Edwina, list:
haha! It just hit me that
(*B*, that which goes from surprise to suspect is true)
can be re-written as:
(*B*, Hence, *there is* *reason* to suspect is true).
That is, B = reasons, accounts, justifications, support for interpretant
(what the commens says).
For example,
B = "Consider what effects..." is one justification or account, whereas,
B = CP 5.189 is an alternative one, the best one, and the best one because
one two three... C A B... esthetics ethics logic... spiritedness desire
reason...
icon index symbol... object sign interpretant... First Second Third...
CP 5.189 is the inference to the best explanation for
pragmaticism/pragmatic maxim because reasons given in uberty. And it works
with the following:
*If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see that it
is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction. *
*That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render
needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as
hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful
suggestions; and, furthermore, this is all that the maxim of pragmatism
really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is
not understood as a proposition in psychology.*
Best,
Jerry Rhee
On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 7:31 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Edwina, list:
>
>
>
> I apologize if I missed something but what you just stated was basically
> all only generals.
>
>
>
> What I am asking for is to apply those generals to the question of the
> pragmatic maxim and provide the argumentation, that is, the specific
> premisses (e.g., what is the object or original stimuli?).
>
>
>
> That is,
>
>
>
> 1)* If* the pragmatic maxim is the object,
>
> *then* what is the representamen and what the interpretant?
>
>
>
> 2)* If* the pragmatic maxim is the representamen/index,
>
> *then* what is the object/icon and what the interpretant/symbol?
>
>
>
> _________
>
>
>
> Here is a clearer way of putting things. You said:
>
>
>
> The Object of a syllogism is the minor premise (the surprising fact, *C*,
> is observed...)
>
>
>
> the Representamen is the major premise (But if *A* were...)
>
>
>
> the Interpretant is the Conclusion. (*B*, that which goes from surprise
> to suspect is true).
>
>
>
> So, is the following correct? If not, please correct me.
>
>
>
> 1) *C = pragmatic maxim*
>
> A = Consider what effects…
>
> B = lots of freedom for what I can conceive about which you will
> deny
>
>
>
> or,
>
>
>
> 2) C = pragmaticism
>
> *A = pragmatic maxim*
>
> B = Consider what effects…
>
>
>
> For case 2), do you see why I object to “Consider what effects…”?
>
> It doesn’t fully/wholly/completely capture the essence of pragmaticism,
> e.g., things like the categories, of which there are three; ordinality,
> philosophy of Socrates, the commens, convergence to truth, etc...
>
>
>
> Best,
> Jerry Rhee
>
>
>
> Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you
> conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, *your* conception
> of those effects is the whole of *your *conception of the *object*.
>
> On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 7:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Gary R., List:
>>
>> Thanks for the reminders about Sheriff's book; it was one of my first
>> introductions to Peirce's thought, and I even re-read it recently, but I
>> need to review the portions that you mentioned in light of the discussions
>> in this thread. Thanks also for the additional information on the role of
>> the categories in Peirce's classification of the sciences.
>>
>> GR: I would tend to disagree with you, Jon, that this ur-continutiy is
>> "creat*ed*" 3ns; rather, I see it as "creat*ive*" 3ns as distinguished
>> from the 3ns that become the habits and laws of a created universe. So, in
>> a word, my view is that only these laws and habits are the 'created' 3nses.
>>
>>
>> As I said, taking the blackboard to be created Thirdness is no more than
>> a working hypothesis at this point. If the diagram is confined to the
>> blackboard itself, as Peirce's description seems to indicate, then your
>> characterization makes more sense. I am still toying with a couple of
>> other alternatives, as well.
>>
>> GR: How can one deny Peirce's own words here?
>>
>>
>> Yes, any alleged "reading" or "interpretation" that directly contradicts
>> what an author explicitly states in the text is obviously untenable.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, Edwina, Gary F, Soren, List,
>>>
>>> John Sheriff, in *Charles Peirce's Guess at the Riddle: Grounds for
>>> Human Significance*, in commenting on what Peirce calls the "pure zero"
>>> state (which, in my thinking, is roughly equivalent to the later blackboard
>>> metaphor) quotes Peirce as follows: "So of potential being there was in
>>> that initial state no lack" (CP 6.217) and continues, " 'Potential', in
>>> Peirce's usage, means indeterminate yet capable of determination in any
>>> specific case" (CP 6.185-86) [Sheriff, 4). This "potential being" is, then,
>>> decidedly *not *the "nothing of negation," but rather "the germinal
>>> nothing, in which the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed" (CP
>>> 6.217).
>>>
>>> Sheriff had just prior to this written: "Peirce frequently drew the
>>> parallel between his theory and the Genesis account" and discusses this in
>>> a longish paragraph. I think it is possible to overemphasize this
>>> "parallel" (and, as I've commented here in the past, Peirce's "pure
>>> zero"--or ur-continuity in the blackboard metaphor--seems to me closer to
>>> the Kemetic *Nun *in the dominant Ancient Egyptian creation myth; while
>>> it should be noted in this regard that Peirce knew hieroglyphics and may
>>> well have been acquainted with this myth).
>>>
>>> Jon wrote:
>>>
>>> [M]y current working hypothesis is that "Pure mind, as creative of
>>> thought" (CP 6.490) is the Person who conceives the *possible *chalk
>>> marks and then draws *some *of them on the blackboard, rather than the
>>> blackboard itself as a "theater" where chalk marks somehow spontaneously
>>> appear; instead, the blackboard represents *created *Thirdness.
>>> However, I will tentatively grant that your analysis may be closer to what
>>> Peirce himself had in mind.
>>>
>>>
>>> I would tend to disagree with you, Jon, that this ur-continutiy is "creat
>>> *ed*" 3ns; rather, I see it as "creat*ive*" 3ns as distinguished from
>>> the 3ns that become the habits and laws of a created universe. So, in a
>>> word, my view is that only these laws and habits are the 'created' 3nses.
>>>
>>> One way of considering this is via the Ancient Egyptian myths just
>>> mentioned. In these Kemetic myths there is "one incomprehensible Power,
>>> alone, unique, inherent in the Nun, the indefiniable cosmic sea, the
>>> infinite source of the Universe, outside of any notion of Space or Time."
>>> At Heliopolis this Power, the Creator, is given the name, Atum, "which
>>> means both All and Nothing [involving] the potential totality of the
>>> Universe which is as yet unformed and intangible. . . Atum must. . .
>>> distinguish himself from the Nun and thus annihilate the Nun in its
>>> original inert state." (all quotations are from Lucie Lamy's book, *Egyptian
>>> Mysteries: New light on ancient knowledge*, p 8, a popularization of
>>> her grandfather, R. A. Schwaller de Lubicz's, great scholarly work in
>>> Egyptology, still not as influential in that field as it ought to be in my
>>> opinion).
>>>
>>> I won't go further into this myth now except to note that even at this
>>> 'stage' of proto-creation that the above "first act is expressed in three
>>> major ways" such that A*tum*, as *tum* in Nun, "projects" himself as
>>> Khepri (that is, becoming, or potential). All the *neteru* ('powers'
>>> according to S. de Lubicz, but usually translated incorrectly as 'gods')
>>> will follow from that priordial 'act'.
>>>
>>> Although there might now be this disagreement as to what the
>>> ur-continuity represents, I would not disagree with you whatsoever, Jon, in
>>> your view that it was Peirce's belief that God is "Really creator of all
>>> three Universes of Experience" since opposition to this view would fly in
>>> the face of Peirce own words: "The word 'God' ... is *the *definable
>>> proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator
>>> of all three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452). How can one deny Peirce's
>>> own words here?
>>>
>>> Returning now to Sheriff's book, after a fascinating Preface (which, for
>>> one example, makes pointed reference to Stephen Hawking's essay, "A Unified
>>> Theory of the Universe Would Be the Ultimate Triumph of Human Reason"),
>>> Chapter 1, "Peirce's Cosmogonic Philosophy" opens with this quote:"[T]he
>>> problem of how genuine triadic relations first arose in the world is a
>>> better, because more definite, formulation of the problem of how life came
>>> about."(6.322)
>>>
>>> Moving on to another topic taken up in this thread, Edwina's claim that
>>> *everything* is semiosic does not seem to acknowledge the pervasive use
>>> of the categories throughout Peirce's *oevre *which does not pertain to
>>> semiotics as such, including his classification of the sciences (as you
>>> mentioned), nor the placement of the first of the cenoscopic sciences,
>>> viz., phenomenology, well ahead of logic as semeiotic in this
>>> classification, nor the content of phenomenology itself, concerned
>>> explicitly with categorial relations in themselves (and there is much, much
>>> else which Peirce emphatically associated with the categories which is not
>>> semeiotic).
>>>
>>> But considering for now just Peirce's Classification of the
>>> Sciences, Beverly Kent, who wrote the only book length monograph on the
>>> topic, *Charles S. Peirce: Logic and the Classification of the Sciences*,
>>> has a number of things to say about the categories in relation to the
>>> classification. For example, after mentioning that one of his earliest
>>> classification schemes was based on the categories, Kent comments: "Fearing
>>> that his trichotomic might be misleading him, he set it aside and developed
>>> alternative schemes, only to find himself ineluctably led back. Even so, it
>>> was some time before he conceded that the resulting divisions conformed to
>>> his categories" (Kent, 19). Phyllis Chiasson, as I recall, makes much the
>>> same point.
>>>
>>> Kent later remarks that regarding his final *Outline Classification of
>>> the Sciences* (which he stuck with, prefaced virtually all his
>>> subsequent works in logic with, and thought "sufficiently satisfactory" as
>>> late as 1911), that Peirce wrote that "most of the divisions are
>>> 'trichotomic' " (Kent, 121) in the sense of involving the three categories
>>> (much as Jon outlined them in a recent post).
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Gary R
>>>
>>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>>
>>> *Gary Richmond*
>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>>> *Communication Studies*
>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>> *C 745*
>>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>>>
>>
>>
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>
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