Edwina, List:
ET: Jon - the requirement for a community in the analysis of reality [see
5.311] is hardly a nominalistic outline.
Yes, the community is required for the *analysis* of reality; but reality
is whatever it is, *regardless* of that analysis--in fact, regardless of
whether there even *is* a community to analyze it! What is nominalism, if
not the view that there must be thinkers in order for generals to be real?
ET: I think that, based on the obvious differences of our use of the terms
on this list, that we should clarify what we - and Peirce - meant by those
terms.
That is exactly what I have been trying to do--clarify what Peirce meant by
those terms, and how that differs from what you evidently mean by those
terms. This is not to say that Peirce's usage is some kind of infallible
standard with which all must invariably comply, just that we ought to
acknowledge when and how our usage departs from his.
ET: I don't think that all three terms of 'real, realism and reality' mean
the same thing.
Does anyone? I do think that "real" and "reality" are, at least in most
cases, the adjective and noun that correspond to the same concept. That is
why the Commens Dictionary to which I linked treats Reality as a variant of
Real, such that defining one is sufficient to define both. These three
passages, two rather early and the other very late, summarize the
consistent thread that runs through all of those definitions.
CSP: A real thing is something whose characters are independent of how any
representation represents it to be. Independent, therefore, of how any
number of men think it to be. (W2.439-440; 1870)
CSP: If an object is of whatever character I or any man or men will have
it to be or imagine it, it is a fiction; but if its characters are
independent of what you or I or any number of men think about it, it is a
reality. (W3.58; 1872)
CSP: To say that a thing is Real is merely to say that such predicates as
are true of it, or some of them, are true of it regardless of whatever any
actual person or persons might think concerning that truth.
Unconditionality in that single respect constitutes what we call Reality.
(EP 2.456-457; 1911)
On the other hand, "realism" is a particular stance on what *qualifies* as
"real" or "reality" in this sense, and a "realist" is someone who adopts
that stance. As I quoted previously, Peirce described his view in about
1905 as "extreme scholastic realism"--the position that not only the
*actual* (Secondness) is real, but also the *possible* ("may-be,"
Firstness) and the *general* ("would-be," Thirdness). In fact, Peirce
*always* held that generals are real; that is precisely what he said it
means to be a "scholastic realist," extreme or otherwise.
CSP: Hence, before we treat of the evidences of pragmaticism, it will be
needful to weigh the pros and cons of scholastic realism. For pragmaticism
could hardly have entered a head that was not already convinced that there
are real generals. (CP 5.503; c.1905)
Thus it is not "my interpretation" to align these terms--"real," "realism,"
and "reality"--with Firstness and Thirdness; it is what Peirce himself
*explicitly* did.
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 12:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:
> Jon - the requirement for a community in the analysis of reality [see
> 5.311] is hardly a nominalistic outline. Indeed, Peirce explains this
> requirement repeatedly throughout his works.
>
> I wrote: "And i also consider that we should clarify the terms of 'real',
> 'reality' and 'realism'. You chastized me for such a request - telling me
> that I thereby 'disagree with Peirce'. How is asking for clarification of
> terminology a 'disagreement with Peirce'???"...Again - how is asking for
> clarification of terminology a 'disagreement with Peirce'?
>
> I think that, based on the obvious differences of our use of the terms on
> this list, that we should clarify what we - and Peirce - meant by those
> terms. After all - you disagree with my interpretation of them [ telling me
> that my quoted references are from an 'old text of Peirce's] and I
> disagree with your interpretation of them [i.e., your aligning them with
> Firstness and Thirdness]. So- I think the clarification of terms is
> important. Plus, I don't think that all three terms of 'real, realism and
> reality' mean the same thing...
>
> Edwina
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <[email protected]>
> *Sent:* Thursday, September 08, 2016 1:24 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> In accordance with Stephen's gentle admonition, I will attempt to refrain
> from engaging in an "exegetical contest" with you. I provided links to
> Peirce's various (but largely consistent) definitions of "real" and
> "existence"; did you even read through them before replying? He evidently
> tightened up his usage of those terms over time to maintain the distinction
> that I have summarized; of what part of those definitions are you still
> "asking for clarification"? Your latest citations for Peirce's "view of
> reality" are from an 1868 paper, "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities";
> as I already pointed out, Peirce referenced that very paper in 1892, and
> explicitly characterized it as "too nominalistic." Perhaps our
> disagreement is more over *which *writings of Peirce, earlier or later,
> we give more weight in attempting to ascertain what his views were.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 11:46 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon- you've done it again. The opinions you express on the issues are
>> your analysis of Peirce; the opinions on these same issues are my analysis
>> of Peirce - and are not, as you insist, 'my own system of thought' which
>> you declare that I 'ought to acknowledge'. They are, I repeat, my analysis
>> of Peirce - and I disagree with YOUR analysis of Peirce on those same
>> issues. But - you insist that yours alone are right!!
>>
>> Again, in my view, Firstness and Thirdness are not examples of 'the real'
>> - but are modes of organization of thought and the semiosic process [which
>> is thought]. I consider that your use of them to define *reality* moves
>> this reality into 'sensations' - and Peirce rejected this definition of
>> reality as 'nominalism'.
>>
>> His view of reality, to my understanding was "the very origin of the
>> conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the
>> notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite
>> increase in knowledge" 5.311....and this knowledge of the truth or the
>> universal is attainable in the future.
>>
>> As well, he writes, 'generals must have a real existence' 5.312. That
>> 'reality' of the universal or general - is what, in my view, Peirce is
>> talking about when he discusses the term of reality. Again - it has nothing
>> to do with the three categories - which refer to 'representation'.
>>
>> And i also consider that we should clarify the terms of 'real', 'reality'
>> and 'realism'. You chastized me for such a request - telling me that I
>> thereby 'disagree with Peirce'. How is asking for clarification of
>> terminology a 'disagreement with Peirce'???
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <[email protected]>
>> *Sent:* Thursday, September 08, 2016 12:11 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> I trust our fellow List participants to judge for themselves, but I think
>> that a fair reading of my posts would not come close to suggesting that I
>> "hold [my]self up as The Master-Guru-of-Peirce," or have been "arrogant,"
>> or have behaved as if I were "the Ultimate-Master of Peirce." In this
>> thread, I was even careful to state more than once that I was expressing
>> "my understanding of Peirce," although that should really go without
>> saying. The fact that you have a different "reading and analysis of
>> Peirce" does not entail that your resulting views are entirely consistent
>> with HIS views, which are quite clear on these matters as expressed in his
>> voluminous writings. It seems incontrovertible to me that Peirce DID NOT
>> confine the three Categories to "processes of semiosis," DID consider
>> Firstness (after about 1890) and Thirdness (his whole adult life) to be
>> examples of "the real," and DID (repeatedly) define "the real" in precisely
>> the way that I have summarized it (see http://www.commens.org/diction
>> ary/term/real and, for good measure, http://www.commens.org/diction
>> ary/term/existence). Your disagreements on these three points are not
>> merely disagreements with my interpretation of Peirce, they are
>> disagreements with Peirce himself, plain and simple--not that there is
>> anything wrong with that! You have taken *some *ideas from Peirce and
>> developed your *own *system of thought, which is obviously *not *identical
>> to his. Why not simply acknowledge this and move on, rather than being so
>> defensive about it and resorting to name-calling?
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 10:42 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon- I consider that you should not hold yourself up as The
>>> Master-Guru-of-Peirce. You are one person, with your own reading and
>>> analysis of Peirce. I am also one person, with my reading and analysis of
>>> Peirce. We have the right and ability to disagree with our interpretations
>>> of Peirce. Therefore, I object to your declaration, when I disagree with
>>> you - that I therefore ALSO disagree with Peirce. That is merely your view;
>>> it is not necessarily The Truth.
>>>
>>> And your statement that I am 'more than welcome to disagree with Peirce'
>>> is really quite arrogant on your part. You, again, are not the
>>> Ultimate-Master of Peirce.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
>>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
>>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <[email protected]>
>>> *Sent:* Thursday, September 08, 2016 11:17 AM
>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>>>
>>> Edwina, List:
>>>
>>> ET: Actually, my quotes came from that section, but, there is no
>>> evidence that Peirce discarded the Scotus view of realism in later life and
>>> there are plenty of quotes from elsewhere that support it.
>>>
>>>
>>> I never claimed that Peirce "discarded the Scotus view of realism." In
>>> fact, Peirce still calls himself a "scholastic realist" in drafts of "A
>>> Neglected Argument." However, he did write the following in about 1905.
>>>
>>> CSP: Even Duns Scotus is too nominalistic when he says that universals
>>> are contracted to the mode of individuality in singulars, meaning, as he
>>> does, by singulars, ordinary existing things. The pragmaticist cannot
>>> admit that. I myself went too far in the direction of nominalism when I
>>> said that it was a mere question of the convenience of speech whether we
>>> say that a diamond is hard when it is not pressed upon, or whether we say
>>> that it is soft until it is pressed upon. I *now* say that experiment
>>> will prove that the diamond is hard, as a positive fact. That is, it is a
>>> real fact that it *would *resist pressure, which amounts to extreme
>>> scholastic realism. (CP 8.208)
>>>
>>>
>>> He basically says here that his own realism goes *beyond *that of
>>> Scotus, and calls it "*extreme *scholastic realism"! Both "may-bes"
>>> and "would-bes" are real, as well as actual facts.
>>>
>>> ET: Furthermore, the Three Categories are NOT identical with the terms
>>> of 'universal' and 'particular' - even though you seem to use them that way.
>>>
>>>
>>> Where have I ever used the words "universal" and "particular"? I try to
>>> follow Peirce's lead by using "general" for Thirdness and "individual" or
>>> "singular" for Secondness, as well as possible/actual/habitual for the
>>> modalities of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness.
>>>
>>> ET: I consider that the three Categories are processes of semiosis -
>>> period.
>>>
>>>
>>> Then you disagree with Peirce.
>>>
>>> ET: I disagree with your outline that 'Firstness' and 'Thirdness' are
>>> examples of 'the real'.
>>>
>>>
>>> Then you disagree with Peirce.
>>>
>>> ET: I think that a great problem is with the definition of the terms of
>>> 'real', 'reality', 'realism'.
>>>
>>>
>>> Then you disagree with Peirce.
>>>
>>> As I have said before, you are more than welcome to disagree with
>>> Peirce; but then, please do not pretend that your views and terminology are
>>> consistent with his.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>
>>> On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 9:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jon, list
>>>>
>>>> Actually, my quotes came from that section, but, there is no evidence
>>>> that Peirce discarded the Scotus view of realism in later life and there
>>>> are plenty of quotes from elsewhere that support it.
>>>>
>>>> Furthermore, the Three Categories are NOT identical with the terms of
>>>> 'universal' and 'particular' - even though you seem to use them that way. I
>>>> consider that the three Categories are processes of semiosis - period. The
>>>> concept of 'the universal' as the definition of 'reality' is quite another
>>>> outline and analysis. Therefore, I disagree with your outline that
>>>> 'Firstness' and 'Thirdness' are examples of 'the real' . Helmut's
>>>> question, after all, was on the difference between reality and existence.
>>>> And a universal is not a possibility or a habit.
>>>>
>>>> I think that a great problem is with the definition of the terms of
>>>> 'real', 'reality', 'realism'.
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>
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