Hi Ben U., Gary R., List,
Responses interpolated: JD: Conclusion: The humble argument for the Reality of God is logical in all three senses--according to the assurance of instinct, experience and according to the exact requirements of good logical form. We should remember, however, that this is not a claim that the conclusion of the argument is true. Rather, the claim is that the conclusion is plausible. [End quote] BU: The claim is rather that the conclusion is 1. plausible (assurance by instinct) *and* 2. verisimilar (in Peirce's sense, likeness of conclusion to premisses, the assurance by experience when experience has accumulated but is not yet conclusive), *and* 3. formally valid. Abductive formal validity, if it does not include plausibility (instinctual assurance), still includes at least critical abductive formal validity (the abductive inference can be put into the form of rule, result, ergo case, or into the form of CP 5.189, or into whatever other form is accounted good for abduction at the critical level, i.e., the level of critique of arguments. JD: Yes, I agree. BU: In addition, in your paragraph beginning "Major premiss", you listed a series of _methodeutical_ (not critique-of-argument) justifications for an abductive inference, such as testability (I'll just discuss testability for simplicity's sake). Indeed Peirce came to regard methodeutical justifications as needed for completing the justification (i.e., validation) of an abductive inference, whereas no particular methodeutical justification was needed for a deduction or an induction to be valid (Carnegie Application, L75, 1902, New Elements of Mathematics v. 4, pp. 37–38. http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-carnegie-institution-correspondence-0 ). JD: I am suggesting that the methodeutical requirements for abduction that pertain to the first rule of reason, the principle of continuity and the pragmatic maxim do provide something by way of a justification for the validity of those abductive inferences that satisfy--in some degree, perhaps--the methological requirements. BU: But I wonder whether the methodeutical justification can be considered assurance by (logical) form. Is it _assurance_ at all? That a claim is testable in principle (idioscopically or otherwise) gives some kind of assurance versus claims that are untestable in principle or uncertain as to whether they're testable in principle. Yet such assurance in whatever degree is assurance not per se _of truth_ but of pragmatic meaningfulness, and that pragmatic meaningfulness is not in turn a source per se of assurance of truth, but only of the methodeutical possibility of reaching some sort of truth. That seems the case, even though a claim that is pragmatically meaningless (its object is uninvestigable, incognizable) even in principle amounts to a false claim that something unreal is real. (Meanwhile a claim's testability or untestability in merely our foreseeable practical future lends it little if any assurance that it is true/false or pragmatically meaningless in principle). The three assurances (instinct, experience, form) belong to a trichotomy of kinds of sign in at least one of Peirce's ten-trichotomy systems. I admit that I wouldn't know what to do with an assurance that something is pragmatically meaningful in that regard, if it is not a kind of assurance by form. Quote | Abduction | Commens<http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-carnegie-institution-correspondence-0> www.commens.org Entry in the Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms | Abduction | Commens: Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce JD: I think this passage from "The Neglected Argument..." bears on the question you are raising about the relationship between these methodeutical matters and the different sorts of assurance--by instinct, experience and form--for abductive inferences. Every inquiry whatsoever takes its rise in the observation, in one or another of the three Universes, of some surprising phenomenon, some experience which either disappoints an expectation, or breaks in upon some habit of expectation of the inquisiturus; and each apparent exception to this rule only confirms it. There are obvious distinctions between the objects of surprise in different cases; but throughout this slight sketch of inquiry such details will be unnoticed, especially since any normal man who considers the three Universes in the light of the hypothesis of it is upon such that the logic-books descant. The inquiry begins with pondering these phenomena in all their aspects, in the search of some point of view whence the wonder shall be resolved. At length a conjecture arises that furnishes a possible Explanation, by which I mean a syllogism exhibiting the surprising fact as necessarily consequent upon the circumstances of its occurrence together with the truth of the credible conjecture, as premisses. On account of this Explanation, the inquirer is led to regard his conjecture, or hypothesis, with favor. As I phrase it, he provisionally holds it to be "Plausible"; this acceptance ranges in different cases -- and reasonably so -- from a mere expression of it in the interrogative mood, as a question meriting attention and reply, up through all appraisals of Plausibility, to uncontrollable inclination to believe. The whole series of mental performances between the notice of the wonderful phenomenon and the acceptance of the hypothesis, during which the usually docile understanding seems to hold the bit between its teeth and to have us at its mercy, the search for pertinent circumstances and the laying hold of them, sometimes without our cognizance, the scrutiny of them, the dark laboring, the bursting out of the startling conjecture, the remarking of its smooth fitting to the anomaly, as it is turned back and forth like a key in a lock, and the final estimation of its Plausibility, I reckon as composing the First Stage of Inquiry. Its characteristic formula of reasoning I term Retroduction, i.e. reasoning from consequent to antecedent. In one respect the designation seems inappropriate; for in most instances where conjecture mounts the high peaks of Plausibility -- and is really most worthy of confidence -- the inquirer is unable definitely to formulate just what the explained wonder is; or can only do so in the light of the hypothesis. In short, it is a form of Argument rather than of Argumentation. CP 6.469 In many cases, we are able formulate a number of competing hypotheses that might explain some surprising phenomena. In other cases, however, the hypotheses that are able to satisfy the requirements of valid abduction are quite limited in number. I suspect that, in the case at hand, we are presented with something that is akin to what Kant calls a "need" of reason. In this case, where we seek an explanation that might be sufficient to bring unity to the three Universes into unity, the requirements for a plausible explanation are quite demanding--and it appears that only one key will fit the lock. After all, only one Ideal can, it would seem, really be highest. As this point, let me offer a suggestion that draws on some remarks that Peirce makes about the Idea of the Absolute. As in projective geometry, where we call the point on the infinitely distant horizon where all lines of "perspectivity" converge the "Absolute," so too in philosophy, we need something that will enable us to ground the different standards we might use in evaluating the validity of the different forms of argument. In this case, the grounding is an "Absolute" Ideal that might enable us to see how the different standards for measuring the validity of arguments might be mapped--one onto another. --Jeff On 9/23/2016 2:32 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: Hi Gary R., Ben U., List, Yes, with respect to " Ben's "quibble" to the effect that "Peirce said that every mental action has the form of a valid inference, not that every inference is valid as a pattern of inference", the point is well taken. We'll see if any of the critics of the Humble or the larger Neglected Argument want to take up the question raised at the end of the post. For my part, I don't think that Dennett or Dawkins have much to offer by way of a response to the question. Here are two options that are open to a critic: (1) offer an alternate hypothesis that can perform the grand totalizing and synthesizing function that has traditionally be supplied by a conception of a personal God that, in his Ideas and Ideals, embodies and gives life to all of the laws of logic, metaphysics and nature. Or, (2) reject the need for such a grant totalizing and synthesizing hypotheses. One of Peirce's points is that many thoughtful and reflective human beings (such as Plato and Emerson) have recognized the need for the Ideas and Ideals embodied in this sort of hypothesis--and Peirce recognizes the same need. He is asking each of us to reflect on some basic operations of our own feelings, imagination and thought, and then ask ourselves--do we recognize a similar need? Like Schiller, I think the aim of further cultivating our habits of feeling, action that thought does indeed seem to call out for the kinds of Ideas and Ideals that will be sufficient to offer us hope as we seek to bring the conflicting tendencies in our personal and social lives into better harmony. Whether we call that embodied system of Ideas and Ideals "Nature" or "God" matters little to me--so long as we grow to appreciate the Beauty, Goodness and Truth of its Divine character. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Gary Richmond Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:56 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking Ben, Jeff, List, Ben, I think your 'quibble' is well taken, and I agree with your analysis. Jeff, I'm hoping that critics of the 'Humble Argument' as well as the N.A. as a whole will respond to the good question at the end of your post: JD: So, let us ask: does this hypothesis involving the conception of God involve some kind of confusion on our part about the real character of the inference, or does it rest on false premisses? Peirce's essay on "The Neglected Argument" is a sustained effort to show that neither of these is the case. As such, it is a reasonable hypothesis. Is the same true of the alternate hypotheses? Best, Gary R [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 12:48 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: Jeff, Edwina, list, I've just a few quibbles, nothing major. Jeff, you wrote: Every inference is, in one way or another, valid as a pattern of inference, including those that are instinctive. Those that appear to be invalid are patterns of inference that are, themselves, valid, but the appearance of invalidity is really due to the fact that we have misunderstood what kind of inference it is (e.g., we think it is inductive, when it is really abductive). Or, the apparent invalidity is really just a lack of soundness in that something in the premisses involves an error on our part and it is really false. [End quote] Some of that is very close to what Peirce said in his articles in _Journal of Speculative Philosophy_ in 1868, but with a decisive difference. Peirce said that every mental action has the form of a valid inference, not that every inference is valid as a pattern of inference. In "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," he said: It is a consequence, then, of the first two principles whose results we are to trace out, that we must, as far as we can, without any other supposition than that the mind reasons, reduce all mental action to the formula of valid reasoning. [CP 5.266, W 2:214, http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/conseq/cn-frame.htm<http://www.iupui.edu/%7Earisbe/menu/library/bycsp/conseq/cn-frame.htm> Yes, invalidity of inference arises from mistaking what kind of inference it is - where "it" refers to the mental action. But saying that every inference is valid as a pattern of inference sounds confusingly like saying that there is no invalid inference. An unsound deduction is unsound by virtue (or should I say 'vice') of a falsehood in the premisses, an invalidity in the deductive form, or both. A valid deduction is unsound if it has one or more false premisses, and is necessarily unsound if there is an inconsistency (a.k.a. necessary falsehood) in a premiss or among premisses. A 'forward-only' deduction can be valid and unsound yet true in its conclusion, e.g., Socrates is a cro-magnon, all cro-magnons are mortal, ergo Socrates is mortal. (A particularly vacuous example, based on a necessarily false conjunction of premisses, is: p&~p, ergo p or ~p.) It's difficult to think of a deduction whose seeming invalidity boils down to the occurrence of something contingently or necessarily false in its premisses, maybe that difficulty is what Edwina was getting at in her reply (I haven't had time to catch up with this thread). Anyway, whether one can explain seeming invalidity as unsoundness in non-deductive inference modes depends I guess on how one defines validity and soundness for them. Best, Ben On 9/21/2016 5:06 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: Hello Jon, List, The argument you are trying to reconstruct could be fleshed out more fully in a number of ways. Here are a few suggestions for filling in some of the details a bit more: Major premiss: Every inference is, in one way or another, valid as a pattern of inference, including those that are instinctive. Those that appear to be invalid are patterns of inference that are, themselves, valid, but the appearance of invalidity is really due to the fact that we have misunderstood what kind of inference it is (e.g., we think it is inductive, when it is really abductive). Or, the apparent invalidity is really just a lack of soundness in that something in the premisses involves an error on our part and it is really false. As a form of inference, every retroductive conjecture that meets certain conditions (e.g., it responds to a question occasioned by real doubt, it is really explanatory, it is possible to deduce consequences that can be put to the test, it is possible to make inductive inferences that will tend to show the hypotheses is confirmed or disconfirmed by observations, the observations that will be used to test the hypothesis are not the same observations that will be used to make the inductive inference, etc.) is a valid abductive inference--and hence has a logical character. Such arguments can, in time, be the subject of further development in arguments that are more fully under our conscious control. As such, they can be made into logical inferences that may rise up to higher levels of assurance, including those of experience as well as form. Minor premiss: The humble argument for the Reality of God is a retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason. What is more, it has in fact be met with the support of large communities of inquirers at different times and places in human history and culture. In fact, it appears that the core inferential patterns in the argument are prevalent in the thought of virtually all reasonable human beings. Over time, different communities have developed the instinctive hypothesis in a number of different ways, but the core ideas seem to cut across all such communities--including those communities that are quite spiritual in orientation as well as those that claim to be less spiritual in orientation. Setting aside the particularities of how the conceptions have been developed in different human communities, and focusing on the core ideas that appear to be held in common, we can see that those core ideas can be developed into hypotheses that can be affirmed in a responsible and self-controlled manner by those who are deeply infused by the desire to learn and who have a relatively refined sense of how to conduct their inquires according to experimental methods. Conclusion: The humble argument for the Reality of God is logical in all three senses--according to the assurance of instinct, experience and according to the exact requirements of good logical form. We should remember, however, that this is not a claim that the conclusion of the argument is true. Rather, the claim is that the conclusion is plausible. While it may lack something by way of security, it possesses much by way of uberty. In fact, our experience shows that this grand hypothesis--which serves a remarkable totalizing and synthesizing role in the great economy of our ideas--both within the realm of our long growing commitments of common sense and in our most cutting edge inquiries in the special sciences--has shown and continues to show great uberty in the way that it informs the healthy growth of our aesthetic feelings, our ethical practices and in the ongoing logical growth of our thought. So, let us ask: does this hypothesis involving the conception of God involve some kind of confusion on our part about the real character of the inference, or does it rest on false premisses? Peirce's essay on "The Neglected Argument" is a sustained effort to show that neither of these is the case. As such, it is a reasonable hypothesis. Is the same true of the alternate hypotheses? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2016 12:24 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
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