Jon, list
My use of the term 'universal' refers to its use in the analysis of reality.
i frequently refer to that 4.551 quote about Mind - but, in my view, Mind is
not the same as Thirdness. Thirdness is a semiosic process, one of the three
categorical actions of the actions of Mind - but the two are not identical.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2016 5:19 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Edwina, List:
ET: Now - you are diverting from your original criticism above of my
reference by talking about it instead as 'analysis'. Why didn't you state that
originally rather than reject the 'very paper' as 'too nominalistic'.
You did not use the word "analysis" originally, and I did not mean to imply
that the entire paper should be rejected out of hand as "too nominalistic." My
apologies for being unclear about that; my intended point was simply that
Peirce in 1892 considered his views in 1868 to be "too nominalistic," which
implies that his views became even less nominalistic over time.
ET: Your reference to 5.503 doesn't, in my reading of it, refer to
Firstness or Thirdness as aligned with 'real', realism, reality'. He doesn't
refer to the categories at all in this section - so, I fail to understand your
claim.
Peirce says in that passage that pragmaticism requires, as a prerequsite,
being "convinced that there are real generals." All generals are examples of
Thirdness. Therefore, Peirce held that pragmaticism requires, as a
prerequisite, being convinced that there are real examples of Thirdness; i.e.,
at least some examples of Thirdness are real.
ET: BUT - my understanding of the Peircean definition of reality defines
it as generals or universals [which are not the same as habits in my view]
Habits are generals in Peirce's view, but I will resist the urge to give
multiple citations to this effect. Why are we suddenly talking about
"universals" now?
ET: That is, reality 'exists' [I know you'll object to the word but Peirce
himself uses it with 'reality]...
Yes, he did--but only until he got it clear in his own mind what the
difference is. Why keep repeating his mistake, rather than embracing his
self-correction?
ET: In my view - this removes Thirdness [as well as Firstness] from the
formation of universals because Thirdness, as pointed out above, is a action of
THOUGHT, and a universal is not created by thought. ie, 'the property, the
chaaracter, the predicate hardness, is not invented by men, as the word is, but
is really and truly in the hard things and is one in them all" 1.27ff.
There seems to be an equivocation here on the word "thought." My
recollection is that, in other threads, you have acknowledged--even cited--this
statement by Peirce.
CSP: Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the
work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one
can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes,
etc., of objects are really there. (CP 4.551; 1906)
Here he affirms the reality of both thought (Thirdness) and qualities
(Firstness), but thought is clearly not limited to what happens in the brains
of men (and women). There is hardness, regardless of whether any human being
ever thinks about it; and there are colors and shapes, regardless of whether
any human being ever thinks about them. In Peirce's carefully considered later
terminology, this is precisely what it means to be real--and it is clearly
different from what it means to exist. Hardness, colors, and shapes cannot and
do not exist as such; actual objects that are hard and have specific colors and
shapes can (and do) exist.
In other words, there are real universals, but they do not exist; only
particulars exist. That is my statement, not Peirce's, and I offer it only
because you introduced those terms to the conversation. He would more likely
say that there are real generals, but they do not exist; only individuals (or
singulars) exist.
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 2:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:
Jon - you referred to my original quote from 5.311, wherein I referred to
Peirce's notion of 'community' as
Your latest citations for Peirce's "view of reality" are from an 1868
paper, "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities"; as I already pointed out,
Peirce referenced that very paper in 1892, and explicitly characterized it as
"too nominalistic."
Therefore - you DID refer to that quote as 'nominalistic'. Now - you are
diverting from your original criticism above of my reference by talking about
it instead as 'analysis'. Why didn't you state that originally rather than
reject the 'very paper' as 'too nominalistic'.
Your reference to 5.503 doesn't, in my reading of it, refer to Firstness or
Thirdness as aligned with 'real', realism, reality'. He doesn't refer to the
categories at all in this section - so, I fail to understand your claim.
Now, he DOES, refer to the third category, Thirdness, in 5.436 - "the
category of thought, representation, triadic relation, mediation, genuine
thirdness, thirdness as such - is an essential ingredient of reality yet does
not by itself constitute reality, since this category [which in that cosmology
appears as the element of habit] can have no concrete being without action, as
a separate object on which to work its government, just as action cannot exist
without the immediate being of feeling on which to act".
BUT - my understanding of the Peircean definition of reality defines it as
generals or universals [which are not the same as habits in my view] - and
"the real is that which is not whatever we happen to think of it, but is
unaffected by what we may think of it" 8.12. That is, reality 'exists' [I know
you'll object to the word but Peirce himself uses it with 'reality]...outside
of thought but can be accessed within the 'community of thinkers'.
In my view - this removes Thirdness [as well as Firstness] from the
formation of universals because Thirdness, as pointed out above, is a action of
THOUGHT, and a universal is not created by thought. ie, 'the property, the
chaaracter, the predicate hardness, is not invented by men, as the word is, but
is really and truly in the hard things and is one in them all" 1.27ff.
Again - universals, which are real, are, in my understanding of Peirce,
thus 'knowable' by thought - which uses the Three Categories.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2016 2:37 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Edwina, List:
ET: Jon - the requirement for a community in the analysis of reality
[see 5.311] is hardly a nominalistic outline.
Yes, the community is required for the analysis of reality; but reality
is whatever it is, regardless of that analysis--in fact, regardless of whether
there even is a community to analyze it! What is nominalism, if not the view
that there must be thinkers in order for generals to be real?
ET: I think that, based on the obvious differences of our use of the
terms on this list, that we should clarify what we - and Peirce - meant by
those terms.
That is exactly what I have been trying to do--clarify what Peirce meant
by those terms, and how that differs from what you evidently mean by those
terms. This is not to say that Peirce's usage is some kind of infallible
standard with which all must invariably comply, just that we ought to
acknowledge when and how our usage departs from his.
ET: I don't think that all three terms of 'real, realism and reality'
mean the same thing.
Does anyone? I do think that "real" and "reality" are, at least in most
cases, the adjective and noun that correspond to the same concept. That is why
the Commens Dictionary to which I linked treats Reality as a variant of Real,
such that defining one is sufficient to define both. These three passages, two
rather early and the other very late, summarize the consistent thread that runs
through all of those definitions.
CSP: A real thing is something whose characters are independent of how
any representation represents it to be. Independent, therefore, of how any
number of men think it to be. (W2.439-440; 1870)
CSP: If an object is of whatever character I or any man or men will
have it to be or imagine it, it is a fiction; but if its characters are
independent of what you or I or any number of men think about it, it is a
reality. (W3.58; 1872)
CSP: To say that a thing is Real is merely to say that such predicates
as are true of it, or some of them, are true of it regardless of whatever any
actual person or persons might think concerning that truth. Unconditionality
in that single respect constitutes what we call Reality. (EP 2.456-457; 1911)
On the other hand, "realism" is a particular stance on what qualifies as
"real" or "reality" in this sense, and a "realist" is someone who adopts that
stance. As I quoted previously, Peirce described his view in about 1905 as
"extreme scholastic realism"--the position that not only the actual
(Secondness) is real, but also the possible ("may-be," Firstness) and the
general ("would-be," Thirdness). In fact, Peirce always held that generals are
real; that is precisely what he said it means to be a "scholastic realist,"
extreme or otherwise.
CSP: Hence, before we treat of the evidences of pragmaticism, it will
be needful to weigh the pros and cons of scholastic realism. For pragmaticism
could hardly have entered a head that was not already convinced that there are
real generals. (CP 5.503; c.1905)
Thus it is not "my interpretation" to align these terms--"real,"
"realism," and "reality"--with Firstness and Thirdness; it is what Peirce
himself explicitly did.
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 12:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
wrote:
Jon - the requirement for a community in the analysis of reality [see
5.311] is hardly a nominalistic outline. Indeed, Peirce explains this
requirement repeatedly throughout his works.
I wrote: "And i also consider that we should clarify the terms of
'real', 'reality' and 'realism'. You chastized me for such a request - telling
me that I thereby 'disagree with Peirce'. How is asking for clarification of
terminology a 'disagreement with Peirce'???"...Again - how is asking for
clarification of terminology a 'disagreement with Peirce'?
I think that, based on the obvious differences of our use of the terms
on this list, that we should clarify what we - and Peirce - meant by those
terms. After all - you disagree with my interpretation of them [ telling me
that my quoted references are from an 'old text of Peirce's] and I disagree
with your interpretation of them [i.e., your aligning them with Firstness and
Thirdness]. So- I think the clarification of terms is important. Plus, I don't
think that all three terms of 'real, realism and reality' mean the same thing...
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2016 1:24 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Edwina, List:
In accordance with Stephen's gentle admonition, I will attempt to
refrain from engaging in an "exegetical contest" with you. I provided links to
Peirce's various (but largely consistent) definitions of "real" and
"existence"; did you even read through them before replying? He evidently
tightened up his usage of those terms over time to maintain the distinction
that I have summarized; of what part of those definitions are you still "asking
for clarification"? Your latest citations for Peirce's "view of reality" are
from an 1868 paper, "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities"; as I already
pointed out, Peirce referenced that very paper in 1892, and explicitly
characterized it as "too nominalistic." Perhaps our disagreement is more over
which writings of Peirce, earlier or later, we give more weight in attempting
to ascertain what his views were.
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 11:46 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
wrote:
Jon- you've done it again. The opinions you express on the issues
are your analysis of Peirce; the opinions on these same issues are my analysis
of Peirce - and are not, as you insist, 'my own system of thought' which you
declare that I 'ought to acknowledge'. They are, I repeat, my analysis of
Peirce - and I disagree with YOUR analysis of Peirce on those same issues. But
- you insist that yours alone are right!!
Again, in my view, Firstness and Thirdness are not examples of 'the
real' - but are modes of organization of thought and the semiosic process
[which is thought]. I consider that your use of them to define reality moves
this reality into 'sensations' - and Peirce rejected this definition of reality
as 'nominalism'.
His view of reality, to my understanding was "the very origin of
the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the
notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite
increase in knowledge" 5.311....and this knowledge of the truth or the
universal is attainable in the future.
As well, he writes, 'generals must have a real existence' 5.312.
That 'reality' of the universal or general - is what, in my view, Peirce is
talking about when he discusses the term of reality. Again - it has nothing to
do with the three categories - which refer to 'representation'.
And i also consider that we should clarify the terms of 'real',
'reality' and 'realism'. You chastized me for such a request - telling me that
I thereby 'disagree with Peirce'. How is asking for clarification of
terminology a 'disagreement with Peirce'???
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2016 12:11 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Edwina, List:
I trust our fellow List participants to judge for themselves, but
I think that a fair reading of my posts would not come close to suggesting that
I "hold [my]self up as The Master-Guru-of-Peirce," or have been "arrogant," or
have behaved as if I were "the Ultimate-Master of Peirce." In this thread, I
was even careful to state more than once that I was expressing "my
understanding of Peirce," although that should really go without saying. The
fact that you have a different "reading and analysis of Peirce" does not entail
that your resulting views are entirely consistent with HIS views, which are
quite clear on these matters as expressed in his voluminous writings. It seems
incontrovertible to me that Peirce DID NOT confine the three Categories to
"processes of semiosis," DID consider Firstness (after about 1890) and
Thirdness (his whole adult life) to be examples of "the real," and DID
(repeatedly) define "the real" in precisely the way that I have summarized it
(see http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/real and, for good measure,
http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/existence). Your disagreements on these
three points are not merely disagreements with my interpretation of Peirce,
they are disagreements with Peirce himself, plain and simple--not that there is
anything wrong with that! You have taken some ideas from Peirce and developed
your own system of thought, which is obviously not identical to his. Why not
simply acknowledge this and move on, rather than being so defensive about it
and resorting to name-calling?
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 10:42 AM, Edwina Taborsky
<[email protected]> wrote:
Jon- I consider that you should not hold yourself up as The
Master-Guru-of-Peirce. You are one person, with your own reading and analysis
of Peirce. I am also one person, with my reading and analysis of Peirce. We
have the right and ability to disagree with our interpretations of Peirce.
Therefore, I object to your declaration, when I disagree with you - that I
therefore ALSO disagree with Peirce. That is merely your view; it is not
necessarily The Truth.
And your statement that I am 'more than welcome to disagree
with Peirce' is really quite arrogant on your part. You, again, are not the
Ultimate-Master of Peirce.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2016 11:17 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Edwina, List:
ET: Actually, my quotes came from that section, but, there
is no evidence that Peirce discarded the Scotus view of realism in later life
and there are plenty of quotes from elsewhere that support it.
I never claimed that Peirce "discarded the Scotus view of
realism." In fact, Peirce still calls himself a "scholastic realist" in drafts
of "A Neglected Argument." However, he did write the following in about 1905.
CSP: Even Duns Scotus is too nominalistic when he says
that universals are contracted to the mode of individuality in singulars,
meaning, as he does, by singulars, ordinary existing things. The pragmaticist
cannot admit that. I myself went too far in the direction of nominalism when I
said that it was a mere question of the convenience of speech whether we say
that a diamond is hard when it is not pressed upon, or whether we say that it
is soft until it is pressed upon. I now say that experiment will prove that
the diamond is hard, as a positive fact. That is, it is a real fact that it
would resist pressure, which amounts to extreme scholastic realism. (CP 8.208)
He basically says here that his own realism goes beyond that
of Scotus, and calls it "extreme scholastic realism"! Both "may-bes" and
"would-bes" are real, as well as actual facts.
ET: Furthermore, the Three Categories are NOT identical
with the terms of 'universal' and 'particular' - even though you seem to use
them that way.
Where have I ever used the words "universal" and
"particular"? I try to follow Peirce's lead by using "general" for Thirdness
and "individual" or "singular" for Secondness, as well as
possible/actual/habitual for the modalities of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness.
ET: I consider that the three Categories are processes of
semiosis - period.
Then you disagree with Peirce.
ET: I disagree with your outline that 'Firstness' and
'Thirdness' are examples of 'the real'.
Then you disagree with Peirce.
ET: I think that a great problem is with the definition of
the terms of 'real', 'reality', 'realism'.
Then you disagree with Peirce.
As I have said before, you are more than welcome to disagree
with Peirce; but then, please do not pretend that your views and terminology
are consistent with his.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 9:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky
<[email protected]> wrote:
Jon, list
Actually, my quotes came from that section, but, there is
no evidence that Peirce discarded the Scotus view of realism in later life and
there are plenty of quotes from elsewhere that support it.
Furthermore, the Three Categories are NOT identical with
the terms of 'universal' and 'particular' - even though you seem to use them
that way. I consider that the three Categories are processes of semiosis -
period. The concept of 'the universal' as the definition of 'reality' is quite
another outline and analysis. Therefore, I disagree with your outline that
'Firstness' and 'Thirdness' are examples of 'the real' . Helmut's question,
after all, was on the difference between reality and existence. And a universal
is not a possibility or a habit.
I think that a great problem is with the definition of the
terms of 'real', 'reality', 'realism'.
Edwina
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