Gary R - thanks for your long post - I'll get to it when I've a bit more time.
[Other than to say now that I'd agree that the 'Ur-continuity is creative and
creating'..but not 'creator' - ie, I reject individual or seeming psychological
agency; the universe is self-creating..and that is a huge difference from Jon's
Genesis view].
But I'll just comment that my reading of Peirce is that everything is semiotic.
That is, matter is a semiosic process - both within the physico-chemical realm
as well as the biological - and within both its stable and evolving capacities
..and its interactional networking. The same with the mental processes of
humans - also a semiosic process. Therefore - I don't understand why you claim
that there are some areas that are NOT semiosic!
Certainly - the classification of the sciences - is a process of thought, and
thought is a semiosic action. The actual classes do not fit in exactly with the
categories - i.e., again, mathematics is not a process of Firstness - but -
Peirce DOES classify using a triadic set - but I don't see these Sets-of-Three
as actually operative in the categorical mode.
Edwina.
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Friday, October 14, 2016 4:29 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
Jon, Edwina, Gary F, Soren, List,
John Sheriff, in Charles Peirce's Guess at the Riddle: Grounds for Human
Significance, in commenting on what Peirce calls the "pure zero" state (which,
in my thinking, is roughly equivalent to the later blackboard metaphor) quotes
Peirce as follows: "So of potential being there was in that initial state no
lack" (CP 6.217) and continues, " 'Potential', in Peirce's usage, means
indeterminate yet capable of determination in any specific case" (CP 6.185-86)
[Sheriff, 4). This "potential being" is, then, decidedly not the "nothing of
negation," but rather "the germinal nothing, in which the whole universe is
involved or foreshadowed" (CP 6.217).
Sheriff had just prior to this written: "Peirce frequently drew the parallel
between his theory and the Genesis account" and discusses this in a longish
paragraph. I think it is possible to overemphasize this "parallel" (and, as
I've commented here in the past, Peirce's "pure zero"--or ur-continuity in the
blackboard metaphor--seems to me closer to the Kemetic Nun in the dominant
Ancient Egyptian creation myth; while it should be noted in this regard that
Peirce knew hieroglyphics and may well have been acquainted with this myth).
Jon wrote:
[M]y current working hypothesis is that "Pure mind, as creative of thought"
(CP 6.490) is the Person who conceives the possible chalk marks and then draws
some of them on the blackboard, rather than the blackboard itself as a
"theater" where chalk marks somehow spontaneously appear; instead, the
blackboard represents created Thirdness. However, I will tentatively grant
that your analysis may be closer to what Peirce himself had in mind.
I would tend to disagree with you, Jon, that this ur-continutiy is "created"
3ns; rather, I see it as "creative" 3ns as distinguished from the 3ns that
become the habits and laws of a created universe. So, in a word, my view is
that only these laws and habits are the 'created' 3nses.
One way of considering this is via the Ancient Egyptian myths just mentioned.
In these Kemetic myths there is "one incomprehensible Power, alone, unique,
inherent in the Nun, the indefiniable cosmic sea, the infinite source of the
Universe, outside of any notion of Space or Time." At Heliopolis this Power,
the Creator, is given the name, Atum, "which means both All and Nothing
[involving] the potential totality of the Universe which is as yet unformed and
intangible. . . Atum must. . . distinguish himself from the Nun and thus
annihilate the Nun in its original inert state." (all quotations are from Lucie
Lamy's book, Egyptian Mysteries: New light on ancient knowledge, p 8, a
popularization of her grandfather, R. A. Schwaller de Lubicz's, great scholarly
work in Egyptology, still not as influential in that field as it ought to be in
my opinion).
I won't go further into this myth now except to note that even at this
'stage' of proto-creation that the above "first act is expressed in three major
ways" such that Atum, as tum in Nun, "projects" himself as Khepri (that is,
becoming, or potential). All the neteru ('powers' according to S. de Lubicz,
but usually translated incorrectly as 'gods') will follow from that priordial
'act'.
Although there might now be this disagreement as to what the ur-continuity
represents, I would not disagree with you whatsoever, Jon, in your view that it
was Peirce's belief that God is "Really creator of all three Universes of
Experience" since opposition to this view would fly in the face of Peirce own
words: "The word 'God' ... is the definable proper name, signifying Ens
necessarium; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience"
(CP 6.452). How can one deny Peirce's own words here?
Returning now to Sheriff's book, after a fascinating Preface (which, for one
example, makes pointed reference to Stephen Hawking's essay, "A Unified Theory
of the Universe Would Be the Ultimate Triumph of Human Reason"), Chapter 1,
"Peirce's Cosmogonic Philosophy" opens with this quote:"[T]he problem of how
genuine triadic relations first arose in the world is a better, because more
definite, formulation of the problem of how life came about."(6.322)
Moving on to another topic taken up in this thread, Edwina's claim that
everything is semiosic does not seem to acknowledge the pervasive use of the
categories throughout Peirce's oevre which does not pertain to semiotics as
such, including his classification of the sciences (as you mentioned), nor the
placement of the first of the cenoscopic sciences, viz., phenomenology, well
ahead of logic as semeiotic in this classification, nor the content of
phenomenology itself, concerned explicitly with categorial relations in
themselves (and there is much, much else which Peirce emphatically associated
with the categories which is not semeiotic).
But considering for now just Peirce's Classification of the Sciences, Beverly
Kent, who wrote the only book length monograph on the topic, Charles S. Peirce:
Logic and the Classification of the Sciences, has a number of things to say
about the categories in relation to the classification. For example, after
mentioning that one of his earliest classification schemes was based on the
categories, Kent comments: "Fearing that his trichotomic might be misleading
him, he set it aside and developed alternative schemes, only to find himself
ineluctably led back. Even so, it was some time before he conceded that the
resulting divisions conformed to his categories" (Kent, 19). Phyllis Chiasson,
as I recall, makes much the same point.
Kent later remarks that regarding his final Outline Classification of the
Sciences (which he stuck with, prefaced virtually all his subsequent works in
logic with, and thought "sufficiently satisfactory" as late as 1911), that
Peirce wrote that "most of the divisions are 'trichotomic' " (Kent, 121) in the
sense of involving the three categories (much as Jon outlined them in a recent
post).
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 8:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
wrote:
Edwina, List:
ET: When you say that some of Peirce's positions are perfectly clear and
not reasonably disputable - again, this is your opinion.
Are you claiming here that none of Peirce's positions are perfectly clear
and not reasonably disputable--i.e., that all of his positions are at least
somewhat murky, and thus open for debate? Is there anything that you would
confidently assert to be Peirce's position, without qualifying it as merely
your interpretation or opinion?
ET: I happen to disagree with your view of Peirce's view on 'god- as
'creator of the three universes.
My view is that in Peirce's belief, God as Ens necessarium is Really
creator of all three Universes of Experience. Peirce wrote, in CP 6.452, "The
word 'God' ... is the definable proper name, signifying Ens necessarium; in my
belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience." What is the basis
for your disagreement with me about Peirce's view on this--i.e., what
meaningful difference do you see between my statement of it and his own?
ET: I completely disagree with you on the above.
My view is that Peirce's view is that all signs are genuine triads, and
thus must be in the universe of representations. Peirce wrote, in CP 1.480, "a
triad if genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact," which
means that it can only be "in the universe of representations." What is the
basis for your disagreement with me about Peirce's view on this--i.e., what
meaningful difference do you see between my statement of it and his own?
ET: A quality IS a qualisign! ... There is no such thing as a 'quality'
in itself.
Are you saying that all qualities are also qualisigns--i.e., tthat here is
no distinction between the two? If so, do you believe that this was Peirce's
view, as well? If so, based on what specific passages in his writings?
Thanks,
Jon
On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 5:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:
1) Jon - When you say that some of Peirce's positions are perfectly clear
and not reasonably disputable - again, this is your opinion. I happen to
disagree with your view of Peirce's view on 'god- as 'creator of the three
universes. You have your opinion - and again, I think it is incorrect for you
to declare that you 'read' Peirce 'exactly correctly'.
2) Now - when you write:
"My example was a qualisign, which as a quality (as well as an icon and
rheme) is entirely in the mode of Firstness, but as a sign--at least, according
to Peirce in CP 1.480--can only belong to the third Universe."
I completely disagree with you on the above. The whole triad - a rhematic
iconic qualisign - is entirely in the mode of Firstness and is a sign. And does
NOT belong to the third Universe. There is no such thing as a single relation
i.e.,the Representamen-Object, existing on its own. The triad of all three
relations is irreducible. O-R; R-R; R-I. None of these exist on their own but
within the triad. A Qualisign is a quality, a feeling - and is not in the
'third Universe'.
A quality IS a qualisign! There is no such thing as something operating
outside of the triad. There is no such thing as a 'quality' in itself.
The definition of a sign is its triadic set of Relations: That between
the Representamen and the Object; that of the Representamen in itself; that
between the Representamen and the Interpretant. The Representamen acts as
mediation - and can be in a mode of Firstness. An Interpretant is not an
Object but is an 'output' interpretation linked by the Representamen to the
stimuli of the Object.
And again - of the ten classes of SIGNS, four of them do NOT have their
Representamen operating in a mode of Thirdness. That includes the genuine sign
of a rhematic iconic qualisign; and the Dicent Indexical Sinsign...
And yet - these are legitimate SIGNS. They have no Thirdness in them at
all.
See 2.227 and on.
Again, the triad is basic to semiosis; it does not necessarily require
Thirdness in its component [again, see the ten classes 2.227..] and ..there is
no such thing as a 'quality' or indeed anything, functioning outside of the
semiosic triad.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2016 5:42 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
Edwina, List:
ET: We each read him a different way and I don't think that you have
the right to self-define yourself as someone who is 'one-with-Peirce'.
Those are your words, not mine; I have never claimed to be "one with
Peirce." What I have claimed is that some of Peirce's positions are perfectly
clear and not reasonably disputable, whether I happen to agree with him or not.
That he believed in the Reality of God as Ens necessarium, Creator of all
three Universes of Experience, is one of those--and I do happen to agree with
him about that. At the same time, this is not to say that his entire "view of
Mind and creation" was identical to my own; I am quite certain that it was not.
ET: I think that many others have to read Peirce - and - your and my
comments - and make up their minds as to how 'accurately' we interpret him.
On this, we are in complete agreement.
ET: I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see that eg the
mathematical reasoning is in a categorical mode of Firstness. It IS pure
ideational - which would be, in the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic
legisign argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS.
Again, this conflates the mode of a sign with the Universe of
Experience to which it belongs, although I am not even sure that all
mathematical reasoning should be assigned to the Universe of Ideas. My example
was a qualisign, which as a quality (as well as an icon and rheme) is entirely
in the mode of Firstness, but as a sign--at least, according to Peirce in CP
1.480--can only belong to the third Universe.
ET: I don't see that a qualisign - one entirely in a mode of
Firstness - has any 'active power to establish connections between different
objects' and therefore, I simply don't see how you can declare that it belongs
to 'Thirdness'.
If something does not have "active power to establish connections
between different objects," then it is not a sign at all--in this case, it is
merely a quality, rather than a qualisign. The very definition of what it
means to be a sign is that it is able to connect different
objects--specifically, an object with an interpretant.
ET: With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers to THREE
kinds of 'genuine triads'.
Yes, he does; but he also goes on to say that "a triad if genuine
cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact," which means that all
three kinds of genuine triads can only be "in the universe of representations."
Again, this is not about the mode of the sign, which can be in any of the
three categories, but about the Universe of Experience where it belongs.
Peirce then adds, "Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine triad.
For it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or inward,
mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. Now this is neither a
matter of fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since
thought is living." Here we see that all representation--i.e., all
sign-action, all semeiosis--necessarily involves a genuine triad, which can
only be in the third Universe precisely because it mediates between an object
and interpretant. We also see that "thought is general" and "thought is
living," which is another way of saying that thought is Thirdness--which makes
sense, since all thought is in signs.
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 3:55 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
wrote:
Jon- I don't think you can move into saying 'If I [Jon] am wrong
inthis, then Peirce was wrong]. We remain, all of us, readers of Peirce - and
thus - interpreters. We each read him a different way and I don't think that
you have the right to self-define yourself as someone who is 'one-with-Peirce'.
I think that many others have to read Peirce - and - your and my comments - and
make up their minds as to how 'accurately' we interpret him.
For example - I consider that EVERYTHING is semiosic - whereas, I'm
not sure what meaning you assign to the word. For me - all actions within the
physico-chemical, biological and socioconceptual world are semiosic - and don't
need human agency to be such. Again, 'matter is effete mind'.
I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see that eg the
mathematical reasoning is in a categorical mode of Firstness. It IS pure
ideational - which would be, in the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic
legisign argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS.
So, i don't equate the three universes to match the three
categories. The quotation you provide "I said that a thoroughly genuine triad
in a mode of Firstness (i.e., a qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of
Experience, as something "whose being consists in active power to establish
connections between different objects" (CP 6.455). .....I consider that this
quote refers to Thirdness. And therefore - I don't see that a qualisign - one
entirely in a mode of Firstness - has any 'active power to establish
connections between different objects' and therefore, I simply don't see how
you can declare that it belongs to 'Thirdness'.
With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers to THREE kinds of
'genuine triads'. I read a genuine triad as operational in A quality and in A
fact. So- 1-1-1, a qualisign, is a triad in a total mode of Firstness; it is a
'feeling of redness' but it is NOT the same as a thoroughly genuine triad'
which involves generality or Thirdness. A 2-2-2 or Dicent Sinsign is a triad in
a total mode of Secondness, eg, a weathervane - but it is not the same as a
thoroughly genuine triad which involves generality or Thirdness. So, again, a
triad in a mode of Firstness does not, in my readings of Peirce, belong in 'the
Third universe'; there is no generality. Firstness has no capacity to 'make
connections', to mediate, to connect. That is the nature of Firstness - its
isolate vividness.
So- we disagree in our readings.
As for your interpretation of God and Peirce - I maintain that it
remains your interpretation and that Peirce's view of Mind and creation - is
quite different from yours.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2016 4:13 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
Edwina, List:
I try to be careful about only attributing to Peirce, rather than
myself, those things that strike me as incontrovertibly clear in his
writings--things that the vast majority of Peirce scholars recognize to be HIS
views, as expressed in those writings. I do not subscribe to the approach that
all interpretations are equally valid; while there can certainly be legitimate
differences, there are also objectively incorrect readings, assuming (as Gary
F. once put it) that Peirce said what he meant and meant what he said. Of
course, I am (very) fallible, so I may (and probably do) overreach in some
cases. I even conceded in my last post, "We might quibble about these
particular assignments of the labels, which are just off the top of my head."
The overall point remains--Peirce did not limit the categories to semeiosis, as
you apparently do. If you are right to do so, then not only am I wrong about
this, but Peirce was also wrong about it.
There seems to be a particular terminological difficulty with the
word "mode." I did not say "that a pure or genuine triad in a mode of
Firstness [O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a mode of
representation," I said that a thoroughly genuine triad in a mode of Firstness
(i.e., a qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of Experience, as something
"whose being consists in active power to establish connections between
different objects" (CP 6.455). In some contexts, the categories do correspond
to modes, such as possible/actual/habitual; but not always. In any case, what
I said is perfectly consistent with what Peirce wrote in CP 1.480 (not CP
1.515, as I indicated in my response to Jeff)--"a triad if genuine cannot be in
the world of quality nor in that of fact ... But a thoroughly genuine triad is
separated entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of
representations." So I am not the only one claiming that "it belongs primarily
to the third Universe"--Peirce did, as well. If I am wrong about this, then
Peirce was also wrong about it.
Finally, there is nothing to debate with respect to whether Peirce
believed in the Reality of God as Ens necessarium and Creator of all three
Universes of Experience--he says so plainly in CP 6.452. If I am wrong about
this, then Peirce was also wrong about it.
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky
<[email protected]> wrote:
Jon, you wrote:
"For Peirce, the categories do not only function within the
O-R-I triad--for one thing, they are everywhere in his architectonic
arrangement of the sciences!"
PLEASE - do not write as if you alone are the sole interpreter of
Peirce. Therefore, please write something like: ' In my [Jon Alan Schmidt]
interpretation, the categories of Peirce do not only function within the O-R-I
triad...etc etc.
Do you see the difference? I am always careful to make it clear
that what I write is MY interpretation of Peirce. I do not write as if I had
the direct or correct view of Peirce.
Now - to your points -
1) With regard to genuine - I don't see that a pure or genuine
triad in a mode of Firstness [O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a
mode of representation - and representation suggests Thirdness or the use of
some symbolic mediation. I simply don't see how you can claim that "it belongs
primarily to the Third Universe' [by which I am assuming that you mean to
Thirdness]??
Jeff has provided a quote: "For while a triad if genuine cannot
be in the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere law, or
regularity, of quality or of fact." 1.515***ET - I cannot find this quote at
1.515.
However ,Peirce does write that 'Secondness is an essential part
of Thirdness...and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and
Thirdness' 1.530 - which is why I consider that the three categories are a
complex embedded function.
2) Therefore I disagree with your aligning various sciences with
the categories. I don't think that his differentiation of the various sciences
etc has any real relationship to the categories. The categories, as I read
Peirce, refer to the phaneron- "the collective total of all that is in any way
or in any sense present to the mind quite regardless of whether it corresponds
to any real thing or not" 1.284
Jon, you wrote: "For sciences of discovery, mathematics as
Firstness, philosophy as Secondness, and special sciences as Thirdness; "
I don't see this. Peirce certainly classified the various fields
of studies - but not within the categories. Mathematics, which refers to
'feelings and quality'? Philosophy referring to actual facts?
But he certainly classified fields of study into 'threes'. - and
one can see that some of the descriptions of the modal categories can be
loosely applied - i.e., abduction does indeed have an element of 'feeling,
quality, freedom'; and induction does have an element of actual fact; and
deduction does have an element of necessity. But I think this is a loose
description for all three are, after all, aspects of reasoning [Thirdness].
3) I don't see that Peirce accepted a pre-existent creator.
"Out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would
have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash.
Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash. Thought
time would not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense after the
first, because resulting from it" 1.412.
Now - this self-organized complexity didn't need a prior 'ens
necessarium'. I am aware, Jon, of your view of genesis and god, since you have
provided your supportive quotations from the Bible - which sees god as an
agential creator - but - I don't see that this Agential Force is accepted by
Peirce. Peirce sees 'Mind' as the agential force - an ongoing, evolving, open
force - and a part of matter - i.e., not separate from matter- and therefore
not prior to time or matter. [see his discussion in the Reality of God - 6.489
....
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Jeffrey Brian Downard ; Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2016 2:20 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
Edwina, List:
ET: Your post outlines the three 'pure' triads where the
Relations between the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are all of one mode;
all in the mode of Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness.
I do not believe that Jeff's post was referring to the O-R-I
relations specifically, but rather to triadic relations in general, since that
is what Peirce discussed in the quoted paper. In other words, O-R-I is not the
only kind of triad, even though it is probably the paradigmatic example of a
triad.
In any case, Peirce stated quite clearly that all genuine
triads belong to the world of representation, and not to the world of quality
or the world of fact. These are undoubtedly what he later called the three
Universes of Experience--quality corresponds to Ideas, fact to Brute Actuality,
and representation to Signs. However, this is not to say that all signs are in
the mode of Thirdness; i.e., Necessitants. Even a qualisign, which must be
iconic and rhematic in its relations to its object and interpretant, and thus
is classified entirely in the mode of Firstness, belongs primarily to the third
Universe--its "being consists in active power to establish connections between
different objects." However, specifically as a qualisign--a quality that is a
sign--it also, in some sense, belongs to the first Universe. Likewise, a
sinsign belongs to both the third Universe as a sign and the second Universe as
an existent. I am still thinking through how all of this works, including how
the R-O and R-I relations fit into the picture, so I would welcome input from
others on it.
ET: As such the categories only function within the triad -
the O-R-I triad.
Perhaps this is our fundamental disagreement, at least when it
comes to this subject. For Peirce, the categories do not only function within
the O-R-I triad--for one thing, they are everywhere in his architectonic
arrangement of the sciences! For sciences of discovery, mathematics as
Firstness, philosophy as Secondness, and special sciences as Thirdness; for
philosophy, phenomenology (phaneroscopy) as Firstness, normative sciences as
Secondness, and metaphysics as Thirdness; for normative sciences, esthetics as
Firstness, ethics as Secondness, logic (semeiotic) as Thirdness. Within
mathematics, the categories manifest as monads, dyads, and triads; within
phaneroscopy, as quality, reaction, and representation; within metaphysics, as
possibility, actuality, and necessity (habituality); within logic, as
speculative grammar, critic, and methodeutic. We might quibble about these
particular assignments of the labels, which are just off the top of my head,
but the point is that restricting the categories to semeiosis is decidedly
contrary to Peirce's own approach.
ET: I don't see either that the 'pure or genuine Thirdness'
- the Symbolic Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens necessarium' because I
consider that our universe requires both Firstness and Secondness and I
therefore reject such a pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three modes or
universes'.
No one is suggesting that "pure or genuine Thirdness" is
identical to an Argument; this thread concerns metaphysics in general, and
cosmology in particular, rather than semeiotic. Even if "our universe [now]
requires both Firstness and Secondness," this does not entail that they were
also required "before" our actual universe came into being. While you "reject
such a pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three modes or universes," Peirce
quite explicitly believed in just such a Creator, and I honestly do not see how
any legitimate reading of "A Neglected Argument" can deny this.
CSP: The word "God," so "capitalized" (as we Americans say),
is the definable proper name, signifying Ens necessarium; in my belief Really
creator of all three Universes of Experience. (CP 6.452)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 12:02 PM, Edwina Taborsky
<[email protected]> wrote:
Jeffrey, list: Your post outlines the three 'pure' triads
where the Relations between the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are all of
one mode; all in the mode of Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness. These are
only three of the ten - and the function of the non-genuine or degenerate modes
is, in my view, to provide the capacity for evolution, adaptation and change.
That is, Firstness linked to Secondness and Thirdness, as in the vital, vital
triad of the Rhematic Indexical Legisign - introduces novelty to actuality to
habit. That's quite something.
My point is that the modal categories have no 'per se'
reality [Jon considers that both Firstness and Thirdness have such a reality]
but are modes of organization and experience of matter/concepts within ongoing
events, i.e, 'matter is effete Mind'. As such the categories only function
within the triad - the O-R-I triad.
I don't see either that the 'pure or genuine Thirdness' - the
Symbolic Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens necessarium' because I
consider that our universe requires both Firstness and Secondness and I
therefore reject such a pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three modes or
universes'. That is - I'm aware that Jon bases his reading of Peirce also
within his belief in Genesis and God - but I can't see this same view within
the writings of Peirce.
Edwina
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