Jon, list: This is the bizarre one:
- Representation is (only) Thirdness. Where, exactly, does Peirce state this? Give me the name, date and serial number! :) Best, Jerry R On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 8:07 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Gary- enjoy your weekend. Hope the weather cools down a bit. > > Yes, the vitality of Thirdness in its three forms [3-3, 3-2, 3-1] > shouldn't be overlooked. But, in your example of 'genuine Thirdness',..... > this means that the triad of O-R; R-R; R-I, are ALL in the mode of > Thirdness. This is Peirce's tenth class, the Argument, i.e., a syllogism. > All three Relations are in the mode of Thirdness. But our phenomenological > world doesn't operate within only this one class! > > When Peirce was referring to the 'genuine form' 8.332, he was referring to > the category of 3-3, rather than the 'two distinct grades of degeneracy > [3-1, 3-2] > > But, Secondness can enter into the interaction [3-2]; or a vague idea > [3-1]...And, in the actions of Mind - which is Thought - we will find pure > triads of Firstness, as well as indexical and dicent interactions....all of > them, operating within the complex process of Mind/Thought. > > I think we have to distinguish between 'Mind', 'thinking', 'cognition'. > > Now - can Mind operate without Thirdness? Obviously not. But since Mind is > constantly thinking and interacting with existentialities and evolving - > then, it can't operate without the other two categories as well. That is my > reason for rejecting that thought is only Thirdness. Thought is a triadic > semiosis - and requires not only all three Relations [R-O; R-R; R-I] but > also all three modal categories. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Friday, September 09, 2016 8:15 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > Jon, Edwina, list, > > About to head off for a weeklong "wellness retreat" in the Catskills, I > have only time to suggest that in this discussion that the notion of > genuine (vs. degenerate) 3ns should be kept in mind. > > 1903 | CSP's Lowell Lectures of 1903. 2nd Part of 3rd Draught of Lecture > III | CP 1.537 Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the > third are all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect > to one another they are first, second, and third. [—] The third is thought > in its role as governing Secondness. It brings the information into the > mind, or determines the idea and gives it body. It is informing thought, or > *cognition*. *But take away the psychological or accidental human > element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a sign > *(emphasis > added GR). > > 1904 | Letters to Lady Welby | CP 8.332 > > In its genuine form, Thirdness is the triadic relation existing between a > sign, its object, and the interpreting thought, itself a sign, considered > as constituting the mode of being of a sign. > http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/thirdness > > Best, > > Gary R > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com > > wrote: > >> Edwina, List: >> >> One of the ways in which Peirce derived his categories was by means of >> phenomenology; or as he called it, phaneroscopy, because it involves >> examining the phaneron--"the sum of all we have in mind in any way >> whatever" (EP 2.362). (By the way--is this what you mean by "the analysis >> of reality"?) Thus, in that *specific *sense, we can *loosely *say that >> all three categories *pertain *to mind or thought; after all, we can and >> do routinely think *about *Firstness and Secondness, as well as >> Thirdness. But that is obviously not what I mean when I say that mind >> *itself >> *or thought *itself *IS Thirdness. I trust that no one will dispute that >> Peirce clearly and consistently affirmed all three of the following >> propositions. >> >> - All thought takes place by means of signs. >> - Every sign represents an object to an interpretant. >> - Representation is (only) Thirdness. >> >> It follows deductively that all thought is (only) Thirdness. Note that >> in the third bullet, I use the word *representation *as distinguished by >> Peirce from *quality *(Firstness) and *relation *or *reaction >> *(Secondness)--not >> "representations," which could just be a synonym for "signs." I am well >> aware that a sign, both in itself and in its relations, can be classified >> in any of the three categories. However, when it comes to the >> interpretants, only those that are classified under Thirdness are possible, >> actual, or habitual *thoughts*; feelings correspond to Firstness, and >> actions correspond to Secondness. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> Clark, list: yes, that's my point. I disagree with Jon with his >>> confinement of Thought to Thirdness. I consider that Mind, which is >>> 'thought', is an action of all three categories. To focus on Thirdness as >>> Thought, which, again, to my understanding, is Jon's view - is more akin to >>> Hegel. All three cognitive modes are 'the semiosic process', i.e., the >>> action of reason, of thought. >>> >>> Thirdness is an action of habit formation, i.e., of generalization, of >>> 'predicate formation' 5.102. Obviously, it is a necessary action in the >>> formation of an actualization, a discrete unit, but I consider that thought >>> requires all three modes. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> >>> *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU> >>> *Sent:* Friday, September 09, 2016 4:52 PM >>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking >>> >>> On Sep 8, 2016, at 3:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: >>> >>> My use of the term 'universal' refers to its use in the analysis of >>> reality. >>> >>> i frequently refer to that 4.551 quote about Mind - but, in my view, >>> Mind is not the same as Thirdness. Thirdness is a semiosic process, one of >>> the three categorical actions of the actions of Mind - but the two are not >>> identical. >>> >>> I remain convinced that some terms are used in such a variety of >>> incompatible ways in philosophical history that they come to have a baggage >>> that makes them perfect tools of confusion. I suspect mind is one of those >>> terms. Quite frequently I wish we could do away with the term entirely. For >>> all the problem of neologisms in philosophy (including Peirce’s own use of >>> them at times) they do avoid that baggage. >>> >>> Your point is very important. I can’t recall if someone quoted it >>> already but this quote of Peirce’s is useful. “I desire to defend the three >>> Categories as the three irreducible and only constituents of thought.” (EP >>> 2.165 “The Categories Defended”) >>> >>> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. 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