concept of 'the universal' as the definition of 'reality' is quite another >> outline and analysis. Therefore, I disagree with your outline that >> 'Firstness' and 'Thirdness' are examples of 'the real' . Helmut's >> question, after all, was on the difference between reality and existence. >> And a universal is not a possibility or a habit. >> >> I think that a great problem is with the definition of the terms of >> 'real', 'reality', 'realism'. >> >> Edwina >> >
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