Mike, List: Here is the most pertinent portion of R 1343 that I have transcribed so far. It appears on pages 11-17 of the manuscript.
Classification is one of the subjects of which Logic has to treat. We must here confine ourselves to such considerations as are almost axiomatic and are indispensible for framing a natural classification of the sciences. Every class is constituted and held together by a concept or idea expressed in its definition. Every arrangement of ideas is itself an idea. Consequently, every classification whatever is governed by an idea, however loose and incongruous it may be. A natural classification, that is to say, a birth-al classification, is a classification whose governing idea coincides with the idea which determines the things classified to exist. An idea, so far as it has any relation to life, is a possible purpose. Therefore the spirit of this work requires us here to regard a natural classification as a classification that conforms to the purpose, or quasi-purpose, of the existence of the objects classified. In case we know what that purpose is, as we should, for example, if we were drawing up a classification of vehicles, it will be a comparatively easy thing,—though none too easy even in that case,—to ascertain approximately the natural classification. Should there be no human purpose, there may, nevertheless, be an evolutionary agency that acts like a purpose, or there may [be] a principle similar to such agency except that it is related, not to a temporal, but to a logical sequence of results. If a natural classification is to be possible, something of that description there must be. Our comprehension of such a principle will be imperfect. It will suffice to enable us to begin a sketch of a natural classification, but not to carry it out. Where such comprehension of the origins of the species to be classified abandons us, we can often derive important aid from the doctrine of probabilities, which teaches us how fortuitous, that is, unintended, characters distribute themselves. It will be demonstrated in the chapter on classification that two closely related natural classes are not, in general, separated by sharp lines of demarcation, so that there will be forms any one of which might, as far as the essential characters of those classes serve to discriminate them, belong either to the one or to the other of the two natural classes. But in such cases it will often be found upon investigation that there are other characters, more or less accidental, which may aid us in referring the forms to their true classes. For example, Prof. Petrie found in the town of Naucratis some hundred and eighty standard weights. The calculus of probabilities applied to their weight-values proves that they were intended to conform to five different quasi-prototypes; but many of the weights, owing to the imperfection of their manufacture, have intermediate values, so that, as far as this governing intended character goes, it would be impossible to say to which standard any one such intermediate weight was intended to conform. But if we take into consideration their shapes, their material, and the perfection of their execution, characters in regard to which there was no distinctive intention, much may be done toward assigning the individual weights to their intended classes. Every purpose, although it relates to action upon an individual subject is in itself general. In the inception of its first fulfillment, whether in reality or in imagination, it is broadly general and simple. But in the process of working itself out, it necessarily becomes successively more and more definite and complex, and each of these determinations may usually take one or other of several forms. Thus, when primitive man first found that he needed clothing in winter, his original and principal purpose may have been to keep warm. But when he came to cut his garment, it may have occurred to him that its appearance would make some impression on those who saw him; and then he might adopt as a *secondary* purpose that of attracting his friends or that of scaring his enemies. Moreover, the attainment of a purpose usually involves the solution of a problem. There are conditions that have to be fulfilled; and the fulfillment of these becomes a *subordinate* purpose. When we come to study the matter more closely, we shall find that there are several different categories of secondary and subordinate purpose. These categories of purpose must be categories of every system of natural classification, so far as that classification expresses the development of a purpose working upon a unvarying condition of matter, or working upon conditions whose gradual changes and revolutions are sufficiently slow to allow of the purpose taking its full development. In some form they must appear in every natural classification,—be it of dances or be it of battles; or at least, so one may presume. But that form can hardly fail to be very different in case nothing interferes with the prosecution of a purpose and in case plans are liable to be deranged or frustrated at every step by unexpected emergencies. These categories must be expected to show themselves not only in true natural classification, but also in mistaken attempts at natural classification,—sometimes even more clearly. For they have their origin in the necessary relations between thoughts and their objects; and these affect the operations of the human mind, even when it is most illogical, quite as clearly as the do those of nature. All this, however, as here stated, is vague in the extreme; and even granting that it is true, leaves us quite in the dark as to helpfulness of a further knowledge of the categories in drawing up a scheme of natural classification. Moreover, while enough has been said to excite a presumption that there are some such categories, yet even this is not made out with certainty. It will be the part of good sense to leave such matters entirely out of account until the frame-work of our classification is nearly or quite complete, and to avoid the "high priori" method. Regards, Jon On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 3:43 PM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com> wrote: > Also see Peirce discussing the difference between logical classification > and natural classification in "Triadomany", CP 1.568-572 > http://www.textlog.de/4336.html > > Best, Ben > > On 9/29/2016 2:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Mike, List: > > Glad to be of service! In the meantime, you might review Peirce's > extensive discussion of "natural classes" and "natural classification" at > CP 1.203-231. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 11:40 AM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote: > >> Fantastic, Jon. That would be most helpful, especially since that is >> "new" information. >> Mike >> >> On 9/29/2016 11:32 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: >> >> Mike, List: >> >> As it happens, I am currently in the process of reading and transcribing >> R 1343, "Of the Classification of the Sciences, Second Paper, Of the >> Practical Sciences," once again thanks to the SPIN project ( >> http://fromthepage.com/collection/show?collection_id=16). So far, about >> 40 pages into it, it presents instead a classification of instincts; but if >> I remember right, it also includes some discussion about principles of >> classification. I do not have my in-progress transcription with me at the >> office, but if I get a chance this evening, I will review it and post >> anything relevant that I find. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 11:22 AM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Hi List, >>> >>> Ben Udell recently quoted from this Peirce memoir: >>> >>> MEMOIR 27: OF METHODEUTIC >>> >>> [....] >>> >>> From Draft B - MS L75.279-280 >>> >>> [....] Two other problems of methodeutic which the old logics usually >>> made almost its only business are, first, the principles of definition, and >>> of rendering ideas clear; and second, the principles of classification. >>> [End quote] >>> >>> I have only found spotty references by Peirce to the "principles of >>> classification" in my own online resources. Would anyone on the list care >>> (Edwina ? :) ) to provide any of their own known citations? >>> >>> Thanks in advance, >>> >>> Mike >>> >>
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