Clark, List: CG: ... overall I suspect we agree that an example of firstness can be the object in an example of thirdness or mediation.
Well, I certainly agree; this is what I had in mind when I said that we can and do think *about *Firstness and Secondness, but thought *itself *is always still Thirdness. Or, as Peirce said in what you quoted ... CSP: Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or thought ... But take away the psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a sign. I am still hoping that Edwina will clarify our disagreement by identifying which of my bullets does NOT accurately state Peirce's view. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Sep 12, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: > On Sep 10, 2016, at 8:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Thank you for sharing these helpful reflections. As others have pointed > out before, how we talk about the categories depends on what type of > analysis we are performing. I am content to accept your correction of my > third bullet. > > - All thought takes place by means of signs. > - Every sign mediates between an object and an interpretant. > - Mediation is always Thirdness. > > Therefore, all thought is always Thirdness. Since Edwina presumably still > disagrees, I remain interested in learning from her which of the three > bullets she believes is NOT an accurate statement of Peirce's view. > > While I know Edwina has some differences from some other list members on > certain foundational ways of reading Peirce, I suspect this is much more a > semantic issue. That is I suspect there’s far less disagreement here than > it appears. > > Mediation can be mediation from 1stness or 2cdness. Such as how we think > of a reaction outside of ourselves or react to a qualia. > > Let us proceed in the same way with Thirdness. We have here a first, a > second, and a third. The first is a positive qualitative possibility, in > itself nothing more. The second is an existent thing without any mode of > being less than existence, but determined by that first. A *third* has a > mode of being which consists in the Secondnesses that it determines, the > mode of being of a law, or concept. Do not confound this with the ideal > being of a quality in itself. A quality is something capable of being > completely embodied. A law never can be embodied in its character as a law > except by determining a habit. A quality is how something may or might have > been. A law is how an endless future must continue to be. > > Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all > three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one another > they are first, second, and third. The first is thought in its capacity as > mere possibility; that is, mere *mind* capable of thinking, or a mere > vague idea. The *second* is thought playing the role of a Secondness, or > event. That is, it is of the general nature of *experience* or > *information.* The third is thought in its role as governing Secondness. > It brings the information into the mind, or determines the idea and gives > it body. It is informing thought, or *cognition.* But take away the > psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we > see the operation of a sign. > > Every sign stands for an object independent of itself; but it can only be > a sign of that object in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a > sign or thought. For the sign does not affect the object but is affected by > it; so that the object must be able to convey thought, that is, must be of > the nature of thought or of a sign. Every thought is a sign. But in the > first degree of degeneracy the Thirdness affects the object, so that this > is not of the nature of a Thirdness — not so, at least, as far as this > operation of degenerate Thirdness is concerned. It is that the third brings > about a Secondness but does not regard that Secondness as anything more > than a fact. In short it is the operation of executing an *intention.* In > the last degree of degeneracy of Thirdness, there is thought, but no > conveyance or embodiment of thought at all. It is merely that a fact of > which there must be, I suppose, something like knowledge is *apprehended* > according > to a possible idea. There is an *instigation* without any *prompting.* For > example, you look at something and say, "It is red." Well, I ask you what > justification you have for such a judgment. You reply, "I *saw* it was > red." Not at all. You saw nothing in the least like that. You saw an image. > There was no subject or predicate in it. It was just one unseparated image, > not resembling a proposition in the smallest particular. It instigated you > to your judgment, owing to a possibility of thought; but it never told you > so. Now in all imagination and perception there is such an operation by > which thought springs up; and its only justification is that it > subsequently turns out to be useful. > *1903 - CP 1.536-8 - Lowell Lectures: Lecture III, Volume 2, 3d Draught* > > An earlier quote might be helpful. > > A quality of feeling is perfectly simple, in itself; though a > quality thought over and thus mixed with other elements, may be compared > with others and analyzed. A quality of feeling, in itself, is no object and > is attached to no object. It is a mere tone of consciousness. But qualities > of feeling may be attached to objects. A quality of feeling, in itself, has > no generality; but it is susceptible of generalization without losing > its character; and indeed all the qualities of feeling we are able to > recognize are more or less generalized. (CP 7.530; undated) > > My sense is that it is this move to generalization that we’re disagreeing > upon. However my sense is that it’s largely a disagreement over terminology > rather than phenomena. While I have some differences with Edwina if I > understand her correctly, overall I suspect we agree that an example of > firstness can be the object in an example of thirdness or mediation. Indeed > when we think about pure feeling we are treating them in just such a > mediated fashion. > > I swear there was a Peirce quote that made this explicit but for the life > of me I can’t seem to find it and don’t have time to look further. i.e. a > place where Peirce talks of a feeling before consciousness and how in > thinking of it we bring it into mediation. >
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