Edwina, List: One of the ways in which Peirce derived his categories was by means of phenomenology; or as he called it, phaneroscopy, because it involves examining the phaneron--"the sum of all we have in mind in any way whatever" (EP 2.362). (By the way--is this what you mean by "the analysis of reality"?) Thus, in that *specific *sense, we can *loosely *say that all three categories *pertain *to mind or thought; after all, we can and do routinely think *about *Firstness and Secondness, as well as Thirdness. But that is obviously not what I mean when I say that mind *itself *or thought *itself *IS Thirdness. I trust that no one will dispute that Peirce clearly and consistently affirmed all three of the following propositions.
- All thought takes place by means of signs. - Every sign represents an object to an interpretant. - Representation is (only) Thirdness. It follows deductively that all thought is (only) Thirdness. Note that in the third bullet, I use the word *representation *as distinguished by Peirce from *quality *(Firstness) and *relation *or *reaction *(Secondness)--not "representations," which could just be a synonym for "signs." I am well aware that a sign, both in itself and in its relations, can be classified in any of the three categories. However, when it comes to the interpretants, only those that are classified under Thirdness are possible, actual, or habitual *thoughts*; feelings correspond to Firstness, and actions correspond to Secondness. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Clark, list: yes, that's my point. I disagree with Jon with his > confinement of Thought to Thirdness. I consider that Mind, which is > 'thought', is an action of all three categories. To focus on Thirdness as > Thought, which, again, to my understanding, is Jon's view - is more akin to > Hegel. All three cognitive modes are 'the semiosic process', i.e., the > action of reason, of thought. > > Thirdness is an action of habit formation, i.e., of generalization, of > 'predicate formation' 5.102. Obviously, it is a necessary action in the > formation of an actualization, a discrete unit, but I consider that thought > requires all three modes. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Clark Goble <[email protected]> > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Friday, September 09, 2016 4:52 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > On Sep 8, 2016, at 3:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > > My use of the term 'universal' refers to its use in the analysis of > reality. > > i frequently refer to that 4.551 quote about Mind - but, in my view, Mind > is not the same as Thirdness. Thirdness is a semiosic process, one of the > three categorical actions of the actions of Mind - but the two are not > identical. > > I remain convinced that some terms are used in such a variety of > incompatible ways in philosophical history that they come to have a baggage > that makes them perfect tools of confusion. I suspect mind is one of those > terms. Quite frequently I wish we could do away with the term entirely. For > all the problem of neologisms in philosophy (including Peirce’s own use of > them at times) they do avoid that baggage. > > Your point is very important. I can’t recall if someone quoted it already > but this quote of Peirce’s is useful. “I desire to defend the three > Categories as the three irreducible and only constituents of thought.” (EP > 2.165 “The Categories Defended”) > >
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