Edwina, List: In accordance with Stephen's gentle admonition, I will attempt to refrain from engaging in an "exegetical contest" with you. I provided links to Peirce's various (but largely consistent) definitions of "real" and "existence"; did you even read through them before replying? He evidently tightened up his usage of those terms over time to maintain the distinction that I have summarized; of what part of those definitions are you still "asking for clarification"? Your latest citations for Peirce's "view of reality" are from an 1868 paper, "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities"; as I already pointed out, Peirce referenced that very paper in 1892, and explicitly characterized it as "too nominalistic." Perhaps our disagreement is more over *which *writings of Peirce, earlier or later, we give more weight in attempting to ascertain what his views were.
Regards, Jon On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 11:46 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon- you've done it again. The opinions you express on the issues are your > analysis of Peirce; the opinions on these same issues are my analysis of > Peirce - and are not, as you insist, 'my own system of thought' which you > declare that I 'ought to acknowledge'. They are, I repeat, my analysis of > Peirce - and I disagree with YOUR analysis of Peirce on those same issues. > But - you insist that yours alone are right!! > > Again, in my view, Firstness and Thirdness are not examples of 'the real' > - but are modes of organization of thought and the semiosic process [which > is thought]. I consider that your use of them to define *reality* moves > this reality into 'sensations' - and Peirce rejected this definition of > reality as 'nominalism'. > > His view of reality, to my understanding was "the very origin of the > conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the > notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite > increase in knowledge" 5.311....and this knowledge of the truth or the > universal is attainable in the future. > > As well, he writes, 'generals must have a real existence' 5.312. That > 'reality' of the universal or general - is what, in my view, Peirce is > talking about when he discusses the term of reality. Again - it has nothing > to do with the three categories - which refer to 'representation'. > > And i also consider that we should clarify the terms of 'real', 'reality' > and 'realism'. You chastized me for such a request - telling me that I > thereby 'disagree with Peirce'. How is asking for clarification of > terminology a 'disagreement with Peirce'??? > > Edwina > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Thursday, September 08, 2016 12:11 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > Edwina, List: > > I trust our fellow List participants to judge for themselves, but I think > that a fair reading of my posts would not come close to suggesting that I > "hold [my]self up as The Master-Guru-of-Peirce," or have been "arrogant," > or have behaved as if I were "the Ultimate-Master of Peirce." In this > thread, I was even careful to state more than once that I was expressing > "my understanding of Peirce," although that should really go without > saying. The fact that you have a different "reading and analysis of > Peirce" does not entail that your resulting views are entirely consistent > with HIS views, which are quite clear on these matters as expressed in his > voluminous writings. It seems incontrovertible to me that Peirce DID NOT > confine the three Categories to "processes of semiosis," DID consider > Firstness (after about 1890) and Thirdness (his whole adult life) to be > examples of "the real," and DID (repeatedly) define "the real" in precisely > the way that I have summarized it (see http://www.commens.org/ > dictionary/term/real and, for good measure, http://www.commens.org/ > dictionary/term/existence). Your disagreements on these three points are > not merely disagreements with my interpretation of Peirce, they are > disagreements with Peirce himself, plain and simple--not that there is > anything wrong with that! You have taken *some *ideas from Peirce and > developed your *own *system of thought, which is obviously *not *identical > to his. Why not simply acknowledge this and move on, rather than being so > defensive about it and resorting to name-calling? > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 10:42 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon- I consider that you should not hold yourself up as The >> Master-Guru-of-Peirce. You are one person, with your own reading and >> analysis of Peirce. I am also one person, with my reading and analysis of >> Peirce. We have the right and ability to disagree with our interpretations >> of Peirce. Therefore, I object to your declaration, when I disagree with >> you - that I therefore ALSO disagree with Peirce. That is merely your view; >> it is not necessarily The Truth. >> >> And your statement that I am 'more than welcome to disagree with Peirce' >> is really quite arrogant on your part. You, again, are not the >> Ultimate-Master of Peirce. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> *Cc:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> >> *Sent:* Thursday, September 08, 2016 11:17 AM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> ET: Actually, my quotes came from that section, but, there is no >> evidence that Peirce discarded the Scotus view of realism in later life and >> there are plenty of quotes from elsewhere that support it. >> >> >> I never claimed that Peirce "discarded the Scotus view of realism." In >> fact, Peirce still calls himself a "scholastic realist" in drafts of "A >> Neglected Argument." However, he did write the following in about 1905. >> >> CSP: Even Duns Scotus is too nominalistic when he says that universals >> are contracted to the mode of individuality in singulars, meaning, as he >> does, by singulars, ordinary existing things. The pragmaticist cannot >> admit that. I myself went too far in the direction of nominalism when I >> said that it was a mere question of the convenience of speech whether we >> say that a diamond is hard when it is not pressed upon, or whether we say >> that it is soft until it is pressed upon. I *now* say that experiment >> will prove that the diamond is hard, as a positive fact. That is, it is a >> real fact that it *would *resist pressure, which amounts to extreme >> scholastic realism. (CP 8.208) >> >> >> He basically says here that his own realism goes *beyond *that of >> Scotus, and calls it "*extreme *scholastic realism"! Both "may-bes" and >> "would-bes" are real, as well as actual facts. >> >> ET: Furthermore, the Three Categories are NOT identical with the terms >> of 'universal' and 'particular' - even though you seem to use them that way. >> >> >> Where have I ever used the words "universal" and "particular"? I try to >> follow Peirce's lead by using "general" for Thirdness and "individual" or >> "singular" for Secondness, as well as possible/actual/habitual for the >> modalities of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness. >> >> ET: I consider that the three Categories are processes of semiosis - >> period. >> >> >> Then you disagree with Peirce. >> >> ET: I disagree with your outline that 'Firstness' and 'Thirdness' are >> examples of 'the real'. >> >> >> Then you disagree with Peirce. >> >> ET: I think that a great problem is with the definition of the terms of >> 'real', 'reality', 'realism'. >> >> >> Then you disagree with Peirce. >> >> As I have said before, you are more than welcome to disagree with Peirce; >> but then, please do not pretend that your views and terminology are >> consistent with his. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 9:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, list >>> >>> Actually, my quotes came from that section, but, there is no evidence >>> that Peirce discarded the Scotus view of realism in later life and there >>> are plenty of quotes from elsewhere that support it. >>> >>> Furthermore, the Three Categories are NOT identical with the terms of >>> 'universal' and 'particular' - even though you seem to use them that way. I >>> consider that the three Categories are processes of semiosis - period. The >>> concept of 'the universal' as the definition of 'reality' is quite another >>> outline and analysis. Therefore, I disagree with your outline that >>> 'Firstness' and 'Thirdness' are examples of 'the real' . Helmut's >>> question, after all, was on the difference between reality and existence. >>> And a universal is not a possibility or a habit. >>> >>> I think that a great problem is with the definition of the terms of >>> 'real', 'reality', 'realism'. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>
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